本発表は、占領下の「蒙疆」において協力者となった回民の伝統エリートたちの事例に注目し、の植民地支配（主に回教工作）が中国の「少数民族」社会にあたえた影響、「少数民族」側の様々な対処方法、「少数民族」社会内部の権力構造の変容について歴史人類学的視点から考察し、植民地行政側と「少数民族」社会とのあいだに生起する政治力学の特徴を見極め、の植民地支配の地域的特性を明らかにする。

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　In 2012, a high school student who was the captain of a school basketball team committed suicide after suffering repeated corporal punishment from the head coach, who was a physical education teacher.
　This sort of tragic incident always prompts discussion about the current state of Japanese sports clubs. However, although such incidents occur repeatedly, Japan has not been able to eradicate violence in sports clubs.
　The purpose of the present study was to examine the reasons why Japanese society has tolerated corporal punishment by coaches or seniors in sports clubs, focusing on a popular belief that the roots of these practices lie in behavioral patterns that were prevalent in the old Japanese military during the Second World War.
　Initially, the paper proposes reasons why many people in Japanese society have believed and shared this view for a long time, although it has not been proven. Secondly, an attempt is made to reveal this as a problem for ordinary people who have consciously or subconsciously accepted corporal punishment as an intrinsic aspect of sports clubs, rather than considering it as an issue specifically for coaches or seniors.
　The following points were clarified:
　1) For critics of corporal punishment, the “military origin theory” supports their opinions powerfully. Because this logic demonstrates the relationship between sports clubs and the old military, it is able to emphasize the problematic and inhuman nature of corporal punishment in sports clubs. This is one explanation for why this belief has been shared by many Japanese people for so long.
　2) The “military origin theory” is a way of shifting the responsibility for violence in sports clubs away from the perpetrators. This has been supported by the general feeling of Japanese ordinary people against the old Japanese military.
　3) The existence of violence in sports clubs reflects a degree of maturity in the general public viewpoint about sports by a considerable proportion of Japanese who do not or can not distinguish between hard training and violent behavior.
　Consequently, this belief negates the chances that many Japanese people consider corporal punishment in sports clubs to be their own problem.

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沖縄戦における集団自決壕からの生存者に関する聞き取り内容の社会人類学的分析である。沖縄本島で1945年4月２日に起こった、通称、チビチリガマとよばれる83名の死者をだした避難壕の様子と・米軍との人間関係の構造を分析し、人類学者としてのその意味を考察する。事例は、チビチリガマからの生還者・ハワイ・オアフ島在住・上原進助氏のライフヒスリーを中心とする。 　

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The aim of this article is to describe the characteristics of Japanese military transport on Thai railways during World War II, by analyzing the train schedules now held in the National Archives of Thailand. These schedules contain such data as the number and type of carriages on each train together with their origin and destination for almost every day from the beginning of the War until September 1945. Although the author initially compiled the data from these schedules hoping to grasp the overall volume of Japanese military transport, it soon became evident that the data did not cover all types of activity, because there were not enough train movements from Malaya to Thailand in the schedules. This forced the author to complement the schedules with an analysis of bills for Japanese military transport issued by the Thai railway department. The author divides the war time period into four stages for analysis: 1) front-line-expansion (December 1941-June 1942), 2) construction of the Thai-Burma line (July 1942-October 1943), 3) the opening of the Thai-Burma line (November 1943-December 1944) and 4) network division (January-September 1945).

During stage 1), the main transport flows were found on two routes: from Bangkok to Malaya via the Southern line and to Phitsanulok or Sawankhalok via the Northern line, corresponding to the Malaya Operation and the Burma Operation, respectively. Other flows originated from Cambodia to the same destinations via the Eastern line and Bangkok. During stage 2), flows from Bangkok to Malaya and from Cambodia to Bangkok still existed, although their volumes were reduced. On the other hand, new flows emerged from either Bangkok or Malaya to the starting point of the Thai-Burma line to supply its construction. Stage 3) experienced an increase in transport due to the opening of Thai-Burma line and the Imphal Operation. Flows to Malaya and the Thai-Burma line still accounted for the majority of the transport, but flows to the Isthmus of Kra and the North also increased to supplement the Thai-Burma line. Finally, during stage 4), transport volume further expanded, while the total distance of transport dramatically dropped, as many lines were halted at several points due to Allied bombing, to the extent that all long-distance transport was suspended, except on the Eastern line.

The characteristic features of wartime Japanese military transport through Thai railways are threefold: 1) long-distance railway transport as a substitute for maritime transport, 2) supplementary transport to the Burmese front-lines, and 3) the existence of commodity transport unrelated to troop movements. This transport concentrated on supplementing the Burmese front-line rather than transport to Malaya, except during the Malay Operation period. As Japanese forces arrived at Saigon or Singapore for deployment to Burma, military transport on Thai railways became the main form of long-distance “international” movement. Before the War, Thai railways were of little importance as international lines compared to maritime transport. This “international” railway activity, while limited only to military transport, eventually emerged for the first time in Southeast Asia through the creation of “international” rail links with Cambodia and Burma, and a shortage of maritime vessels during wartime. Furthermore, there was a considerable amount of commodity transport apart from troop movements, a fact which has not been sufficiently dealt with in the “official” histories of the War.

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　シンガポールの市街中心部には，戦没者記念碑が立つ．第2次世界大戦中，シンガポールを占領した

は，抗日分子の排除を企図して，5万人ともいわれる華僑を粛清していた．1962年になって，粛清された華僑犠牲者の遺骸が発掘されたのを契機とし，占領下に殺されたすべての一般市民を弔うための慰霊碑が求められ，1967年に落成した．市民による抗議運動の高まりを受けて，日本は同年にシンガポールと準賠償協定を結んだが，戦争責任を公式に認めるものではなかった．戦没者記念碑は，多民族国家シンガポールの象徴であるが，日本は今もなお，それを直視することができないでいる．

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It has been pointed out that there are some crucial differences about the nature of the Japanese language education in the Japanese territories of Southeast Asia. It, however, is difficult for us to recognize the differences because “assimilation policy” and “kominka policy” have been interpreted imprecisely.
The aim of this paper is to compare and contrast the case in Malaya with that in the other territories of Southeast Asia on the Japanese language education under the Japanese occupation (1941-45) and direct our attention to the case in Malaya within the framework of the history of Japanese language education.
In the early period Military Administration of the Japanese occupation, the Gunseikambu (Military Administration) attached a great deal of importanceto primary education as a means of popularizing the Japanese language. In the middle period Military Administration, however, it shifted the emphasis to the Japanese teaching coordinated with the spiritual training of Rensei Kyoiku. In the late period Military Administration, it emphasized more on strengthening Japanese language education and primary education.
But at the final stage of the late period, the Gunseikambu shifted to relaxing its language policy, because the policy that instructors employed only Japanese as a teaching language was implemented too soon, so that it failed.
For the reasons stated above, the Gunseikambu played a minimal role in the education policy, particularly during the initial and middle periods of the Japanese occupation. We can confirm that the Japanese language education policy in Malaya during the late period was more directly influenced by the Japanese language education policy of the Japanese government than that in the other Japanese territories of Southeast Asia.
This policy in Malaya, however, was entirely based on the kokugo (national language) ideology, and the same teaching methodology used to teach in Japan and the Japanese colonies was employed in Malaya. Therefore, we can say that the Japanese language education policy in Malaya was ideologically a copy of the internal Japanese language education policy itself in some school, and it was most influenced by the kokugo ideology in the Japanese territories of Southeast Asia. But it eventually failed in Malaya because Japanese was not a Malayan common language nor the kokugo Malayans. In this sense, the nature of the Japanese language education in Malaya was different from that in the Japanese colonies.

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