This article first reviews the 30-year history of the recurring nuclear crisis in the Korean Peninsula, focusing on the U.S. policies, and attempts to find out the reasons why the successive administrations showed a similar pattern of trial and error. From Clinton, who had to deal with the first nuclear crisis in the early 1990s, to Trump who was faced with North Korea armed with almost operational nuclear-tipped ICBMs, U.S. presidents would begin with strong words and actions, but ended in diplomatic compromises. Most of them even contemplated military options, but they had to back down due to the staggering risks and costs of the possible outbreak of the second Korean War. The compromised deals would also turn out to be insufficient to resolve the crisis.
In terms of foreign policy orientation and personnel, the new Biden Administration has a strong link and continuity with the Clinton and Obama eras. By analyzing the discussions on North Korea by the foreign policy experts in the Biden camp, and influential thinktanks such as the Center for a New American Security, this article offers some insights into how the experiences in the previous administrations would affect the future policies on the issue of denuclearization, such as the change of focus to “threat reduction” by applying the arms control paradigm.
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