This issue represents an academic attempt to shed light on the functions of those who work “behind the scenes” in diplomatic negotiations or what is termed here as “informal contact-makers.” Known by various names such as emissaries, secret envoys, secret agents, fixers, intermediaries, diplomatic brokers and back-channel contacts, these informal contac-makers often play significant roles in state-to-state negotiations, particularly when the parties involved are in tense conflict over issues such as war, territory, trade and the like, but are interested in establishing contacts with each other. Informal contact-makers, in such cases, can often play a more effective role than can formal contact-makers who, because of official credentials, find it difficult to compromise in officially-announced conferences.
The functions of contact-makers are viewed in terms of two dimensions: whether their acts of contacting are under “official” sanction or not (“unofficial”) and whether their contacts are pre-announced to the public or not. The combination of the two dimensions will produce four types of contact-makers: (1) those who have official credentials and meet for pre-announced meetings (although the contents of the proceedings may well be kept secret); and (2) those who have official credentials but meet for unannounced, i. e., secret meetings; (3) those who have no official credentials but meet for pre-announced meetings; and (4) those who have no official credentials and meet for secret contacts.
The first type, i. e., official=pre-announced contact-makers are also called “formal contact-makers” such as those attending binational top-level meetings. The second type, i. e., “official=unannounced contact-makers, ” refers to emissaries sent by the authorities and the like. The third type, i. e., “unofficial=unannounced contact-makers” are related to self-appointed emissaries, so to speak. The fourth type may be termed “unofficial=pre-announced contact-makers” such as political and business leaders contacting the other party voluntarily. The last three types are together classified as “informal contact-makers.”
The functions and types of informal contact-makers appear to be affected by various factors including the nature of diplomatic issues, the nature of relations between the governments concerned, the geographical distance between the governments concerned, and the political culture supportive of the role of informal contact-akers. Eight articles, selected here to provide case studies of prewar and postwar Japanese diplomatic negotiations, generally follow this conceptual framework. They suggest that Asian political cultures such as those of China, Korea, the Philippines as well as Japan are more conducive to informal contact-makers than are Western cultures. In Western societies as well, however, a network of personal ties among influentials sometimes plays a significant role.

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Sports comprise inherent physical dangers in playing, and accidents such as injuries are inevitable to a certain extent. Tennis is obviously no exception. However, these accidents may lead to trouble between the parties concerned and legal disputes, such as lawsuits. When such disputes occur, it is important for tennis players to understand who is legally responsible in case of an accident. Therefore, this study aims to analyze court decisions on different tennis accidents to clarify what kind of negligence is found on the part of the parties involved in tennis accidents, and what factors related to tennis are emphasized in finding negligence. The results of the analysis suggest that the level of the participants, the danger of the chosen practice methods, and the existence or non-existence of specific safety instructions by the coach or the organizer are key factors in judging negligence in court cases of tennis accidents. Based on the results of this study, we propose actions for tennis players to prevent accidents and to avoid legal liability in case of accidents.

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Japanese-Philippine negotiations on war reparations lasted from 1951 through 1956, often interrupted by disagreements on the terms of payment. Significantly, the diplomatic deadlocks were often broken by informal channels of communications and secret talks. A host of political and business leaders who had varying degrees of interests in each other's country participated.
A most important breakthrough in deadlocked talks was made in New York and Washington in November 1954 by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru and Senator Jose P. Laurel, whose secret meetings were arranged by the Premier's confidants on Philippine affairs, Nagano Mamoru and Shiohara Tamotsu. Nagano, a leading steel industrialist, had business interests in the Philippine iron mines and other resources, and had his own proposal on a variety of development projects to be financed by reparation funds. Shiohara, Executive Director of the Philippine Society of Japan, had been a personal friend of Senator Laurel since the Japanese occupation period when Laurel was President of the Republic and Shiohara served his government as an advisor on internal affairs.
Nagano played several other roles during the whole process, including one as a member of the Japanese delegation for reparations talks. So did many other leaders such as former Ambassador Murata Shozo, Minister Takasaki Tatsunosuke, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro, and businessmen like Furukawa Yoshizo who had lived in the Philippines before the war and claimed to be experts about the country.
Another diplomatic breakthrough was achieved in May 1955 by Ferino Neri, chief Philippine reparations negotiator, who ran a series of secret meetings in Tokyo with political and business influentials regarding the terms of payment. He finally obtained Prime Minister Hatoyama's confidential endorsement of his proposed terms. This success was made with the skillful help of Hatoyama's Deputy Cabinet Secretary Matsumoto Takizo, who apparently had many Philippine acquaintances primarily through the Free Masonry whose members pointedly included Hatoyama, Senator Camilo Osias, and most probably Senator Laurel.
The long negotiations demonstrated the significant roles played by informal contact-makers on both sides. Many of them were those with official capacity seeking secret contacts, but some without official capacity also volunteered secretly to help the talks. Both Japanese and Philippine political cultures weigh personal ties, particularly, ties based on clientelism, in political dealings. The interaction of the two cultures over such difficult negotiations multiplied the effectiveness of informal contact-makers.

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