Ports have played an important role in trade as part of the modernization process following the Meiji restoration. However, little research has been conducted on how local politics and private capital interact in port construction. This paper therefore focuses on Wakayama Port in order to study this interaction process.
In Wakayama Port (Aogishi Port), the deposition of sands was a major problem, and users have been requesting improvements since the Meiji era. Furthermore, speculation from political parties and sources of private capital actively promoted alternative port construction plans for Aogishi Port. In such developments, there was much to gain in terms of influence and profit. The Nankai Railway was affiliated with the non-Seiyuukai group of the Wakayama City Council and promoted the Oura Port construction in the Taisho era. On the other hand, the Keihan Electric Railway supported the Seiyuukai political party, who proposed the Kemi Port construction. In 1922, the Wakayama Chikkou Kiseikai was formed to solve the port construction problems. However, because of political and capital conflict within the organization, neither the Oura nor the Kemi projects were completed.
The Aogishi Port construction, which accompanied the Kinokawa repair work, was decided in the latter half of the 1920s. However, the problem of subsidizing the construction was prolonged, and Wakayama Prefecture, which had a shortage of funds due to the recession, planned to inject private capital. The governor of the Minseitou political party demanded the participation of the Nankai Railway, which had supported Minseitou. On the other hand, to protect the Hanwa Electric Railway, which the Keihan Electric Railway had helped capitalize, the Seiyuukai opposed Minseitou's plans. In the end, the participation of the Nankai Railway was approved, and the Wakayama Port construction work was started in March 1932.
However, after the work had begun, it soon faced financial difficulties. The lack of funds for restoration work after the Muroto typhoon struck in September 1934 was a major problem. Moreover, after the 1930s, regional development was promoted by city planning and the readjustment of town lots which had an impact on port construction work. In addition, the Sumitomo Metal Industries factory, which manufactured munitions, was attracted by Wakayama Prefecture in 1940. The capital dependence on the Nankai Railway became strong due to economic rather than political reasons because these plans were not negatively affected, and the Nankai Railway again donated additional contributions.
As mentioned above, Wakayama Port construction was always controlled by the logic of the region. Furthermore, it was achieved by the initiative of the Minseitou, which afterwards largely relied on capital help for port construction work from the Nankai Railway. That is, the Nankai Railway played not only the role of main user of Wakayama Port but also that of its main investor.

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In the introduction to his monologues, the Shôwa emperor suggested that the remote cause of the “Greater East Asia War” was racial discrimination in the wake of the First World War. But connecting the “humiliation” of the rejection of the Japanese proposal for racial equality at Versailles and American government's Japanese Exclusion Act in 1924 with the invasion of Kota Bahru on the Malay Peninsula and the attack on Pearl Harbor nearly two decades later requires a huge ahistorical leap. Why did an illogical and sensational ideology that proclaimed a “holy war” against the “devilish Americans and British” gain ascendancy in 1930s Japan? The purpose of this essay is to concretely analyze the influence of pan-Asianism, the communal mentality that began to pervade Japan during the interwar period. These sentiments, as embodied in the words “atmosphere” (kûki) and “feeling” (kibun) are essential in understanding Japanese politics and foreign relations of this time.
This paper focuses specifically on institutions that contributed to a global collision of culture, religion, and commercial interests. It considers the Great East Asia Society, which, led by General Matsui Iwane, became a huge non-governmental network. It also examines religious alliances as represented by Buddhism and business groups, which sought to increase the commercial competitiveness of enterprises such as light industry. I argue that pan-Asianism became a political movement that provided the momentum for the creation of new political institutions that threatened existing political parties and provided a platform for national political organizations that pushed for political equality and participation within and beyond Japan. Furthermore, this essay looks at the activities of Taiwanese, Chinese, and Indian merchants who operated on the peripheries of the Chinese, British, and Japanese empires and contributed to the global reorganization of economic relations in the aftermath of the world depression.
How did these elements contribute to the “Greater East Asia War”? This essay describes the gradual transformation and growth of pan-Asianism by considering three events related to the rise of pan-Asianism. The first two were meetings of the All Asian Race Conference, first at Nagasaki in 1926, which took place after the implementation of the Japanese Exclusion Act in the United States, and then at Dairen in 1934, which followed Japan's creation of the Manchurian puppet-state and the Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations. The third incident was an anti-British demonstration at Kobe in 1939 that occurred during Japan's embargo against British and French concessions at Tientsin. In short, this paper argues that pan-Asianism helped lead Japan to the “Greater East Asia War.”

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