Postwar Japanese diplomatic negotiations with the Soviet Union have involved informal contact-makers in certain significant ways. Their roles and functions, however, have changed over time. Two major diplomatic negotiations involving the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries in the mid-1950s and the continuing territorial dispute in the 1960s and the early 1970s are examined to illustrate the case in point.
The initial contacts to start negotiations on normalizing bilateral relations were made through informal channels. Fujita Kazuo, a journalist, and Majima Kan, the chief administrator of the National Conference to Restore Diplomatic Relations with China and the Soviet Union, became instrumental in the successful Soviet bid to open a direct communication link with Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro (1954-1956) at quite the displeasure of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Once the formal negotiations set off, informal channels were, nonetheless, still utilized, but this time at the highest negotiating levels and mostly by Japan.
Hatoyama's visit to Moscow in October 1956 culminated in the Joint Declaration to establish diplomatic relations but the territorial issue was left unresolved. Subsequently. Japan made repeated efforts in vain to break through the deadlock, including the informal diplomatic maneuvers in the 1960s and Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei's tête-à-tête negotiations with the Soviet leadership in Moscow in 1973. The Soviet Union used non-diplomatic channels to probe Japanese thinking and in turn to convey to Japan some of its own thinking on outstanding issues. The maneuverability of informal contact-makers, however, narrowed in the 1970s as both the Japanese and the Soviet negotiating positions on the territorial dispute hardened.
Several other factors restricted the use of informal contact-makers as back channels of negotiations in the 1970s. The Foreign Ministry took the view that the ultimate resolution of the territorial issue squarely rested with the political judgment of the highest Soviet leadership. The hierarchical and closed structure of Soviet foreign policy-making also limited the maneuverability of Japanese informal contact-makers. The Foreign Ministry did not favor using politicians and other prominent individuals with political clout as emissaries, nor did it favor seeing individuals without official credentials approaching Moscow. This stemmed in part from the Ministry's belief in conducting a unified foreign policy, and in part from the Ministry's elitism in handling foreign relations. It was distrustful of Japanese who with unofficial capacity would volunteer to seek contacts with the Communist power.

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This article investigates that how Japan pursued inconsistent diplomatic conceptions, establishing a New Order in East Asia and avoiding the deterioration of the U.S.-Japan relationship, by focusing on Foreign Minister Arita’s diplomatic strategy toward the United States from the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War to 1940. It argues that Arita tried to maintain the U.S.-Japan relationship within the framework of the Nine Power Treaty by rectifying the open door policy for establishing a New Order in East Asia.

During the initial stage of the Second Sino-Japanese war, Foreign Minister Hachiro Arita devoted his primary attention to the creation of so called Toa Shin Chitsujo (New Order in East Asia) by establishing an economic block with China and a puppet state “Manchukuo.” The United States had been opposing this policy as it infringed upon the Nine Power Treaty which reaffirmed the open door policy and guaranteed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China. At the same time, Japan was economically dependent upon the US especially for raw materials that were of vital importance for Japan’s war against China.

The preset study reveals in what way Arita pursued two inconsistent diplomatic goals: avoiding the deterioration of US-Japan relations while attempting to establish a New Order in violation of the Nine Power Treaty. Previous researches interpreted Arita’s Statement of 18 November 1938 as abandonment of the Nine Power Treaty and alteration of the status quo. However, this article shows that Arita made efforts to keep Japanese engagement consistent with the Nine Power Treaty by asking the Department of State, through the U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew, to rectify the interpretation of the open door policy in exchange for the protection and respect of the US rights in China. In that sense, the Nine Power Treaty served to Arita as a valuable asset in achieving inconsistent diplomatic objectives.

In order to alleviate the Depart of State skepticism about Arita’s approach and gain the US trust, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to engage in protection of the US interests in China. Then policy makers of the Foreign Ministry decided to settle the problem of the blockade of the Yangtzu River. However, this policy had never been implemented because of the strong opposition from young diplomatic officers. As a result, the Department of State made their perception of Japan worse, and it bankrupted the Arita’s foreign policy.

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It is said that Japan did not approach her enemies to end the hostilities until the last stage of the Pacific War. But she tried repeatedly to negotiate a cease-fire between herself and Nationalist China (Chungking) during the war. What made Japan consider a separate peace only with China? How did she intend to make peace with China? This paper aims to analyze the objectives of Japan's approach to China and to make clear the circumstances of her peace efforts toward Chungking.
At first Japan contemplated making peace with China as a part of the plan to weaken the will of the United States to continue the war. As the tide of war turned unfavorably to her, Japan wanted to move her troops stationed in China to the other fronts by making a cease-fire with Chungking. In the last stage of the war, some of the Japanese leaders hoped that China would act as an intermediary between Japan and the United Nations to obtain less severe peace terms than unconditional surrender.
Japan, however, did not negotiate directly with China. The approaches in the early stage of the war were limited to gathering intelligence about Chinese tendency to make peace. Japanese were afraid that they would betray their weakness if they made overtures to China. Japan relied on the Wang Ching-wei Government (Nanking) to make contact with Chungking. Nanking government leaders, especially Chou Fo-hai, opened and maintained various routes of contact with Chungking through liaison agents. But they used the routes as a means to pursue their own purposes other than making peace overtures.
Japan did not regard China as a full-fledged member of the United Nations. So she expected that she would be able to exploit the differences between Chungking and its allies and to make a separate peace with it. But China would not show any attitude to accept Japan's overtures. Japan had few resources or means to induce China to consider making a separate peace.

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