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  • 付 晨晨
    史学雑誌
    2015年 124 巻 9 号 1655-1656
    発行日: 2015/09/20
    公開日: 2017/12/28
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 吉井 文美
    史学雑誌
    2015年 124 巻 9 号 1654-1655
    発行日: 2015/09/20
    公開日: 2017/12/28
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 小幡 尚
    史学雑誌
    2002年 111 巻 5 号 743-746
    発行日: 2002/05/15
    公開日: 2017/12/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 矢島 五三郎
    順天堂医学
    1938年 S13 巻 581 号 581_51-581_56
    発行日: 1938/12/25
    公開日: 2015/06/12
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 草刈 孟
    家事と衛生
    1939年 15 巻 9 号 25-34
    発行日: 1939/09/01
    公開日: 2010/10/13
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 小森 義峯
    法政論叢
    1987年 23 巻 34-41
    発行日: 1987/05/20
    公開日: 2017/11/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This thesis consists of four parts:(1)preface, (2)responsibility for war of the Emperor viewed from the standpoint of constitutional law, (3)responsibility for war of the Emperor viewed from the standpoint of international law, (4)conclusion. Prof. Hasegawa places constitutional responsibility on World War II for the Emperor in his thesis. But his opinion is wrong, because the Meiji Constitution adopts a principle of irresponsibility of a monarch after the examples of foreign constitutional monarchies. Prof. Hoshino places responsibility of international law on World War II for the Emperor in his thesis. But his opinion is wrong, because we can not find such grounds in Art. 227 of the Versailles Treaty in 1920 and also in Cl. 10 of the Potsdam Declaration.
  • 滝沢 一郎
    ソ連・東欧学会年報
    1982年 1982 巻 11 号 62-71
    発行日: 1982年
    公開日: 2010/03/16
    ジャーナル フリー
  • シナン レヴェント
    アジア研究
    2012年 58 巻 1.2 号 69-88
    発行日: 2012/04/30
    公開日: 2014/09/15
    ジャーナル フリー
    The term Eurasia is more than just a geographical statement; it acquired political meaning in the first half of the 20th century. As the term is capable of various definitions, here we restrict the meaning to former-Soviet lands. This paper examines the political intentions of imperial Japan towards the region in the interwar period in terms of Japanese policy towards Islamic populations and the Axis allies, especially German–Japanese military co-operation. The sources are mainly those that relate to questions about Islam and anti-Soviet feelings during this period.
    The strategy of supporting those who opposed the regime in Russia dates back to the Russo-Japanese war. Based on this experience, Japan, in an attempt to play a more important role in international issues after the Paris Conference in 1919, tried to make Tokyo an émigré-center, like Berlin, Paris, and Istanbul at the time. From early 1920s Turkic-Muslim people were recruited and formed a community in Japan under the leadership of the influential Muhammed Abdulhay Kurbanali. Subsequently, Abdurresid Ibrahim arrived in 1933 and took the initiative by replacing Kurbanali in 1938. It was assumed that Japan was utilizing these anti-Bolshevik Muslim factions to foster the anti-Sovietism adopted by the military; this explains the infiltration of Japanese influence into the Muslim groups, especially those suppressed by Soviet Russia.
    As is well known, imperial Japan and Nazi Germany signed the Anti-Commintern Pact in November 1936 against international communism in name, but in fact against Soviet Russia. Hiroshi Oshima, Japanese military attaché to Germany at the time, made an agreement with Wilhelm Canaris on behalf of the German army covering two areas: (i) anti-Soviet intelligence co-operation; and (ii) aid to support propaganda of anti-regime minorities based on an order from the Chief of the Army General Staff of imperial Japan. To summarize the agreement: ‘To collaborate with the German army concerning the intelligence of the Soviet Union so that the independence movements of minorities in the Soviet Union and anti-communist propaganda can be easily supported. This would assist the Japanese army to understand the deficiencies of Soviet Russia and move accordingly in the case of war between Japan and Russia’.
    Finally, the plans mentioned above did not bear fruit in terms of putting Eurasia under Japanese influence due to the fact that Japanese military operations on the Asian mainland and the German invasion in Russia ultimately ended in failure.
  • 田中 義雄
    順天堂医学
    1938年 S13 巻 581 号 581_56-581_66
    発行日: 1938/12/25
    公開日: 2015/06/12
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 林 采成
    社会経済史学
    2002年 68 巻 1 号 71-93
    発行日: 2002/05/25
    公開日: 2017/08/14
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
    With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Korean National Railways (KNR) was confronted by a serious dilemma. Wartime mobilization required an increase in its transport capacity reinforcement, but the necessary material resources were lacking. To solve this dilemma, KNR reorganized its procurement process and established a labor-intensice railroad operation by means of increasing its operation frequency and train units. However, after the outbreak of the Pacific War, these measures ceased to be effective since KNR suffered from an extreme scarcity of management resources. Ultimately, this led to a transport crisis. After Korea was liberated from colonial Japanese rule in 1945, the Korean staff had to take complete responsibility for the operation of the railway network. But this led to a systematic crisis on top of the product-factor crisis because the Japanese staff who had been in charge of the upper strata of the internal organization had been dismissed and the railway network was divided into north and south. KNR had to develop new strata of Korean executives and set up a new procurement network under the command of the U.S. occupation forces. In conclusion, the operation of KNR by Koreans themselves began with the transition-period experiences which followed the 1945 Liberation.
  • 鐵と鋼
    1938年 24 巻 9 号 894-906
    発行日: 1938/09/25
    公開日: 2009/07/09
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 樋口 秀実
    国際政治
    2001年 2001 巻 126 号 185-198,L20
    発行日: 2001/02/23
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact had a great influence on Japan's diplomatic policy during the Sino-Japanese War era. After the two countries concluded the Pact on October 23, 1939, the Japanese Army was forced to abandon its policy for the settlement of hostilities in China by strengthening the Japanese-German Anti-Comintern Pact. So far the Army had considered that the strengthened Pact would have led to the settlement of hostilities, while would have made the Japanese national defense against the Soviet Union more secure. On the other hand, the Japanese Navy tried to play a leading role in Japan's policy-making towards foreign countries, especially towards China, after the conclusion of the German-Soviet Pact. The Navy, which had taken steps to advance southward, had been apprehensive over that it would increasingly lose a voice over policy-making following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, and the Chang-Ku-Feng and Nomonhan incidents between Japan and the Soviet Union. It had functioned as a brake to control the Army and then had searched for an opportunity to get a powerful voice back. The German-Soviet Pact gave the Navy such a golden opportunity. And Japan took advantage of the new phase of the international political situation that resulted from the signature of the German-Soviet Pact. Britain and France carried out their appeasement policy towards Japan in Asia, while they confronted Germany and the Soviet Union in Europe. The Chinese National Government at Chungking was deeply shocked that the Britain and France considered stopping the Sino-Japanese War once the Wang Jing-Wei regime at Nanking had come into existence. The formation of a united government by Chungking, Nanking and the Chinese Provisional Government at Peking seemed to be possible. What measures Japan took to settle hostilities after the conclusion of the German-Soviet Pact is the matter to be examined in this article, which focuses on the activities of the Navy for the establishment of the Wang regime.
    In order to end the War, the Abe Nobuyuki Cabinet, which was formed shortly after the conclusion of the German-Soviet Pact, began to grope for détente with the United States. In those days, the United States was the only country that could intervene in the China problem, while all other counries, such as Britain, France, Germany, and the Soviet Union, had to grapple with the issues of Europe. Both the Navy and the Japanese Foreign Ministry, which also had a voice in policy-making after the signature of the Pact, prompted this moderate policy towards the United States. The Navy, however, did not agree with the Foreign Ministry as to what measures Japan should take to settle the hostilities in China. The latter had the idea to use the Wang Jing-Wei regime as an intermediary with Chungking Government with a view to the settlement of hostilities. It seemed that Japan's strong measures towards the Wang regime would force him to be Japanese puppet and prevent an intervention by him or the United States with the Chungking Government. The former had a strategic plan that the Wang regime would be obliged to closely cooperate with Japan in a war against the United States. In fact, the United States criticized the Japanese hard-line policy towards the Wang regime and reckoned that there was no use in entering into further negotiations with Japan over th China problem.
  • 田中 孝彦
    国際政治
    1992年 1992 巻 99 号 149-167,L15
    発行日: 1992/03/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    On 19 October 1965, Japan and the Soviet Union normalized their diplomatic relations after more than ten years of a state of war. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru of the Hatoyama administration played a significant role in the process of the Soviet-Japanese normalization talks. This article attempts to discuss the main features of his negotiating policy, relying on the materials which have recently become available in Britain, the United States and Japan.
    The main negotiating purpose consistently held by Shigemitsu was to conclude a peace treaty with the Soviet Union on the basis of solving the territorial problems. The prime minister insisted on early normalization by shelving such problems. Shigemitsu believed, however, that Hatoyama's formula would fail to solve them and would leave an intractable disturbing factor for future Soviet-Japanese relations. He regarded the restoration of the Habomais and Shikotan as the minimum territorial condition for concluding the peace treaty. In order to obtain Soviet concessions, he started with the hardest demand for the whole of the Kuriles, but he was prepared to retreat gradually from this to the minimum condition.
    Both domestic and external circumstances were not favourable for Shigemitsu's purpose. The conservative merger between the Liberals and the Democrats did not allow him to make any rapid territorial concessions. The US State Department headed by John Foster Dulles had been implying its displeasure with possible Japanese territorial concessions to Russia. Moreover, the Russians insisted that Japan should recognize their sovereignty over the Kuriles and Sakhalin, though they offered to return the Habomais and Shikotan in August 1955. These circumstances made Shigemitsu adopt cautious and slow negotiations, and, therefore, he decided to demand as a bargaining card the southern Kuriles in response to the Soviet offer.
    In the summer of 1956 in Moscow, Shigemitsu as the plenipotentiary decided to conclude the peace treaty by accepting the Soviet terms in order to prevent Hatoyama's ‘Adenauer formula’, though he knew his decision would be severely attacked by his colleagues in Tokyo. Consequently, Shigemitsu's effort was blocked and later Hatoyama succeeded in normalization by shelving the territorial questions. As Shigemitsu expected, the unsolved territorial questions became a ‘thorn’ of later relations between the two countries. Considering that, Shigemitsu's negotiating policy could have set an alternative course of postwar Soviet-Japanese relations, though many defects can be pointed out in his diplomacy.
  • 戸部 良一
    国際政治
    1989年 1989 巻 91 号 70-85,L9
    発行日: 1989/05/20
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Until September 1939 the Imperial Japanese Army expected that a next World War would break out in 1942. It regarded preparing for the War as well as settling the China Incident as the most important tasks of the country. Why did the army deem it necessary to prepare for the War while it was bogged down in China? And why did it anticipate the War in 1942?
    For years the army aimed at eradicating or neutralizing the menace from the north. Soviet Russia was supposed to interfere most vigorously with Japan's implementation of her national policy to build an autarchical block in East Asia. Japan, however, was militarily inferior to Russia. In June 1934 Japanese forces in Korea and Manchuria were estimated as less than third of Russian armies in the Far East. So the Japanese army had to increase its strength against Russia. Its build-up program which started in 1937 was intended to be completed by 1942. After the outbreak of the China Incident in July 1937, the army considered it more urgent to strengthen its troops against the Soviet Far Eastern forces, in order to keep Russia from intervening in the Incident and to prevent her from encouraging anti-Japanese groups in China.
    But Japan would remain in an inferior position vis-à-vis Russia in military terms even when she completed her build-up program in 1942. Therefore the Japanese army hoped that Soviet Russia would get embroiled in an European conflict, a next World War. Russia, then, would have to transfer a portion of its troops from the Far East to the European theater, or at least could not send reinforcements to the Far East. The military situation there would then turn favorable to Japan.
    It is well known that the army continued to insist on the conclusion of a military alliance with Germany and Italy until August 1939. According to the army's reasoning, the main objectives of this alliance were preventing the outbreak of a World War until 1942, and containing Soviet forces in European theater if the War came about. The army did not think that the China Incident would develop into a World War. It expected that the Incident would have been settled and its build-up plan have been completed when the War broke out in Europe.
    The army hoped that the War would offer it an excellent opportunity to fight the Soviet forces in militarily favorable terms. The World War was supposed to come about between Germany and Italy on the one hand, and Britain, France and Russia on the other. Japan should enter the war against Russia, but fight neither Britain nor France. So the war against Russia in the Far East would be a part of a next World War in Europe, but at the same time would be virtually separated from it.
    The Japanese Army regarded it as necessary to prepare for a next World War because the War was expected to provide a good opportunity to eliminate the Soviet's threat. The army anticipated the War in 1942 because its build-up program would have been completed and its military position have become better by then. But the actual Second World War did not offer the opportunity to fight Russia, owing to the conclusion of Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact. And the War broke out too early for Japan.
  • 高橋 久志
    国際政治
    1989年 1989 巻 91 号 55-69,L8
    発行日: 1989/05/20
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article attempts to shed light on the heretofore little known aspect of the Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations during their protracted war of 1937-1945. More than fifteen years ago, John H. Boyle published a highly commended book on Wang Ching-wei's peace movement and his Nanking regime, China and Japan at War, 1937-1945. But among the important topics he did not deal with in detail (but rather discussed only in passing) was the controversial issue of Nanking's participation in the Greater East Asian War. It is hoped that this short article will make some contribution to better understand the missing part in the wartime history.
    If there was anything Wang Ching-wei and his followers has least dreamed of or dreaded most, it was the outbreak of a new war in the Pacific between Japan, their sponsoring nation, and the U. S. In spite of the seemingly close ties between Nanking and Tokyo due to the latter's heavy multi-faceted commitments to the former, the Japanese government did not make any advance notice to Wang Ching-wei about its decision to open hostilities with the United States and its allies. On the eve of the war, it even decided unilaterally to prohibit the Nanking regime from joining the Japanese by declaring war against the Allies.
    The Pearl Harbor attack was a sudden jolt for the nucleus of the Nanking regime. Above all else, Wang had been surprisingly optimistic about the prospect of the peace talks in Washington. The other side of the coin of this optimism was Wang's great frustration with and serious disappointment at the prospect of his regime under Japanese occupation. Peace with Chungking looked dim and almost impossible. Japan's demands and impositions on Nanking after Pearl Harbor were rising, and, as was rightfully pointed out by Chen Kung-po, Wang's foremost disciple, the regime was seriously beset with major problems of low morale and profiteering attitudes.
    Now that the Sino-Japanese War had to be fought and eventually settled in the context of World War II, Wang made a critical decision to live and die with the Japanese by declaring war against the Allies.
    However, Nanking had to wait long until Tokyo, after many turns and twists, reached a consensus to signal a green light. This article treats at length the decision-making process of the Japanese side, and tries to analyze the gradual shift of views, from a flat “no” to a more conciliatory attitude, held by the Japanese politico-military leaders. As the trends of the war in the Pacific became increasingly less favorable, they came to realize the need to beef up politically the Nanking regime, and the idea of letting Nanking declare war against the Allies became more receptive to the Japanese. However, this idea proved to be contradictory and self-defeating, as Japan wanted to use Occupied China as a rear base to keep their war machine rolling.
  • 中西 治
    国際政治
    1982年 1982 巻 72 号 55-70,L8
    発行日: 1982/10/23
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    On Soviet diplomacy during the .period from the Munich agreement (September 1938) to the Soviet-German non-aggression pact (August 1939), many scholars have been debating two themes: when the Soviet Union changed its policy in regard to Nazi Germany and how the “Nomonhan Affair” (“Khalkin-Gol Incident”) influenced the decision-making of Soviet foreign policy.
    On the former we recognize Stalin's address at the XVIII Party Congress (March 1939) as the turning point of Soviet diplomacy and give special attention to the Munich agreement which brought about this very important change in Soviet policy regarding Nazi Germany. On the latter we presume from the documents which were sent by Richard Zorge, Soviet militaly intelligence agent from Tokyo to Moscow, that Soviet-Japanese relations, especially the “Nomonhan Affair”, definitely influenced the decision-making of Soviet foreign policy.
    In conclussion the Soviet-German pact is evaluated as a very skillful and clever maneuver from the point of view of “Power Politics”, but removed morality from Soviet socialist diplomacy.
  • 史学雑誌
    1995年 104 巻 11 号 1971-2004
    発行日: 1995/11/20
    公開日: 2017/11/30
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 金窪 敏知
    地図
    2015年 53 巻 3 号 3_25-3_33
    発行日: 2015/06/30
    公開日: 2016/11/17
    ジャーナル フリー
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