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全文: "日本" 国旗
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  • 松波 仁一郎
    造船協會會報
    1914年 1914 巻 13 号 25-53
    発行日: 1914/09/24
    公開日: 2009/01/08
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 小野 雅章
    日本の教育史学
    2016年 59 巻 006-018
    発行日: 2016年
    公開日: 2017/04/03
    ジャーナル フリー

    This paper reveals the great controversy surrounding the process of determining Prewar Japan’s national flag regulations through an analysis of government approved textbook descriptions. National flag regulation long remained unsettled, with an intense debate raging through the 1920’s and 1930’s.During the 1920’s the Japanese government failed to model to the public consistent, official national flag customs which contributed to the persistent controversy, in that the government did not recommended the rising of the national flag in public space on holidays, etc.

    Emphasis on national flags customs varied. As a result, diverse views continued to be disseminated even government approved Textbooks. In December, 1930, the government issued an official notice determining national flag customs. However, there was a great deal of public opinion opposed to the new regulation. Flag customs promulgated in textbooks published by the Ministry of Education even differed from one another. Even though the issue was discussed by the House of Representatives, the controversy remained unresolved. The prewar Japanese government was unable to standardize flag custom. In 1940, the issue was finally resolved; the Ministry of Education produced a textbook that finally adopted the December, 1930 official notice on flag customs.

    Public records government approved textbooks, and Diet records were utilizes in the research for this paper.

  • 佐藤 好明
    日本航海学会論文集
    1999年 101 巻 189-200
    発行日: 1999/09/25
    公開日: 2017/01/15
    ジャーナル フリー
    The use of national flags by ships is limited only to its nationals except when it is employed in time of war to escape capture by enemy vessels. It is expressly permited to foreigners by the British Shipping Act of 1894, Sec. 691 and the present Japanese Vessel Act, Article 22, Clause II. In spite of somewhat misleading interpretation by Japanese municipal lawyers to take caputure for arrest in time of peace, these stipulations have the same origin found to be traced back to the French Maritime Ordinance of 1650 which prescribed for French captains not to hoist other banners than France's while waging war. In the days of this ordinance French marines were too weak to engage war on the sea. Besides the exceptional and rare ships which the Admiral fitted out at his own expense, available were only privateers armed by private persons. Their greed for gains forced themselves to neglect sufficiency of armament during wars and exposed the flag of France to insult very often. Harsh pillage was committed even after truce to the detriment of the honour of the king of France and his allies. This state of affairs led to the above mentioned ordinance to bring order to naval wars. But approximately after 1681 ordinance of France it had been almost always permited for the privateers to keep aboard any flags which they judged as proper and to use them when driven by necessity in order either to recognise better the ship they encountered or to escape the pursuit by enemy which they assumed stronger than themselves. What was prohibited was to attack under false flags or colours and mainly concerned privateers, for they were the first to disguise their nationality as a ruse of war. War ships were, as it was expected, the last to hide their nationality to avoid battle with enemy war ship or to attract merchant ship apparantly fragile to resist. It is so natural for this ruse of war to authorise victim of privateers to do the same thing. For a long time this custom could have been maintained without considerable trouble. So long as the speed of war ships was slow and their range was short, no fatal surprise could threaten. A suspicious ship could be observed long before it became dangerous. There was wide room for merchant ships to escape and enough time to make preparation for the combat. Even if a false flag enabled an enemy to approach and fire, the first attack could be rarely fatal. Modern weapon can fataly attack targets beyond visual range or even over the horison where it is impossible to confirm that the target is a legitime military object. The maintenance of this ruse of flag greatly increase the danger to neutrals which Japan has much possibility to become in future armed conflicts. In 1915 the U.S.A. protested the British ship, the Lusitania, wearing American colours in the war area. Strongly worded protests were also presented to Britain from the Netherlands and the three Scandinavian states. Their common ground was that this old rule had become obsolete. It is difficult to see why the law of the sea should continue to tolerate method of deception originating from privateers'discretion of oppotunistic choice between assaulting the weak and retreating from the strong. We need not go so far as dealing all aspects of ruses of war concerning ships. What can be and what should be done is to deplete the exemption clause of the Article 22 of the Japanese Vessel Act to keep free hand in our diplomacy.
  • 迫本 実
    紙パ技協誌
    1962年 16 巻 5 号 398
    発行日: 1962/05/20
    公開日: 2009/11/17
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 東京市電氣局
    照明学会雑誌
    1922年 6 巻 2 号 152-157_5
    発行日: 1922年
    公開日: 2010/10/27
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 高見澤 磨
    法制史研究
    2013年 62 巻 240-244
    発行日: 2013/03/30
    公開日: 2018/04/04
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 草野 厚
    国際政治
    1980年 1980 巻 66 号 19-35,L1
    発行日: 1980/11/05
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Even though Japan continued diplomatic relations with Taiwan, Japan was able to conclude the fourth “non-official” trade agreement with the People's Republic of China on March of 1958. It was through this agreement, Japan hoped to increase the volume of trade with mainland China and thereby stimulate her domestic economy. Mainland China, on the other hand, considered this agreement as a good opportunity to transcend her private relation with Japan toward official recognition.
    Taiwan, which did not want to recognize any relation Japan had with mainland China, strongly opposed the provision in the memorundom attached to the agreement allowing the Chinese trade mission to fly its national flag in Japan. Therefore, Taiwan threatened Japan using various resources including prohibiting trade with Japan.
    The first purpose of this paper is to describe how the strained relationship between Japan and Taiwan was solved. The second is to analyze the decision making process in the Japanese government, especially focusing on how each minister, LDP dietman and bureaucrat acted.
  • 佐藤 広美
    日本教育政策学会年報
    2000年 7 巻 60-71
    発行日: 2000/06/23
    公開日: 2017/12/25
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 冨田 幸祐
    スポーツ史研究
    2014年 27 巻 43-59
    発行日: 2014年
    公開日: 2017/03/16
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
    The purpose of this study is to clarify British India national flag incident which occurred during the ninth Far Eastern Championship Games (FECG), and also to examine its historical meaning The flag incident is an incident that the Indian national team raised the Gandhi’s flag which is a symbol of the Indian independence movement from British rule, although the British side required the Indian team to display the Flag of the Governor-General of India. After the incident happened, it was reported in a number of newspapers. Whilst the Japanese newspapers mentioned that the confrontation between the two countries was resolved by using the Flag of the Governor-General of India, the English newspapers reported that both flags were raised on the roof of Nihon Seinenkan where the Indian team stayed during FECG. Even though there was some confusion over which flag was chosen, in actual fact both flags were raised. In addition, the Indian team appeared in the closing ceremony, holding both the Flag of the Governor-General of India and the Gandhi' s placards. Moreover, not only the Indian team , but also Indians living in Japan and the Japan National Party (Nihon Kokumintou ) were involved in the incident. The flag incident and placards express the Indian team’s dilemma over their independence and sports.
  • 杉浦 康之
    アジア研究
    2008年 54 巻 4 号 70-86
    発行日: 2008/10/31
    公開日: 2014/09/15
    ジャーナル フリー
    This study attempts to establish the limits of the Chinese Communist Party leadership’s perception of Japan based on negotiations over the Fourth Japan-China Private Trade Agreement and the Nagasaki national flag incident. It explains the underlying rationale for and reason why the Chinese decided to break off relations with Japan, what their perceptions of the situation were, and what they had failed to perceive. In addition, this study analyzes the interaction between Chinese intelligence acquisition, data analysis and the perception of Chinese policy-makers.
    When the trade negotiations began in Beijing in September 1957, China’s policy-makers, albeit wary of the Kishi cabinet’s attitude towards China, were optimistic about the prospects for Japanese domestic approval of Sino-Japanese trade; China’s negotiators were not ready to compromise. After the negotiations broke down, demand for trade with China grew strong in Japan and the Kishi cabinet actively worked towards concluding an agreement, whereby the Chinese leaders, although holding fast to certain principles, displayed a more flexible stance. Negotiations were reopened in February 1958, but there was no change in the ambivalent position of the Chinese policy-makers on Japan and their negotiator won some concessions from the Japanese side. During these negotiations, any arbitrary analysis of information obtained by China’s pro-Japan intelligence agencies was checked and nothing suggested that the policy-makers entertained any noteworthy misunderstandings of Japan.
    China turned to stronger methods when Taiwan’s objection to the Fourth Japan-China Trade Agreement developed into a dispute between Japan and Taiwan. At the time of Japan’s general elections, Chinese policy-makers tried to encourage a more China-friendly public opinion by criticizing the policy towards China that the Kishi cabinet was practicing, thereby hoping to alter the Kishi government’s position on China. These moves were consistent with China’s existing policy of “Japan neutralization”. However, there was limited domestic criticism of how Kishi dealt with China, a fact that Chinese intelligence agencies were to some extent informed of. Motivated by a disapproval of the Kishi cabinet and high hopes for Sino-Japanese trade, they made arbitrary deductions based on gathered information suggesting that China’s hard-line stance was in fact bringing results.
    In these circumstances, Chinese policy-makers adopted an even tougher position on Japan in the wake of the Nagasaki national flag incident and decided to break off relations. The Chinese did not intend a complete and permanent cessation of relations, but rather wanted to apply pressure on Kishi. As such, the decision was in line with China’s policy of “Japan neutralization”. On the other hand, Kishi perceived China’s hard-line stance as interference with Japan’s general elections, and chose to observe calmly how events unfolded. Japanese opinion continued to support Kishi government policies. However, China’s pro-Japan intelligence agencies disregarded this fact and produced arbitrary intelligence that China’s hard-line stance was in fact bringing results. Hence Chinese policy-makers persisted with their hard-line stance and did not modify their “Japan neutralization” policy.
    In retrospect, this chain of events suggests that one cause for China’s failed Japan policy was the failure of its intelligence agencies to comprehend that mounting Japanese domestic demand for trade with China had the potential to alter Japan’s foreign policy. Chinese intelligence analysis had backed up its policy-makers’ hard-line stance, and hence China continued to maintain the ambition of achieving its “Japan neutralization” policy.
    The limited insight of China’s Japan-related intelligence agencies was the result of the following three factors: firstly, their abilities to collect and analyze intelligence were not yet fully developed;
  • 右田 裕規
    時間学研究
    2012年 2 巻 29-44
    発行日: 2012年
    公開日: 2017/02/28
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
  • 清水 万里子
    小学校英語教育学会紀要
    2007年 7 巻 43-48
    発行日: 2007年
    公開日: 2017/10/05
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 松井 克行
    日本教育学会大會研究発表要項
    2012年 71 巻 326-327
    発行日: 2012/08/22
    公開日: 2018/04/20
    研究報告書・技術報告書 フリー
  • 森本 真幸
    日本文学
    1996年 45 巻 1 号 62-65
    発行日: 1996/01/10
    公開日: 2017/08/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 高鍬 裕樹
    図書館界
    2007年 58 巻 6 号 347-352
    発行日: 2007/03/01
    公開日: 2017/05/24
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 二五 義博
    小学校英語教育学会誌
    2014年 14 巻 01 号 66-81
    発行日: 2014/03/20
    公開日: 2017/07/27
    ジャーナル フリー

    本研究の目的は,最近ヨーロッパで浸透しているCLIL を日本の小学校英語教育で実践した場合,主に動機づけや「聞く」「話す」のコミュニケーション能力育成の視点からいかなる効果があるのかを探り,ひいては他教科の内容を学びながら言語も同時に習得する二刀流成功の鍵は何なのかを示唆することにある。研究方法としては,広島市の公立小学校5・6年生の児童を対象とし,年間の何回かの英語の授業で社会科内容を取り入れ,CLIL の4つの柱「内容」「言語」および「思考」「協学」を意識した実践を行い,授業実践後には4点法による選択式と感想を聞く記述式のアンケートを実施し,児童の反応を分析した。その結果,①内容が簡単すぎたり難しすぎたりしない限り,CLIL の4つを軸とする活動は児童の知的好奇心を刺激し,社会科の教材により児童の英語学習意欲は高められること,②他教科を学びながらコミュニケーションをとることで,英語学習を強く意識することなく,インプット量を自然に増やし「聞く」「話す」の定着を図ることができること,が明らかになった。また,クラス全員が社会科を好きという訳ではないので,嫌いな子でも活躍の場が持てるように,視覚や身体などの得意な多重知能(MI)を生かす個性重視の指導も併用し,それがより効果的な学習者中心の指導に繋がることも分かった。

  • 西尾 醇
    燃料協会誌
    1960年 39 巻 7 号 496
    発行日: 1960/07/20
    公開日: 2010/06/28
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 高垣 由美
    Revue japonaise de didactique du français
    2014年 9 巻 1-2 号 113-123
    発行日: 2014/09/15
    公開日: 2017/10/14
    ジャーナル フリー
    「Le francais diplomatique 外交フランス語」は,教室での利用を想定しない,自主学習用のiPhoneアプリケーションで,外交の分野で使われるフランス語を学びたい日本人学習者向けの教材である。これは非営利目的の研究プロジェクトの成果であり,Apple社のオンラインストアApp Storeで無償公開されている。教材は,選択式聞き取り問題,選択式文法・語彙問題,国旗から国名を当てるクイズからなりたっている。この教材の独自性は,最新テクノロジーを使ったシリアスゲームである点と,日本人学習者向けに特定目的のための(専門分野別)フランス語を学ぶまれな機会を提供している点である。このアプリケーションの開発の過程で,良いスマートフォンアプリケーションの三つの条件がわかった。操作のシンプルさ,1回のセッションが短いゲームであること,繰り返しの使用に耐えるコンテンツである。
  • 寺本 四郎
    日本釀造協會雜誌
    1954年 49 巻 8 号 339
    発行日: 1954/08/15
    公開日: 2011/11/04
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 大森 照夫
    新地理
    1955年 4 巻 1 号 40-43
    発行日: 1955/06/25
    公開日: 2010/08/10
    ジャーナル フリー
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