It is said that the controversy surrounding the question of the Japan's participation in the United Nations Peace-keeping operations in the 1960s was largely responsible for the establishment of the so called Yoshida Doctrine as Japanese ground strategy in the post war period. This paper will examine the question of the Japanese government's handling of this issue using document by evidence. It will investigate various problems related to Japan's PKO participation through the lenses of Japan's war renouncing constitution and the security alliance with the United States. They form the cornerstone of the Yoshida Doctrine.
These problems became especially salient during the establishment of Sato Eisaku. The administration sought to use Japanese participation in PKO as a means to accomplishment two diplomatic objects. First, such participation was seen as means of actions with in the framework of the US-Japan security system to alleviate some of America's Asian security burdens and create an environment conducive to the return of Okinawa to Japanese administration. Second, it was seen as a means to growing diplomatic autonomy in the United Nations and South East Asia. Therefore Ministry of Foreign Affairs drew up a “United Nations Cooperation Bill” in 1966. Policymakers planned to send Self Defense Forces on PKO using this bill. Even though this plan ended in failure because the climate of public opinion was strongly influenced by postwar pacifism and there was widespread and vehement opposition to the dispatch of military personnel abroad, the Sato administration sought a way to interpret the constitution in a manner that would allow Self Defense Forces participation in PKO.
Afterward, with the end of the Cold War system and the outbreak of regional conflicts, most conspicuously the Gulf War, the international community and especially the United States expressing their exasperation with Japan's continuing reluctance to participate international peacekeeping. However, by that time, due to its actions during the Sato administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had long since devised a method to reconcile PKO participation with the post war constitution and thus allow Japan's adaptation to the new international solution within the framework of the Yoshida Doctrine. As a result, Japan could dispatch not only civilians but also SDF personnel to PKO in Cambodia in time. Japan could reinforce the Japanese commitment to the Cambodian peace process, cooperation with the U. S., and U. N. diplomacy which were, after all the very purposes of Japanese PKO policy.

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Generally speaking, Japan's disarmament policy is twofold. The one is “heiwa kokka”, that is to say as the only country to have suffered atomic bombings Japan keeps the Three Non-Nuclear Principals (not to manufacture, possess, or allow the importation into Japan of nuclear weapons). The other is that Japan's security is dependent on American nuclear deterrent. But, it isn't evident that those factors affected Japan's policy on the nuclear test ban problem immediately after Japan became a member of the United Nations. The aim of this article is to describe the process of Japan's policy on the nuclear test ban problem. Firstly, this article examines how Japanese standpoints of “heiwa kokka” and security were in connection with Japan's policy on the nuclear test ban problem. Secondly, as a case study the policy process of the 12th and 14th General Assembly of United Nations is examined. Finally, this article briefly refers to Japanese attitude toward the partial nuclear test ban treaty.
Because of an aversion to nuclear weapons in the aftermath of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the Bikini incident, the Japanese had protested the nuclear tests of United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. The Japanese government had also protested the nuclear tests of three nuclear powers. But it was not to promote nuclear disarmament but to prevent the Japanese people's feeling from changing anti-nuclear weapon into anti-western nations. That was the reality of “heiwa kokka”. Because the Japanese government had little realization that Japan had been exposed to the military threat of China and Soviet, the utility of American nuclear deterrent had not been discussed in Japan. For that reason the Japanese government could introduce the non-nuclear principals and carried out protest against three nuclear powers without taking account of Japan's security.
At the 12th General Assembly of United Nations, the Japanese government proposed the draft resolution of suspension of nuclear tests. That was not to cope with public opinion but to seek higher status in international society from an independent position, because the Japanese government realized that the issue of nuclear weapons tests was increasing in significance for Japan's diplomacy. When the Japanese resolution was rejected, the attempt of the Japanese government to exercise leadership in the nuclear test ban problem came to an end.
At the 14th General Assembly of United Nations, the Japanese government was in favor of both the resolution of Asia-Africa nations against French nuclear test and Indian resolution. It was because the Japanese Government was afraid of the risk of damaging the credibility of Japanese diplomacy caused by their retreating from their past anti-nuclear weapons tests stance, that they voted for the resolutions. In other words, it was a measure for consulting domestic and international opinion. From the same point of view, the Japanese government signed the partial nuclear test ban treaty.

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There is a strange contrast between Japan's position in the League of Nations and in the United Nations. Japan played an important role for the establishment of the League of Nations, as one of the five victorious countries of the first world war, and took a leading job as one of the five standing committees after it was established. On the contrary, Japan did not participate in the establishment of the United Nations as a defeated country in the second world war, but also was not allowed to join it until eleven years after its establishment. Japan rendered great service to the League of Nations and tried to contribute to its development in the first ten years. But she found herself in a restricted position after the first world war, and had to try desperately to get out from it. Thus, Japan had to set the first example of secession by one of the powers from the League of Nations, and could not avoid placing it in a great difficulty. After the second world war, Japan has eagerly practiced United Nations Centralism as the first principle of her diplomacy. Because of her hard experiences from the first world war until her defeat, she has heartly desired to maintain her peace and security by cooperating the United Nations. As one of the free nations, she cooperates with those nations very closely, but at the same time, she cooperates with Asian and African nations as one of the Asian nations and desires to play a role of communication and mediation as a bridge between the western countries and the A A group. In this sense, Japan can contribute to development of human civilization, to establishment of world peace and to improvement of international cooperation according to her means.

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When did the Japanese begin to regard the United Nations as the ideal organization? Most of Japanese intellectuals must have advocated the construction of the “Greater East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere.” When and why did the switch from the regionalism to internationalism occur? This article's purpose is to answer these questions, focusing on the Japanese intellectuals' perception of the postwar international organization in the Pacific War.
In 1942, the Association of International Law in Japan established four committees in order to serve their country by pursuing and constructing the Greater East Asian International Law. It made a plan to issue the Greater East Asian International Law Series.
The first volume of this series was written by YASUI Kaoru, who was an associate professor of international law at Tokyo University. He introduced the idea of the national socialist international law initiated by Carl Schmitt to Japan. He expressly wrote in this book that he could select neither liberal international law, nor Marxist international law, nor national socialist international law as his own position. But he was purged from Tokyo University in 1948. Why? Because he never denied establishing the Greater East Asian International Law. After the Pacific War he became a Marxist student of international law, and he played an active part in the movement to prohibit the atomic and hydrogen bombs.
One of the faculty members to oppose Yasui's promotion to a professor in 1943 was YOKOTA Kisaburo, who was the head professor of international law at Tokyo University. Both Yokota and Yasui were followers of TACHI Sakutaro, but Yokota considered that Yasui was unprincipled and went with the current of the times. Yokota studied the non-belligerency phenomena in World War II, dissimilar to belligerency or neutrality on the international law. He never converted from liberalism to militarism, though he criticized the United Nations for attacking Japanese hospital ships and merchant ships. And he paid attention to the international organization plan discussed among the United Nations at the Dumberton Oaks Conference before the surrender.
He foresaw that the United Nations would be the name of the new international organization, and he temporarily translated the word of the United Nations with “Kokusai Rengo, ” which meant not Allied Powers but the international union of states, as if it were an ideal organization. This free translation might only be in imitation of the precedent that the League of Nations had been translated into the term “Kokusai Renmei” which implicated the international league in Japanese, but it was fixed as the formal translation in postwar Japan. It has given the United Nations the image of the ideal international organization for the Japanese.

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Among wartime leaders in Japan, no one was more aware that the issue of World War II centered on decolonization than Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru (April 1943-April 1945). As Ambassador to China (January 1942-April 1943), Shigemitsu had become the strong supporter of Japan's “New Deal for China” to approve the Wang Ching-wei regime's voluntary self-independence and freedom. When he became Foreign Minister, Shigemitsu continued to promote “independence, freedom, and mutual equality” towards Asian occupied area as the main principles of Japan's “New Deal for Greater East Asia”. This set of “New Deal” policy could provide a “basic maneuver” for peace proposals towards the Allied Powers. In othe words, if Japan changed its war aims in accordance with those of Great Britain and the United States, there would be no more reason for Japan to keep fighting with China, the United States and Great Britain. At the opening of the Greater East Asian Conference in November 1943, Shigemitsu and the bureaucrats of the Foreign Ministry used the Greater East Asian Declaration as an opportunity to redefine Japan's war aims and to appeal to the Allied Powers with their basic peace maneuver. From the viewpoint of Shigemitsu, however, “New Deal” policy including the Greater East Asian Declaration was as much for domestic as for foreign use, to give the Japanese people a clearer conception of war aims, and to reform the militarism which had caused Japan to fall into military colonialism towards Asia. When he was aware that it was impossible to use the “New Deal” policy for domestic reform to exclude military colonialism from Japan, he insisted that the Japanese Government should accept “unconditional surrender” on their own initiative for the attainment of the same purpose.

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This article aims to reappraise the official diplomatic historiography on Japanese-American negotiations from April to December 1941. The foreign minister, MATSUOKA who was alienated from SHIRATORI, kept in mind a grand strategic design that would be a peace resolution between Germany and Britain through the intermediary of Japan and the United States. MATSUOKA was sure that it was difficult to negotiate equally with the United States unless Japan was powerful.
At first, KONOYE, MUTO and the “Reformist” group approved MATSUOKA's world-policy, the Tokyo-Berlin-Rome-Moscow entente. KONOYE's New Order group made efforts to end the Sino-Japanese War and may have had in mind the completion of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, keeping the United States out of the war.
But on the coming of the peace negotiations between Japan and the United States, each of the many factions in the Foreign Office and the Military Section of the Government reacted differently to Drought's peace proposal-a proposal was later strategically adopted by F. D. Roosevelt through F. Walker.
Except for the MATSUOKA and SHIRATORI group, the moderate “Reformists” in the Foreign Office, e. g. the ARITA group, had aimed at a resolution of the Sino-Japanese War, being short of going to war with the United States.
It seems possible a peace-bargain could have been made between Japan and the United States before the Russo-German War.
Japanese-American negotiations were dominant in “backdoor diplomacy” because of a strategic bargain. Thus the full story of the outbreak of the Pacific War can not be really described without the framework of the official negotiations from “Draft Understanding” to “Hull Note.”

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政治と司法との関係を裁判所の制度的定着過程から分析することを目的とした本稿は, 1960年代から70年代にかけての国際司法裁判所の危機とその収拾過程を歴史的に解明する。南西アフリカ事件の判決によって, アジア・アフリカ諸国から批判された裁判所は, 付託件数が僅少になるという事態に立ち至った。裁判所は, 国連総会に所長以下が出席してそのプレゼンスを強化するとともに, 裁判所移転問題としての国際司法裁判所規程第22条改正を総会の議題となるよう働きかけて, 総会での裁判所改革の論争に能動的に対応しようとした。こうした国連の諸機関との外交交渉を通じて, 裁判所は単なる孤立ではなく能動的な中立を志向する。結果的に裁判所は, 1970年代に規程改正を取りやめるが, 裁判所棟増築を実現させ, 徐々に付託件数も増えることで制度的定着を果たしたのである。

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