This article attempts an analysis of how colonial officials perceive reality, make policy decisions and what motivates them to change those policies. The tremendous shock suffered by Japanese political leaders in the wake of the Korean independence movement that spread throughout the country from the nationalist demonstration that was staged in Seoul on 1 March 1919 brought about a fundamental reassessment of colonial policy and a heated debate concerning what was to be done. In the proposals that were offered by various policymakers we find varying degrees of warmth with respect to their perceptions about Korea as well as how to rule that country. Following the demonstrations, Japanese Prime Minister Hara Takashi, a territorial expansionist, called for a top-down approach involving a complete replacement of the top officials serving in the Governor-General's Office. In contrast, the staff of the Governor-General's police-state organization, who had been encouraged to be strongly independent-minded, opposed any unilateral moves, arguing that the situation in Korea was unique, and called for a new governance policy that reflected the actual state of the colony. It was these two approaches that would form the battle lines over which the rapid-fire reforms that were made in colonial institutions and their legal framework would be fought. Furthermore, the staff of the Governor-General's Office had after World War I toured Europe, North America and their colonies, enabling them to see first how the world was being decolonized, and this experience greatly influenced their new vision of how Korea should be governed. The sudden appointment of former Hyogo Prefectural Governor Ariyoshi Chuichi as the inspector general of political affairs in the Governor-General's Office created a new aspect to its operations. For example, the appointment of an inspector general who did not have any political connections in the Imperial Diet posed serious problems in terms of obtaining budget allocations and policy cooperation there, especially when the prosperity brought about by the War, which had made possible the aggressive cultural assimilation agenda pushed forward by Hara and Interior Minister Mizuno Rentaro, took a turn for the worst with the post-War depression that began in 1920. Consequently, as the aggressive Japanization policy promoted by the Prime Minister began to lose steam, head of the Governor-General's Home Bureau Otsuka Jozaburo attempted to jumpstart the agenda by proposing a reorganization of the colonial order through the establishment of a "Korean Parliament", which would be given autonomy over such domestic affairs as education and industry.

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Korean film historians traditionally regard 1923 as the foundation year for the country's production of fictional motion pictures. In contrast, this paper argues that the movie Ai no kiwami-made earlier in 1922 by the Motion Picture Unit of the Japanese colonial government newspaper Keijo nippo-ought to be regarded as the starting point for movie production in Korea. While earlier research has tended to separate Korean film history from that of the Japanese empire, this paper claims that films made in colonial Korea should be studied as part of the history of the Japanese empire. It argues that studies of national cinema need to reflect the historical circumstances when a particular film was made.

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  This paper analyzes the Japanese police's “Zendo-shugi” policy to the Korean residents in the late Taisho period. It aimed to ease the discontent of the Korean residents except “Hutei(dangerous)” Koreans. It was influenced mainly by the new policy of the Government-General of Korea after the March First movement and also partly by the new policy of the Japanese police after the Rice Riot and the former colonial bureaucrats and their policy. In rivalry with the judiciaries, the police tried to understand the anti-Japanese sentiment of the Koreans and satisfy them. But it tended to provoke the Koreans' antipathy toward its interference and had a problem that “Zendo” raised the Korean nationalism. And it was difficult for the police to realize the policy because lower-ranking policemen couldn't understand the “Zendo-shugi”. And further, as some Korean immigrant workers the police hadn't seen dangerous sometimes resorted to violence, the police had trouble in distinguishing dangerous Koreans from good Koreans

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本稿では、1920年代の教育雑誌記事の分析を通し、学校教育に対する職業指導導入の論理について考察する。まず、日本における学校教育と職業への移行との結びつきを歴史的に解明する必要性、および職業指導の導入という事象に注目する意義について論じる。次に、社会政策の面から浮上した職業指導の現実的必要性について指摘し、その背景となる1920年代の労働情勢について考察する。続いて、教育雑誌記事における社会政策関係者の職業指導言説を分析する。それらの言説が、職業指導導入に消極的な文部省に対する「宣伝」を目的とするものであったこと、またそこで示されたのが「労作教育」の思想を取り入れ拡張された職業指導概念であったことを明らかにする。さらに、訓令第20号と関連資料の分析から、文部省にとっての職業指導が進学も含めた卒業後の進路問題への対応として位置づけられたことの意味と背景について明らかにする。

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平治の乱については、同時代史料が皆無に近いことが原因してその実態が不明であり、これまで種々の推測がなされてきた。小稿は、初発の事件である三条焼き討ちを、後白河の意を受けた信頼が信西を除こうとした事件であるとする河内祥輔氏説を支持し、その補強を行った上で、自分なりに平治の乱を捉え直し、その認識の上に立って『平治物語』における信頼、光頼、清盛に関わる虚構を解明しようとするものである。

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The aim of the present article is to clarify the policy response of the Seiyukai Party to the effects of the Great Depression on Japan, a phenomenon know as the "Showa Depression", through an investigation of the Party's economic platform during the leadership of Inukai Tsuyoshi centered around Policy Affairs Re- search Council Chairman Yamamoto Jotaro's ideas prioritizing economic measures with such slogans as "national livelihood, the dominant issue in the political process" and "economization of politics". This economic platform, which the Seiyukai advertised as "proactive", was criticized by its political rival throughout the prewar era, the Minseito Party, as a conglomerate of "laissez faire do-nothing" measures. The author argues that in response to such criticism, both the content and meaning of "proactive policy" would change significantly within the Seiyukai during the Inukai era. The Five-Year Industrial Plan proposed by Council Chairman Yamamoto called for overcoming the Depression through government stimulus measures aimed as fiscal expenditure and customs and tariffs, thus setting a clear standard for what the Seiyukai considered "proactive" in response to criticism of "proactive inaction." For the Seiyukai, overcoming the economic downturn and stabilizing the livelihood of the nation meant expanding ideas about the role of government as outlined in ten general policies centered around its highly touted Five-Year Plan. In other words, the Plan was an attempt by the Seiyukai to improve its "proactive policy" for the purpose of 1) rebutting criticism raised by its rival concerning the two issues of economic recovery and livelihood stabilization and 2) raising its national popularity. On another front, although there was a Seiyukai faction that was committed to state monopolization of rice sales as a means of agrarian relief, the stimulus-based Five-Year Plan remained as the Party's policy base up until the Naval officer mutiny and assassination of Inukai on May 15, 1932. It was only after the incident, in the midst of public outcry for agrarian relief measures, that the Seiyukai attempted to incorporate such measures into the policy decision-making process by claiming that they, too, would contribute to economic recovery. In this sense, the May 15th Incident would determine the political process in one more aspect by putting an end to policy-making based on the longterm visions created within political parties in favor of more attention being paid to trends in public opinion.

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