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  • 中川 雅彦
    アジア経済
    2022年 63 巻 1 号 2-20
    発行日: 2022/03/15
    公開日: 2022/03/28
    ジャーナル フリー HTML

    本稿は,朝鮮民主主義人民共和国の党営企業グループの形成過程,そして党営企業グループの傘下企業の構成,さらに党営企業グループと国家の計画経済に基づく一般経済との関係について分析し,党営企業グループの活動の特徴を明らかにするものである。党営企業グループの形成過程に関しては,1960年代に党直営の貿易会社である大聖貿易会社が設立されたこと,また,一般経済部門の生産機関から党の直営に移管されて輸出専門工場になった沙里院タオル工場の例が示された。そして,1970年代に党財政経理部39号室,平壌市党委員会や党軽工業部などで大聖,金剛,綾羅島,烽火などの企業グループが形成されて活動資金を蓄積するようになったことが示された。党企業グループの傘下企業に関する分析から,金のインゴットやマツタケ,ベニズワイガニに関して,党営企業グループの独占状態があることなどが確認された。その一方で,船興食料工場が党軽工業部の企業グループから一般経済部門へ移管された例や党行政部の活動資金が一般経済部門の養鶏工場に投資された例,39号室の資金で建設された平壌樹脂鉛筆工場,祥原セメント連合企業所など,党営企業グループあるいは党営企業グループの資金が一般経済に生産的な貢献をしている例により,党営企業グループが一般経済部門から一方的に資源を吸い上げているという従来の見解が正確ではないことが示された。

  • 伊豆見 元, 平岩 俊司
    国際政治
    1994年 1994 巻 106 号 149-161,L15
    発行日: 1994/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the relationship between the withdrawal of Chinese People's Volunteer Army (CPVA) which was completed in 1958 and the establishment of Kim Il Sung's power base. When compared with the U. S. forces still stationed in South Korea, the CPVA withdrawal progressed smoothly upon Chinese-North Korean agreement. The CPVA withdrawal was implemented in two stage, in 1954-1955 and 1958, and suspended in 1956-1957. Why suspended in 1956-1957? According to the Chinese explanation, it was suspended upon Chinese-North Korean agreement with the shakeup within the socialist camp after the 20th Soviet Communist Party Congress in the background. However, 1956 and 1957 was a period in which Kim Il Sung established his own power base by purgeing the Chinese and Soviet factions within North Korea. In 1956, China suspended the withdrawal of CPVA to pressure Kim Il Sung who trying to eliminate the Chinese faction within North Korea. However, Kim Il Sung has almost completed purging the main members of the Chinese faction by the end of 1957. In 1958, China who judged that the revival of the Chinese faction was difficult, completely withdrew the CPVA to maintain good relations with North Korea. Afterwards, Kim Il Sung continued his all-out purge of the Chinese faction and established his power base. Therefore, the establishment of Kim Il Sung's power base and the timing of the CPVA withdrawal was closely connected. Afterwards, North Korea and China maintained good relations, but it was a delicate relationship between Kim Il Sung and China in the beginning.
  • 中川 雅彦
    アジア経済
    2001年 42 巻 11 号 2-27
    発行日: 2001/11/15
    公開日: 2023/03/29
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 朝鮮戦争の開戦工作との関連
    森 善宣
    国際政治
    2003年 2003 巻 134 号 136-151,L17
    発行日: 2003/11/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In this paper, I reflect on the correlation between the formation of Korean Worker's Party (KWP) and KIM Il-sung's maneuver to wage the Korean War. For a long time, it was believed that KWP was formed through the merging of South Korean Worker's Party (SKWP) and North Korean Worker's Party (NKWP) from June to July in 1949 with KIM Il-sung as the chairman of the Central Committee. However, new materials prove that the formation of KWP just meant the integration of the Central Committee of both KWPs and had a close connection with the tactical defferences between PAK Honyong, the top leader of SKWP, and KIM Il-sung who had been pointed out the leader of Korean Communist Movement by Stalin in 1946.
    PAK pursued the overturn of Rhee Syng-man's regime by guerrilla conflict of SKWP in South Korea and tried to avoid the civil war between South and North regimes by appealing for a ‘peaceful unification plan’ which the Democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland (DFUF) proposed. DFUF was established under PAK's initiative in June 1949. In this tactics it seems that SKWP and NKWP formed a ‘Joint Central Committee’ to manage activities of DFUF between June 28 and July 7 in 1949, when KIM Il-sung failed to take up the chairmanship of the Central Committee since the appeal of DFUF was not only one to withstand invasion of South Korea but also to contain KIM Il-sung's tactics. His tactics had dual purposes to achieve Korean unification and to seize the actual initiative of Korean Communist Movement with KIM's head position of KWP through advancing Korean People's Army into South Korea.
    KIM opened up his tactics in a conversation with T. Shtykov, Soviet Ambassadar to North Korea, in August 1949 after his agreement to the ‘peaceful unification plan’ of DFUF. Although in September 1949 the Central Committee of Soviet Communist Party rejected this military option and ordered KIM and PAK to develop the latter's tactics with alerting KWP to the intervention of U. S. forces into the civil war, KIM Il-sung made a use of an opportunity of the favorable turn of Sino-Soviet relation. Finally, KIM gained his end in January 1950 that Stalin allowed him to prepare to open the war on condition that Mao Tse-zung should agree with KIM's tactics. Before the agreement of Stalin and Mao to open the civil war in Korean Peninsula, PAK had no other choice but to cooperate with KIM's tactics. Therefore the Korean War broke out in June 1950 and KIM began a purging of KWP after failing to accomplish his purposes through the war.
  • ―朝鮮労働党の軍事路線の成立経緯―
    宮本 悟
    国際安全保障
    2012年 40 巻 1 号 1-18
    発行日: 2012/06/30
    公開日: 2022/04/07
    ジャーナル フリー
  • なぜ北朝鮮の軍人はクーデターを起こさなかったのか?
    宮本 悟
    年報政治学
    2005年 56 巻 2 号 195-215,253
    発行日: 2005年
    公開日: 2010/04/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    For a long time, a majority of people have thought that the military would attempt a coup d'etat in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea due to the widespread economic deterioration in the past, and the fact that the domestic economy has seen some recent improvement makes this event more unlikely at present.
    Why haven't a group of officers within the Korean People's Army attempted a coup d'etat? In this research, I provide three key reasons that explain why, even during three crisis periods involving major politico-military purges, this has not happened.
    Chiefly these were: entrenched clique competition in the military; the existence of an organization that can oppose the armed forces; and a systemic and purposeful division of the military. I have confirmed through this research that the system that has divided the military still exists in the army, a system controlled effectively by a senior commissar. Therefore, this research concludes that the possibility of a coup d'etat occurring is low even in the present D. P. R. K.
  • 中川 雅彦
    アジア経済
    2004年 45 巻 5 号 2-33
    発行日: 2004/05/15
    公開日: 2023/03/27
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 朝鮮半島の国際政治
    鐸木 昌之
    国際政治
    1989年 1989 巻 92 号 63-79,L10
    発行日: 1989/10/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The catalyst for improvement in recent North Korea (NK)-Soviet relations was the Soviet's acknowledgement of the Kim Jong Il successor regime, and its de facto recognition of NK's independence after Brezhnev's death. NK's assessment of “perestroika” has strong diplomatic implications, which reflects the closer relationship between the two countries. Perestroika is highly appraised on parts in accord with “juche (self-reliance)” ideology and course stressed by Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. However, the NK leaders have clearly shown that, they will independently choose the reforms to be introduced. In this aspect, NK's reforms may be called selective reforms or openness based on “self-reliance.”
    Namely, political structural reform or, “glasnost, ” a major part of “perestroika” is not in consistence with their own base for legitimacy. Therefore, it is necessary for them to prevent the influences of those reforms from penetrating the domestic arena. From the lessons of the past, the leaders feel a need to prevent the development of a domestic political power based on Soviet theories which would challenge the Kim Il Sung-Kim Jong Il regime. It becomes more imperative, especially, at the present moment when the effectiveness of the Kim Jong Il successor regime is being tested.
    Therefore, as a preventive against the impact of “perestroika” a new ideology called “social-political organism” theory has been created as a legitimation for the successive regime. In this theory, it is said that the supreme leader, the party, and the poeple comprise one social organic body, and the supreme leader guarantees eternal “social-political organism” to its members. A socialist society have been redefined not only as collective possession of manufacturing means, but also as a society in which a “social-political organism” is created. Furthermore, this is a strong expression of NK nationalism, with the purpose of the recovering the superiority of socialism vis-a-vis capitalism.
    Accordingly, in ideological terms, it could be said that the Soviet “perestroika”, political structural reform in particular, is being criticized as revisionism. However, it must be stressed that this ideology, at the present, is only domestically-oriented, and does not comprise a direct criticism toward the Soviet Union. As long as autonomy is respected between NK and the Soviet Union, a sense of incompatibility in each other's course or regime would not develop into open criticism as in the past. But the very fact that these mutual differences exist, sets the limits on NK-Soviet relations.
  • 黒坂 真
    大阪経大論集
    2014年 65 巻 3 号 27-
    発行日: 2014年
    公開日: 2018/02/15
    ジャーナル フリー
  • アジア経済研究所 2011年 v+237ページ
    柳 学洙
    アジア経済
    2011年 52 巻 10 号 68-72
    発行日: 2011/10/15
    公開日: 2022/09/15
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 崔 智喜
    アジア研究
    2023年 69 巻 1 号 1-21
    発行日: 2023/01/31
    公開日: 2023/02/17
    [早期公開] 公開日: 2023/01/17
    ジャーナル フリー

    The 1980s was a period when North Korea’s military actions, such as the Rangoon bombing and the bombing of Korean Air Flight 858, drew focus away from Japan-North Korea relations. In terms of North Korea’s foreign policy, it is often contrasted with South Korea’s “Nordpolitik,” which was aimed at improving relations with China and the Soviet Union ahead of the 1988 Seoul Olympics.

    However, during this period, North Korea did not spare any effort to improve relations with Western countries such as Japan, the United States, or South Korea. Among them, the approach to Japan was remarkable. In 1984, North Korea re-signed a fishing agreement with Japan that had been neglected for two years. In 1985, active personnel exchanges between Japan and North Korea took place, and there were significant moves to improve relations at the political level.

    North Korea clearly expressed its intention to build political relations, including exchanges with the Liberal Democratic Party and the Japanese government, and tried to address resolvable issues. While the situation in Northeast Asia was exhibiting increasing fluidity, such as China’s reforms, opening-up policies and efforts to improve China-South Korea relations, North Korea had tried to develop not only economic but also political relations with Japan.

    On the other hand, North Korea expressed its negative attitude regarding the issue of establishing mutual trade offices, fearing that it would lead to cross-approval. It is presumed that this was largely due to concerns over the rapid development of China-South Korea relations. North Korea was reluctant to enter into a South Korea-led cross-approval initiative aimed at linking Japan-North Korea relations with China-South Korea relations, but tried hard to advance bilateral relations by increasing contacts with Japan’s government.

    It is no exaggeration to say that North Korea, which had been closely watching South Korea expand its exchanges with socialist countries such as China and the Soviet Union, was trying its own “Southern Policy”. North Korea’s efforts to build relations with the Japanese government and the Liberal Democratic Party in response to South Korea’s improved relations with communist countries such as China in the mid-1980s were maintained amid changes in the strategic environment caused by easing U.S.-Soviet tensions. It led to Kanemaru’s visit to North Korea in 1990 and negotiations to normalize diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea in 1991.

  • 中川 雅彦
    アジア経済
    2002年 43 巻 11 号 2-23
    発行日: 2002/11/15
    公開日: 2023/03/29
    ジャーナル フリー
  • London: Hurst & Company, 2002, xvii+202pp.
    河原地 英武
    アジア経済
    2003年 44 巻 4 号 70-73
    発行日: 2003/04/15
    公開日: 2023/03/27
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 岩波書店 2002年 x+492+37ページ
    中川 雅彦
    アジア経済
    2003年 44 巻 1 号 115-119
    発行日: 2003/01/15
    公開日: 2023/03/27
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 高 昇孝
    土地制度史学
    1966年 9 巻 1 号 1-15
    発行日: 1966/10/20
    公開日: 2017/09/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    農業・農民問題は,農業生産力の発展にかんする問題,農民をあらゆる搾取と抑圧から解放し,かれらを社会主義,共産主義の道へ導びいてゆく方途と方法についての問題である.レーニンは,農民問題を,労農同盟にかんする革命の基本的な戦略的問題として提起し,農業・農民問題を社会主義,共産主義建設の重要な構成部分のひとつとみなした.したがって,農業・農民問題を正しく解決することなしには,革命を勝利へ導びくことと,社会主義,共産主義を実現することもできない.わけても,農民が住民の圧倒的多数をしめる植民地・後進諸国において,農業・農民問題はとくに重要な意義をもつ.それは,農業・農民問題の正しい解決いかんが,これらの諸国では,革命の勝敗と国の運命を左右する決定的な鍵となるからである.朝鮮(北朝鮮)では,解放後これまで,革命発展のそれぞれの段階で提起された農業・農民問題を成功のうちに解決してきた.そしていまでは,「社会主義農村問題にかんするテーゼ」のしめした方向にしたがい,農業・農民問題の最終的解決をめざしてすすんでいる.以下では,朝鮮における反帝・反封建民主主義革命および社会主義革命の段階における農業・農民問題解決の諸経験を概観し,そのおもな特徴をあきらかにしてみたい.
  • 上澤 宏之
    アジア市場経済学会年報
    2021年 24 巻 29-37
    発行日: 2021年
    公開日: 2021/09/27
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス

    北朝鮮の金正恩体制下における「経済改革」は,既存社会主義理論の枠内での解釈や経済管理方法の部分的修正に止まっていることなどから,1960年代にみられたソ連・東欧社会主義国の改革措置と類似した低いレベルの動きと言えるが,同法制化を通じて市場メカニズムを活用する方向性を明示するなど従来と異なる新しい変化もうかがえる。現在,これら改革措置を中心とした金正恩体制の経済発展戦略は,国連制裁により「制裁への対抗」という内向きの性格に変容した上,昨今のコロナ禍と水害によって更なる軌道修正を迫られるなど重大な試練期を迎えている。

  • 李 明
    都市計画論文集
    2013年 48 巻 3 号 519-524
    発行日: 2013/10/25
    公開日: 2013/10/25
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
    本稿は、朝鮮戦争休戦直後における平壌の被害状況、都市復興計画や住環境整備などの復興過程を辿ることにより、東アジア戦災復興史の研究に興味深い情報を提供しようとするものである。1)朝鮮戦争による戦災状況について若干の確認を試みる。2)戦時中の復興計画について考察する。3)復興と国家建設方針について社会主義建設方針、設計の標準化・規格化と組立式施工方式の導入などの面から若干の確認と考察を試みる。4)復興建設について復興都市計画、都市中心部の町並み形成や住環境整備を中心に考察する。
  • 金 炳植
    国際経済
    1960年 1960 巻 12 号 280-283
    発行日: 1960/12/15
    公開日: 2012/02/09
    ジャーナル フリー
  • Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2005, xv+274pp.
    河原地 英武
    アジア経済
    2005年 46 巻 10 号 92-95
    発行日: 2005/10/15
    公開日: 2023/02/07
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 中川 圭輔
    アジア経営研究
    2023年 29 巻 107-118
    発行日: 2023年
    公開日: 2023/11/03
    ジャーナル フリー

    The purpose of this study was to clarify various characteristics of business ethics awareness in North Korea. As its research method, the study reviewed previous research to examine the approximate flow of the Socialist Corporate Responsibility Management System, from its introduction to its implementation, and the contents of the Enterprise Act in North Korea. The study then explored the characteristics of morals in North Korea by focusing on several videos from the “Let’s eliminate this kind of phenomenon” series on Korean Central Television(KCTV).

    The study revealed the following four characteristics of business ethics awareness in North Korea.(1)Executives must have responsibilities and morals in an organization; however, the opinions of subordinates are disregarded, while the excessive flattering of superiors is criticized implicitly.(2)The collectivist spirit of “one for all, all for one” is the basic principle of socialist ethics in life, which is related to communist morality in some way.(3)Various new programs appear to have raised public consciousness of environmental conservation and the Sustainable Development Goals(SDGs), helping to strengthen awareness.(4)While the Chollima Movement, speed battles(Sokdochun), and self-reliance(Jaryeokgaengsaeng)have persevered with granting greater autonomy to business, various indications persist of an unchanging and firm adherence to the socialist system.

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