本論文の目的は，フィールド教育をもつ農学部系大学が取組む地域志向型教育の実態を把握し，教育の場を提供した地域が得られる利益について考察することである。研究課題は，第1に，漁業・漁村社会の人材育成のなかで，農学部系学部の大学生への教育がどこに位置づけられるか検討する。第2に，地域と連携しながら提供する大学の地域志向型教育プログラムの役割と可能性について明らかにする。第3に，広島大学生物生産学部の地域志向型教育の活動成果と課題をまとめ，大学に教育の場を提供した地域が何を得ることができるか考察する。長期的にみると，地域が大学の地域志向型教育を支えることは，漁業・漁村社会を周辺から支える人材の育成につながっている。

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20世紀の世界に大きな衝撃を与えたソ連社会主義について，社会主義経済体制と社会主義的民主主義に注目して再考する．社会主義経済体制は一時は大きな成果を挙げたが，体制構築時の犠牲には見合わず，非効率的で，もはや発展途上国にとってさえモデルとはならない．社会主義的民主主義は，非自由主義的で自由が制限されるため採用されるべきではないが，直接民主主義的な制度の重視と個別救済の制度化という点では参照に値しよう．

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The purpose of this paper is to review the changing patterns of Chinese communist perception of the world during the 1950s, focusing on the rise and fall of the theory of intermediate zone. The theory was first articulated by chairman Mao Zedong in an interview with an American journalist Anna Louise Strong in August 1946. The intermediate zone means the vast area lying between the United States and the Soviet Union. The theory contended that not the East-West conflict but the conflict between the American imperialism and the oppressed people of the world formed the main contradiction in the present situation. This view was accompanied by a characteristic notion of international security. According to Mao, it was the bold struggle against imperialism that would promote “peace” among world great powers. Such a notion marked a contrast with the Soviet attitude which saw “The Great Alliance” as essential in securing world peace.
With the increasing pressure from Moscow to unify ideology within the socialist camp, the term “intermediate zone” vanished from the Chinese documents since late 1948. But the logic of the theory still influenced the perception of the Chinase leaders until 1952.
There were remarkable changes in the framework of Chinase world view after 1953. Firstly, the notion of peaceful coexistence was introduced into the Chinese policy papers. Secondly, the evaluation of neutralism was adjusted. Thirdly, the demarkation of the socialist camp was redefined. These changes altogether modified the previous notion of international security underlying the theory of intermediate zone. Namely, the idea that people's bold struggle against imperialism in the intermediate zone would reduce the probability of world war was replaced by the notion that consultation among the great powers was indispensable for promoting world peace. With this notion on international security, Chinese communist theory proceeded to the diplomacy of peaceful coexistence.
In 1958 the theory of intermediate zone was revived. While it emphasized the necessity of daring anti-imperialist struggle in the intermediate zone as it did in the late 1940s, it did not discard the idea that the coordinated effort between the communist nations and the Asian nationalist regimes was effective in eradicating the influence of American imperialism from Asia.
The revival of the theory of intermediate zone brought about a discrepancy with regard to the notion of peaceful coexistence between the Chinese and Russians. Although such a discrepancy was relative in character, it was destined to deepen by the transformation of the world system in the late 1950s.

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On August 23, 1958, the People's Liberation Army of China began a heavy bombardment against the Quemoy Island, an island still under the control of the Chinese Nationalist regime in Taiwan. This action escalated tensions across the Taiwan Strait, leading to the direct military confrontation between China and the United States. In fact, the conflict was so serious that the United States considered using tactical nuclear weapons against the Communist China.
This paper explores why China chose to conduct such military activities despite risks of direct military engagement with the United States. China's decision to bombard the Quemoy is puzzling because it was fairly predictable that China's use of force would prompt the United States to respond militarily, bringing the two countries to the brink of a nuclear war. Why did China dare to take such risks and what were they trying to accomplish?
There are two schools of thought that attempt to explain China's behavior leading to the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. The first focuses on an external factor, that is, China's security environments. According to this view, China's decision to conduct bombardment against the Quemoy was driven by Chinese leaders' concerns about increasing military threats posed by the United States. The second school of thought, the so-called “domestic mobilization” school, argues that the main reason for China's use of force was the necessity to mobilize domestic support for “the Great Leap Forward, ” a radical communization program that Mao Tse-dong tried to promote. Recently, researchers who utilized new documentary evidence from China and the former Soviet Union emphasize the role of Mao's radical communist ideology, and they claim that the “domestic mobilization” argument combined with an explanation based on Mao's ideology, provides a better explanation for China's behavior. Chen Jian, for instance, argues that Mao, who was committed to radical communist internationalism, was concerned about the slow speed of communization in China, and tried to accelerate the speed by creating an external crisis.
While recognizing the importance of Mao's radical ideology, I argue that the importance of Mao's ideology was exaggerated because many of his radical statements were interpreted without analyzing contexts in which they were made. Furthermore, I point out evidence that shows that the Chinese leaders' decisions were driven by their concerns about China's security, not only because of increasing US threats but also because of the Soviet Union's pursuit for the “peaceful coexistence” with the West. In this sense, China's use of force was designed to serve two political purposes: warning the United States against increasing support for Taiwan and damaging what Chinese leaders considered to be Moscow's “appeacement” policy toward the United States.
In making the argument stated above, I analyze the Chinese leaders' statements and decisions from 1954 to 1958 by examining Chinese and Soviet primary documents made available through the Cold War International History Project. Special attention is paid to analyzing Chinese leaders' diplomatic decisions within the context of China's strategic environments, because doing so provides a more complete picture of how China decided to bombard the Quemoy. In conclusion, I not only summarize the research findings, but also attempt to derive some theoretical implications from this case study by utilizing the notion of a “building block approach” to theorizing international relations.

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Khrushchev's administration declared a new line in domestic and foreign policies based on anti-Stalinism. It is peaceful co-existence and peaceful economic competition in the diplomatic field, and construction of a communist society by betterment of national welfare in the domestic area.
He advocated compromise of both sides, East and West, and resolution of conflicts by negotiation as important factors of peaceful co-existence. But, as a prerequisite to it, he gives great weight to the maximum strengthening of Soviet military forces for avoiding war. Thus he tries to solve problems between both blocs in his advantage by power diplomacy. But Khrushchev's approach to co-existence has not solved the cold war, nor reduced the tension between the two blocs, nor weakned the two their mutual distrust. Power diplomacy, which is the antithesis of peaceful co-existence, is the main obstacle to the agreement against nuclear test, and is the basis of the obstinate attitude of the Soviet Union against international investigation.
Though he advocates peaceful co-existence, he also promotes development of revolutional struggles by all possible means within the safe limits of avoiding war. This policy results in the continuous collapse of peaceful co-existence among nations and the negation of all conditions for peace.
Such diplomacy which is based on continuous strengthening of the armed forces, gives serious effects on its domestic policy and results in heavy burden on people's life. But some policies of the Khrushchev administration such as the developing process to managerize activists of the party and the attempt to introduce renaissance into the party seem to be giving some favourable effects on people's life and on pluralization of the Soviet society. Nevertheless, the administration still adheres to such policies as to control everything by the party, to confine the anti-Stalinist drive to the limits from above and to surpress people's desire for liberalization. These Khrushchev's domestic and foreign policies show its transitional characteristics and they are to be changed and developed somehow. But this change does not seem to be made in near future.

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