詳細検索結果
以下の条件での結果を表示する: 検索条件を変更
クエリ検索: "安里積千代"
9件中 1-9の結果を表示しています
  • 一九四〇年代後半の沖縄を事例に
    一色 哲
    日本の神学
    2010年 49 巻 32-52
    発行日: 2010/09/17
    公開日: 2012/01/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    Okinawa was occupied by the U. S. Armed Forces after World War II. It served as the starting point of that control system from 1945 until 50. In that age, Christianity became the core of the mental reconstruction of the community. The Christianity of Okinawa then expanded this power by enriching political relations with the occupation forces. This paper demonstratively clarifies these facts by analyzing the memorandums of the concerned persons in those days and the first historical materials. During that period, the Christians in Okinawa established the “Christ League of Okinawa” and propagated Christianity in a systematic manner. They received the indirect support of the U. S. Armed Forces. A part of the Christian leaders made maximum use of this support and tried to favorably proceed with the postwar reconstruction. They partly acknowledged military occupation. On the other hand, another leader maintained a bridge between the Occupation Forces and the Okinawan government. They devoted themselves to the mission's activities. Such two tides existed in the Christianity of Okinawa later on as well.
  • 江上 能義
    年報政治学
    1996年 47 巻 173-188
    発行日: 1996/12/10
    公開日: 2009/12/21
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 一九五六年のプライス勧告をめぐって
    平良 好利
    国際政治
    2012年 2010 巻 160 号 160_122-136
    発行日: 2012/03/25
    公開日: 2012/06/15
    ジャーナル フリー
    By Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty signed in September 1951, the U.S. could continue to rule over Okinawa and have the exclusive right to maintain military bases there. After the ratification of the treaty in April 1952, people of Okinawa voiced opposition in regard to the use of land by the U.S. military. In June 1956, the U.S. authorities in Okinawa released a Report of the Price Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee (hereinafter called the Price Report) that supported the land policy proposed by the U.S. military. The Price Report recommended lump sum payments for fee title and accepted to the planned acquisition of additional land. However, the release of the report inflamed the opposition movement of the people of Okinawa.
    The purpose of this paper is to analyze the political process over the Price Report in 1956 by focusing on the attitudes of the Japanese Foreign Office and the U.S. Department of State.
    After the release of the Price Report, Okinawans requested that the Japanese Foreign Office negotiate with the U.S. government to solve the land dispute. During June and July of 1956, Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu requested the U.S. Ambassador John Allison to abandon lump sum payments and to reduce the acquisition of additional land.
    Following the recommendation of the U.S. Embassy in Japan, the U.S. State Department carefully reexamined the Price Report in regard to the possibility of abandoning lump sum payments in order to improve U.S.-Japan relations. However, shortly before the State Department was due to hold a conference with the Department of Defense (which supported the Price Report), the issue of abandoning lump sum payments was dropped, because the U.S. Consul General in Okinawa strongly recommended that the State Department not retreat from the Price Report. However, the State Department did ask the Pentagon to make some modifications, such as abandoning the acquisition of the fee title, in view of possible damage to U.S.-Japan relations.
    After this political process revealed the importance of taking into consideration the involvement of the Japanese Foreign Office and the U.S. State Department, it was clear that the U.S. military was not capable of ruling Okinawa on its own. Thereafter, U.S. military control over Okinawa was always considered in the context of Japan-U.S. relations. Therefore, the political process over the Price Report in 1956 marked the start of Japanese Foreign Office and U.S. State Department involvement in U.S. military control of Okinawa. Concomitantly, it also was the starting point of recognizing that the role of the U.S. military in Okinawa was an issue affecting Japan-U.S. relations.
  • ─USCARによる市町村自治への介入を中心に─
    村岡 敬明
    法政論叢
    2020年 56 巻 2 号 1-
    発行日: 2020年
    公開日: 2021/01/20
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 山田 貴史
    スポーツ史研究
    2005年 18 巻 1-15
    発行日: 2005/03/20
    公開日: 2017/03/18
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this study is to explain the progress of the Keirin importation plan in the Ryukyu Islands of a period of U.S. occupation. The subjects of this study are three points of the following. (1) Progress from the Keirin importation plan in the Ryukyu Islands of a period of U.S. occupation a plan to the abolition is researched. (2) Research into the reason why the Keirin importation plan was promoted. (3) Research into the reason why the Keirin importation plan couldn't be enforced The following three matters could be pointed out as a result of the study. (1) Progress from the decision of Keirin importation plan to the abolition reflected the diplomatic relations of Japan and the United States and the international situation such as the beginning of the political change of the East Asian region and the cold war. (2) As for the Keirin importation plan, a Japanese side was cooperating in Naha City and Ryukyu side. The purpose of Naha City was to make up for shortage of finance. A purpose on the Japanese side was to exercise a political influence and an economical influence in the Ryukyu Islands. (3) The development of Keirin importation plan stimulated USCAR (United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands). One of the causes that USCAR dismissed the decision of Naha municipal assembly which ignored public opinion is an inhabitant's Keirin counter movement
  • 日米交渉と日本側立法過程から
    市川 周佑
    史学雑誌
    2023年 132 巻 1 号 42-67
    発行日: 2023年
    公開日: 2024/01/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    本稿は、日米両政府の交渉過程と日本側の立法過程から、沖縄の国政参加の実現過程を明らかにするものである。
     アメリカの施政権下にあった沖縄の住民は、自らの代表を日本の国会に送ることができず、国政参加が沖縄住民の強い要望となっていた。
    アメリカ政府は、沖縄の問題が国会に持ち込まれ、日米間に新たな政治的問題が生じることを恐れ、沖縄の国政参加に反対していた。しかし、このようなアメリカの考えは、琉球政府主席公選を受け変化する。アメリカ政府は、沖縄自民党から立候補する西銘順治を支援するため、表決権を与えないという限定を設けた国政参加を容認した。日本側は、国内で国政参加問題が盛り上がったことや、西銘支援のため、アメリカ側の提示した国政参加案に同意した。これにより、日米両政府は、1968年10月9日に開催された日米協議委員会で国政参加の合意を発表した。
     しかし、国政参加の実現は遅れた。日本国内の野党は沖縄代表に完全な権限を付与することを主張し、日米の合意を批判した。これに対し、内閣法制局は、アメリカの施政権下にある沖縄から選出された代表を、憲法の定める国会議員として扱うことは困難との認識を示した。自民党は野党と共同で法案提出を目指したが、与野党の懸隔は埋まらず、1969年中の国政参加実現は断念された。
     このような状況は、1969年11月に1972年の沖縄の施政権返還が合意されたことで変化する。内閣法制局は、返還合意によって沖縄の地位に変化が生じ、国会が認めれば表決権付与も可能との考えを示した。アメリカ政府も内閣法制局の態度が変化し、日本国内で表決権付与が大勢となったことを受け、表決権付与を黙認した。自民党内には、表決権付与に異論が存在したが、政府・与党首脳部は異論を押し切って、沖縄の国政参加法案を推し進めた。これによって沖縄の国政参加が実現したのである。
  • 小松 寛
    国際政治
    2012年 2012 巻 168 号 168_58-73
    発行日: 2012/02/29
    公開日: 2014/03/31
    ジャーナル フリー
    Previous studies of Okinawa's restoration to Japan have explored Japan-U.S. relations while paying little attention to relations between Japan and Okinawa. However, this approach assumes that Okinawa was simply an object in the negotiating process for its reversion to Japan, and not a subjective actor. Accordingly, this paper is concerned with negotiations between Japan and Okinawa in order to clarify the part played by the latter. I shall focus on visits to Tokyo made by Chobyo Yara, Executive Chief of the Ryukyu Government, to meet with Japanese Government officials including Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi. In particular, this paper deals with “homeland level status”, a term used in their discussions to define the conditions for Okinawa's reversion.
    Japanese officials made frequent mention of their expectation that U.S. military bases would be reduced and consolidated after Okinawa's reversion, just as they had seen the removal of military bases after Japan's independence in 1952. This reveals an evident analogy between the restoration of Japanese sovereignty and the restoration of Okinawan administrative rights. However, the reality that several U.S. military bases were moved from Japan to Okinawa, which came under U.S. direct control, was ignored: a fact which reveals a significant flaw in the Japanese Government's logic.
    Throughout their negotiations, the Ryukyu Government made persistent claims for “immediate, unconditional and total” reversion, to which the Japanese Government repeatedly answered that reversion would bring Okinawa to “homeland level status”. These negotiations offered no room for manoeuvre to the Ryukyu Government, who was powerless in decisions regarding the restoration of administrative rights to Okinawa. Yara therefore sought to justify Okinawan peoples' demand for “immediate, unconditional and total” reversion using three key arguments: that politically, as Executive Chief, Yara represented the consensus of Okinawan opinion; that nationally, Okinawa should be reunited with Japan; and, that Okinawa's aspiration for peace would be secured by the “democratic and peaceful” Japanese Constitution.
    On the Okinawan side, the reversion movement is said to have developed from resistance to military occupation and its aim was the complete removal of military bases. However, Okinawa had already been positioned as a keystone of the U.S. military within the U.S.-Japan security treaty structure even before its reversion. In this sense, it is logically doubtful that Okinawa's reversion to Japan could have led to the clearance of military bases. Hence, such expectations held by Yara and pro-reversion supporters may be considered contradictory.
    To understand the “Okinawan Problem” as it exists today, it is necessary to consider the history of both Japan-U.S. and Japan-Okinawa relations. To that end, it is critical to problematise Japan and Okinawa's historical relationship.
  • 国民政府の対在台沖縄人・朝鮮人政策を中心に
    楊 子震
    国際政治
    2010年 2010 巻 162 号 162_40-55
    発行日: 2010/12/10
    公開日: 2012/10/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper focuses on Ryukyuans and Koreans living in Taiwan after the end of the Second World War, and by drawing a comparison of disparity in treatment between these two ethnic groups, examines the Chinese Nationalist government's seizure of Taiwan.
    The theme of this paper is “vicarious decolonization.” As a consequence, neither the ruling power (suzerain: Japan), nor the ruled (colony: Taiwan) were involved in the actual process of decolonization. For this reason the decolonization of Taiwan can be deemed to have been carried out vicariously.
    In this paper, I begin by discussing the Chinese Nationalist government's post-war relations with the Ryukyu Islands and the Korean Peninsula. Then, against the background of the collapse of the Japanese colonial empire and the Chinese Nationalist government's seizure of power, I compare the repatriation and conscription of the Ryukyuans and Koreans living in Taiwan by the Chinese Nationalist government by focusing the discussion on the drawing of boundaries among ethnic groups in Taiwan. Finally, I discuss the role played by the Chinese Nationalist government in Taiwan's post-war decolonization.
    Although the repatriation of the Ryukyuans and Koreans occurred slightly apart, there was little actual difference in the processes of repatriation. Soldiers and army personnel were repatriated at an early stage, followed by the repatriation of ordinary residents. The Chinese Nationalist government actively pursued the conscription of experts and engineers deemed useful for governing Taiwan.
    However, the conscripted experts and engineers were all outsiders, and the concept of conscription was nothing more than a temporary measure by the Chinese Nationalist government to secure its rule of Taiwan. The system of conscription conducted by the Chinese Nationalist government was a miniature copy of the pre-existing structure formerly adopted by Japan. Although there were some Ryukyuans amongst the experts and engineers working in the administration and research organizations, most positions were occupied by those born on the Japanese mainland. The fact that no Koreans can be found on the list of conscripts implies that Koreans were not included as part of the administrative side within the governing structure of the former colony of Taiwan.
    The Chinese Nationalist government's policy of repatriation and conscription of “Japanese people” reestablished borders among ethnic groups in Taiwan, and resulted in the vicarious decolonization and withdrawal of Taiwan from the Japanese colonial empire, while at the same time, through a continuation of existing occupation policies, was oriented toward maintaining the status quo.
  • 松田 ヒロ子
    文化人類学
    2016年 80 巻 4 号 549-568
    発行日: 2016年
    公開日: 2017/02/28
    ジャーナル フリー
    1945年8月に日本が無条件降伏した際、台湾には約3万人の沖縄系日本人移民(沖縄県出身かあるいは出身者の子孫)がいたといわれている。そのなかには、1895年に日本が植民地化して以来、就職や進学等のために台湾に移住してきた人びととその家族や親族、戦時中に疎開目的で台湾にきた人びとや、日本軍人・軍属として台湾で戦争を迎えた沖縄県出身者が含まれる。本稿はこれらの人びとの戦後引揚げを「帰還移民」として捉え、その帰還経験の実態を明らかにする。沖縄系移民は日本植民地期には日本人コミュニティに同化して生活し、エスニックな共同体は大きな意味を持っていなかった。にもかかわらず、米軍統治下沖縄に引揚げの見通しが立たないまま、台湾で難民状態におかれた沖縄系移民らは、はじめて職業や地域を超えて全島的な互助団体「沖縄同郷会連合会」を結成した。中華民国政府からは「日僑」とよばれた日本人移民らは、原則 として日本本土に引揚げなくてはならなかったが、米軍統治下沖縄への帰還を希望した人びとは、 沖縄同郷会連合会によって「琉僑」と認定されることによって引揚げまで台湾に滞在することが特別に許可された。すなわち、帝国が崩壊し引揚げ先を選択することが迫られたときに、それまで日本人移民コミュニティに同化して生活していた人びとにとって「沖縄(琉球)」というアイデンティティが極めて重要な意味を持ったのである。しかしながら、「琉僑」として引揚げた人びとが須らく米軍統治下沖縄社会を「故郷」と認識し、また既存の住民に同郷人として受け入れられたわけではなかった。とりわけ台湾で幼少期を過ごして成長した引揚者たちは、異なる環境に適応するのに苦労を感じることが多かった。また、たとえ自分自身は沖縄社会に愛着と帰属意識を持っていたとしても、台湾引揚者は「悲惨な戦争体験をしていない人」と見なされ、「戦後」沖縄社会の「他者」として定着していったのである。
feedback
Top