In 9th January 1903, Morihiro Ichihara was inaugurated into the forth mayor of Yokohama. Half a year later, he addressed on an urban policy of Yokohama. In August 1903, Yokohama City Improvement Council was established. The city reform of Yokohama by Ban Miyake was planned in February 1910, and it consisted of urban zoning (commercial zones, industrial zones and residential zones), a traditional buildings and a scenic zones to be preserved. The plans for a city of Yokohama based on the civil societies in the Europe and America. On the other hand, the city reform of Tokyo was essentially for its role as "imperial capital" of the modem Japan.

抄録全体を表示

The purpose of this paper is to clarify the establishment and the background in the meiji era on De Forest Hall. On his second visit to Japan in 1896, of the three buildings, De Forest resided in one of the buildings at 6-1 Minamirokken-cho. This is the building that eventually became De Forest Hall. The three cherished buildings were designed in 1887 by an architect of the name of Ueda who also created other public buildings such as the Miyagi prefecture parliamentary building. In keeping with the set of three buildings at Katahira-cho and Minamirokken-cho, De Forest Hall as it exists today continues to stand on the same plot as the former building at 6-1 Minamirokken-cho. As it is the only one of the three buildings still in existence, architecturally speaking it has significant historical value.

抄録全体を表示

Most Japanese vocational high schools having architecture course were established after 1900's. In Taisho and early Showa Era, some of these graduates of architecture course became low-ranking official architects in construction division of the Kanagawa Prefectural Government and some of them played substantial leaders' role. Especially just after the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923, they had to work hard to cope with enormous demands to construct public buildings. But almost all these architects disappeared namelessly in the history. This thesis shows some of these architects' careers and works, focusing Matazo Naritomi and his subordinates.

抄録全体を表示

日本は官学重視の伝統があるため、私学はともすると官学を補完する位置に置かれる場合が多く、私学の存在根拠を明示するために、殊更「建学の精神」が強調されてきた。しかしアメリカ合衆国では、日本とは逆に私学が言わば自生的に発生し、後に高等教育への進学需要を満たすために、州立大学が拡大した経緯がある。つまり官学と私学の関係には多様性がある。同志社の創立した新島襄は、アメリカの私学で十年間学んだ経験をもち、アメリカ教育における私学的伝統を知悉していた。しかし同時に明治期以降、次第に官学中心に傾く日本の動向も知っており、その動向を認めつつ、キリスト教主義私学に近代日本を切り開く可能性を見た。本報告では、私学同志社の教育思想を、自由主義、平民主義、キリスト教主義という三つの視角から理論的、歴史的に検討し、最終的に21世紀に望まれる、私学と官学の関係について考察する。

抄録全体を表示

After Japan had seen a transport revolution centering on railway building in 1890s, she found it necessary to tackle the problem of harbour improvements in the years between the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War (1900s) when the industrial capitalism was establised in Japan. Groping the way, she began to accomodate the harbour improvements to the transport system in a capitalistic society. Most of the studies on this ' harbour question ' have hitherto been concerned with harbour improvements largely from the viewpoint of civil engineering and management. The author approaches the problem in its politico-economic relevance. When the Sino-Japanese War came to an end, the Finance Ministry undertook harbour works at Yokohama. Here can we see a special feature of the post-Sino-Japanese War period, because the works ought to have been undertaken by the Ministry of Home Affairs as engineering public works were under their jurisdiction from the nature of the matter. This harbour works, however, were threatened to be suspended in the Russo-Japanese War, when the municipal corporation of Yokohama changed its attitude and offered to share the expense. Thus it was finally decided in March 1906 to continue the Yokohama harbour works, the expense being shared between the state and the municipal corporation of Yokohama. This pattern of sharing the expense was to become a model case in the development of the harbour policy even after the Russo-Japanese War as long as there remained a restrictive influence of wartime structure on the national finance. After the First Saionji Cabinet was formed, the harbour works under the leadership of the Ministry of Finance with a view to national enrichment were not always carried out successfully, for Kei Hara, the Minister of Home Affairs, preferred overall systematic harbour works under the guidance of the Ministry of Home Affairs to the policy of doing works under the direction of the Ministry of Finance. On 31st May 1906, he convened the first meeting of the Committee on Harbours and on 24th June 1907, the committee was made to be an official institution. Now the formerly missing policy concerning harbours was to come into being, and the committee chose some 770 harbours all over the country and graded them, designating 14 harbours as important. The meaning of this measure to solve the harbour problem in the post-Russo-Japanese War period was to set a priority order for various harbour works, or for various regional interests, under the name of 'harbour policy', because it was impossible for the government to satisfy all the local or regional interests under the peculiar financial circumstances which had not got rid of the influence of the wartime structure. Moreover, it was devised in lines of, so to speak, 'national enrichment and propartisanship' -national interests being given the primary place, but regional interests being taken into consideration as well. For it was requisite for Seiyukai led by Hara to act upon national rationale in order to gain a footing among political powers, and at the same time they had to establish a system of local control by leaving room of discretion to various local and regional interests.

抄録全体を表示

The aim of the present article is to reexamine Japan's policy regarding international investment loans to China made during the premiership of Terauchi Masatake (1916-18), by focusing the analysis on the approach proposed by Finance Minister Shoda Kazue and the relationship between the Terauchi Cabinet and the China investment consortium. The research to date has tended to focus attention on the aspect of the imperialistic international financial aspect of the eight loans totalling 145 million yen lent to the Duan Qirui (段祺端) government through Terauchi's personal secretary Nishihara Kamezo, the united front put up by Terauchi, Shoda and Nishihara, known as the "Korean Group" (朝鮮組), and the role played by the "unofficial" Sino-Japanese network formed by Nishihara. In particular, the work focusing on the historical development of Japanese capitalism has pointed to the Nishihara loans as the event marking a transition from a unified Korean-Manchurian monetary policy to the formation of a Japan-Manchuria-China monetary bloc (the gold-backed yen bloc), but has yet to 1) sufficiently analyze Shoda's specific ideas regarding investment loans to China and 2) place the funds earmarked to finance the second wave of Chinese political reforms within the Terauchi Cabinet's overall investment loan policy. The author's reexamination brings to light three new facts. First, while emphasizing the "unification of Korean-Manchurian monetary affairs", Shoda also promoted a policy of investment lending on the "Chine proper" involving not only existing institutions there, but also the founding of a new Japan-China joint venture bank. Secondly, the large scale loans that the Terauchi Cabinet began granting beginning in March 1918 should be considered as part of a two-pronged policy for regulating domestic specie combined with strengthening and expanding Japanese interests in Manchuria, Mongolia and the Shandong Peninsula. Finally, Shoda was by no means critical of China's August 1918 gold certificate regulations promoted by Nishihara; however, he was not enthusiastic about the necessity of having to export domestic specie. The author also identifies differences in the policy approaches taken by Shoda and Nishihara. Nishihara's refusal to recognize a Chinese fiscal management mechanism based on the international investment consortium in favor of a Chinese government enjoying "amicable relations with Japan" contrasted with Shoda's official position as Finance Minister emphasizing the necessity of "Sino-Japanese friendship" in combination with "US-Japanese cooperation". Because Shoda believed in the existence of investment loan contracts that would not contradict "US-Japanese cooperation", the contracts concluded during its administration were bound to follow the precedents set by the preceding Hara Takashi Cabinet. Consequently, Shoda Kazue's policy approach can be characterized as aiming at 1) the unification of Korean-Manchurian monetary affairs, 2) solving domestic Japanese economic issues and 3) strengthening and expanding Japanese interests in Manchuria, Mongolia and Shandong, all based on the assumption that economic cooperation with China was critical to the development of Japan's post-World War I economy. The "Korean Group" notwithstanding, the author argues, there were significant differences among its members regarding what was to be done concerning the "Chine proper".

抄録全体を表示