本稿の目的は 「新体制試案要綱」 の策定に関わる民間シンク・タンク国策研究会と陸軍省軍務局幕僚の関係を再評価すると共に, 軍務局幕僚の新体制構想の実像を明らかにすることにある。従来, 国策研究会は陸軍のブレーン・トラストと考えられており, 同会が策定した 「新体制試案要綱」 は, 未発見の陸軍の新体制構想を代替するものと明確な根拠を欠いたまま推測されてきた。しかし 「新体制試案要綱」 の策定過程を確認すると, 同要綱が多様性に富んだメンバーによって立案され, 審議の過程や結論が広く公開されたこと, その内容も議会や旧政党を尊重するものであったことが分かる。この事実は同要綱と軍務局幕僚の関係を一見否定するものである。にもかかわらず, 既存研究はこの矛盾について全く説明しえていない。本稿は, 当該期に軍務局幕僚が陥っていた政治的苦境を指摘し, 軍務局幕僚にとっては国策研究会の 「中立性」 や 「公開性」 にこそ同会の利用価値の本質があったことを指摘する。そしてこの考察の過程で, 当該期の軍務局幕僚の新体制構想が, 議会政治や政党政治に肯定的評価を与えるものであったことを明らかにする。

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At the beginning of 1945 American forces landed in the Philippines and Manila fell. As the war situation grew still more desperate, Konoe Fumimaro attended the court on February 14 for the first time in over three years and presented a long memorial to the Throne. In this memorial Konoe adomitted that defeat was inevitable but reasoned that defeat itself did not necessarily mean the end of the national polity, as the real threat was a communist revolution which could occur as a result of defeat. Therefore Konoe concluded that Japan should seek to terminate the war as immediately as possible.
Until now studies about this memorial have focused mainly on his fear against the danger of a communist revolution. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to reexamine his aim in this memorial.
Not only Konoe but also the Jushin, Hiranuma, Kido, and Wakatsuki, had strongly expressed the same view. It is natural that the ruling class has such feeling, and Konoe, who was a prince, has been frightened by the fear of a communist revolution from his youth.
Konoe also stressed that the Manchurian Incident and Sino-Japanese War and their expansion into the Pacific War were skillfully plotted by one group within the army which have long time aimed at a communist revolution. But Konoe was strongly influenced by Ueda Shunkichi, Yosida Shigeru, and other some adherents of Kodoha, who had helped draft this memorial to begin to hold this conspiracy. Moreover this idea has been developed and intensified by his strong anger toward the army, which regarded his detachment as negativism and watched him with deep suspicion, the Sorge Incident, and his political motive to attempt a Kodoha revival.
More noteworthy is Konoe's grasp of the international scene. On the one hand he pointed out that the Soviet Union was pushing revolution not only in Europe but also in East Asia. On the other hand he observed that America and Britain had not yet decided over forcing Japan to abolish the national polity. Through obtaining much accurate information from the Department of Foreign Affairs and other channels, he was somewhat optimistic about American opinion. Amongst his contacts, Ogata Shoji, chief of the second section of the Investigation Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs, played a most important role by talking and submitting the memorandum to Konoe about the international situation.
In particular Konoe was very sensitive to the trend about Japan in America and knew well that there were some influential persons like Joseph Grew and Hugh Byas, who understood the position of Konoe and Japan. He concluded that Japan must terminate the war immediately by negotiating with America in order to avoid a communist revolution and to preseve the national polity.
Four months later Konoe agreed to go to the Soviet Union as special envoy by the Emperor's entreaty. Though he personally distrusted the Soviet Union, he had one secret plan to negotiate directly with America using this chance. But his plan was not realized, as the Soviet Union did not accept the Konoe mission.

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The purpose of this study was to investigate the part of a civilian ski-club in the plan to progress the physical fitness by the Welfare Ministry. This study focused on ski-lessons and races held by the local administration（Hoken section）in Nagano prefecture 1938-1940 and investigated the part of Nozawaonsen ski-club from preparations on way to opening the ski-lessons（and races）and that day. The materials are the political papers that the local administration has kept to reserve since in those days.
The result is as follow as;
1． Nozawaonsen ski-club played the very important parts in the preparations on way to opening the ski-lessons and the management of that day. For example, the loan of the goods of ski-races and the contract of ski-leaders and the umpires of ski-races.
2． If Nozawaonsen ski-club had not held to open that ski-lessons and races held by the local administration（Hoken section）in Nagano prefecture 1938-1940. That ski-lessons and races could not hold.

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Japanese-U. S. relations deteriorated after September 1940 when Japan joined the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, and Tokyo and Washington had few official options to improve their relations. This encouraged two private individuals, Hashimoto Tetsuma and Ikawa Tadao, to act as diplomats in breaking the diplomatic deadlock.
Being head of Shiunso, a right-wing ideological group, Hashimoto had extensive contacts with political and business circles and even U. S. Ambassador Joseph Grew. With Grew's letter of introduction, he secretly went to Washington in December 1940. At the State Department he pronounced his own personal concerns about Japan's pro-German stand and the need for closer Japan-U. S. relations. Neither Maxwell M. Hamilton, Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, nor Stanley K. Hornbeck, Advisor on Political Relations, with both of whom Hashimoto privately met, accepted his line of reasoning.
Ikawa was a former official of the Ministry of Finance. In November 1940, when, after his retirement, he was on the board of directors of the Central Bank of Cooperative Society, he accidentally got to know two visiting American emissaries, Bishop James Walsh and Father James Drought, whom he introduced to Matsuoka Yosuke, Foreign Minister, and Muto Akira, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, the Ministry of the Army. Through this experience he became enthusiastic about his possible mission. He secretly visited the United States in February 1941 and worked closely with Colonel Iwakuro Hideo, who also secretly came to Washington as Ambassador Nomura's assistant. The two succeeded in producing the Draft Understanding on the terms for avoiding imminent conflicts, the work which led to the formal meeting between the Japanese ambassador and Secretary of State Hull.
Unlike Hashimoto, Ikawa was successful as a diplomat, because of his personal ties with American emissaries and Iwakuro and because of the confidence of Frank Walker, the Postmaster General, and Ambassador Nomura. Yet, in August 1941 when he returned to Tokyo, he saw no room for his activities since the binational negotiations were being handled solely by the authorities. Just as Hashimoto was arrested after his return home for his pro-American behavior, so Ikawa too found himself being watched by the authorities.
The two persons were simply utilized by the government and were foresaken when their roles were over. Inherent here is the tragic fate of private citizens trying to act as diplomats.

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