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全文: "板垣征四郎"
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  • 北岡 伸一
    年報政治学
    1989年 40 巻 1-23
    発行日: 1990/03/29
    公開日: 2009/12/21
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 永井 和
    社会学評論
    1985年 36 巻 3 号 390-392
    発行日: 1985/12/31
    公開日: 2009/11/11
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 川田 稔
    人間環境学研究
    2008年 6 巻 1 号 1_1-1_21
    発行日: 2008年
    公開日: 2009/06/19
    ジャーナル フリー
    Nagata Tetsuzan is known as one of the leading figures of the Imperial Army after the Manchurian incident. However, the full- scale research on him has not been done yet. This paper, therefore, as part of the research on the relations between Nagata and the Imperial Army, explores Nagata's action based on his vision and policies during the Manchurian incident. In 1929, just before the incident, Nagata gathered elite army officers and organized a group called "Isseki-kai." With the power of the group, Nagata influenced the central headquarters to cause Manchurian incident. Furthermore, he drove for the national reconstruction led by the Army. The background to his action was his own perspective on "total war."
  • 伊藤 隆, 佐々木 隆
    史学雑誌
    1977年 86 巻 10 号 1503-1521,1559
    発行日: 1977/10/20
    公開日: 2017/10/05
    ジャーナル フリー
    This essay is based on the diary kept by General Suzuki Teiichi (1888- ) from September 27,1933 until August 29,1934. At the time Lieutenant colonel Suzuki (promoted to colonel in December 1933) served as the chief of the press section of the Army until March of 1934 when he resigned to become secretary of the research department of the Army Staff College, Suzuki was close to General Araki Sadao who was the Army Minister until January of 1934. Thereafter, Suzuki became one of the important members of the Kodo-ha which was centered around General Araki. This essay uses the informatibn from Suzuki's diary to analyze four important topics involving the army during the 1933-1934 period. First, we have looked at the different army factions which became politically influential after the Manchurian Incident. In particular, we have examined the process by which the anti-Ugaki party headed by Generals Araki, Mazaki, Hayashi divided into the Kodo-ha and the Tosei-ha after General Araki's resignation in 1934. Secondly, we have examined Suzuki's relationship to those in the inner circle around Genro Saionji, in particular Harada Kumao, Kido Koichi, and Konoye Fumimaro. The third topic covered in this essay involves the relationship between the army and the cabinet. Finally, we have closely examined and analyzed the role of the chief of the Army press section. By using this diary, we have been able to examine the inner structure of the army as well as analyze some of the actions involving high army officers during this crucial 1933-1934 period.
  • 桂川 光正
    史学雑誌
    1990年 99 巻 5 号 790-795
    発行日: 1990/05/20
    公開日: 2017/11/29
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 佐藤 恵一
    日本英語教育史研究
    1989年 4 巻 149-179
    発行日: 1989/05/01
    公開日: 2012/10/29
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 胡日査
    内陸アジア史研究
    2010年 25 巻 143-165
    発行日: 2010/03/31
    公開日: 2017/10/10
    ジャーナル フリー
    KIKUTAKE Jitsuzo (1889-1946), a policy maker for Mongolian affairs in the early "Manchukuo" era, assumed vice directorship of the Xing'an Bureau (Xing'anju) on June 1, 1932 and resigned as vice director of the Xing'an Office (Xing'an Zongshu) on December 19, 1933. Unfortunately, no comprehensive study on the cause of his resignation has been made to date. Through analyzing primary sources in the KATAKURA Tadashi Collection, the author came to a conclusion that KIKUTAKE's resignation can be ascribed to the disagreement over the dismissal of OZAWA Iroha, the supervisor of the Darqan Banner police, in a discord within the "Manchukuo" government over how to rule the Mongols. The author also tries to elucidate actions taken by KATAKURA and KIKUTAKE, after the latter resigned from the office and attempted to make a comeback in politics of "Manchukuo."
  • 李 明, 石丸 紀興, 村上 茂輝, 中本 清壱
    日本建築学会技術報告集
    2017年 23 巻 55 号 1037-1042
    発行日: 2017年
    公開日: 2017/10/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    Ujina Arc de Museum, was built in Hiroshima Ujina Port as facilities for the farewell welcome Ian soldiers since during the day the war.
    Construction when the construction committee at the center of the TOMITA Aijiro Governor of Hiroshima Prefecture at the time has been formed, and called for donations across the country.
    February 1938 to groundbreaking, completion ceremony is celebration in April 1939, and than is being donated to the Army.
  • 新野 直吉
    土木計画学研究・論文集
    1990年 8 巻 1-7
    発行日: 1990/11/20
    公開日: 2010/06/04
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 古川 隆久
    史学雑誌
    1990年 99 巻 4 号 457-494,605-60
    発行日: 1990/04/20
    公開日: 2017/11/29
    ジャーナル フリー
    From 1935 to 1945 reformist bureaucrats in Japan occupied virtually the center of policy making along with a group of politically and economically concerned military officers. These bureaucrats were not only able to exert influence in the complete bottom-up process of policy formation, but also, despite little formal powers, were also able to effect decision making to a far greater extent than in the era of the political party cabinets. These reformist bureaucrats belonged to a group of government officials who had received their formal university education in the 1920's in the Marxist tradition. They rose up through the ranks in the latter half of the 1930s from personal and professional relationships in the background of building a controlled economy. They philosophically refuted both Marxism and capitalism, which they viewed as degrading the human character by the strong emphasis on materialism. Focussing their views on success in Manchuria, they stressed domestic totalism (planned economy) according to political priorities (presuming of course the existence of the monarchical [Tenno] institution), and insisted on the "East Asian (toa) bloc" as the corresponding state of affairs on the foreign front. This way of thinking was based on German totalistic thought; however, we can also discern their Marxist educational background enabling them to adopt such an ideology. In terms of concrete goals, their totalism was commonly directed towards "reform" plans geared to increasing the military strength of the army. It was for this reason that these reformist bureaucrats joined hands with politically and economically concerned military officers in policy making and political action. The practical behavior of these reformist bureaucrats, being based generally on this kind of ideology, was geared towards carrying out within such integrative offices as the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikaku-in) a radical state reorganization effort (almost impossible in peacetime) as one link in the creation of a wartime system for supporting the war in China and the Pacific War. Their efforts meet with a fair amount of success. The true intentions of the whole "reformist faction", which included these bureaucrats and embraced totalism in the wake of the German victorids on the European front, came to light during the Konoe New Organization movement of 1940 and 1941. However, the "citizens organization" plan that they were most eager to put through was not realized fully due to resistance in the National Diet. In any case, these reformist bureaucrats, as a result of giving up on both Marxist and capitalist solutions, inevitably plunged Japan into the Pacific War and continued to hold this ideology even after the War was over. While we can say on the one hand that their criticism of both Marxism and capitalism was not completely irrelevant in that it can be linked in the end to Japan's postwar high economic growth, on the other hand, it was because of their hastiness in trying to reform the present situation that they brought a great many of human and material damages in the Pacific War. Furthermore, when looking at the problem in terms of comparative history and national system theory, in the sense that it was the army officers and reformist bureaucrats who exerted real political influence through their commitment to totalist ideology, but were able to realize only a part of their goals in very gradual steps, we could call this period in Japanese history "a wartime state regime tending gradually towards totalism".
  • 富田 武
    ロシア史研究
    2012年 90 巻 66-87
    発行日: 2012/06/12
    公開日: 2017/07/25
    ジャーナル フリー
    There are not only few academic works on this theme in Japan, but also few archival documents accessible to the researchers. The documents in the Russian archives, except minor ones published, have to be read on the spots and still more there are many restrictions and even prohibitions to the access. For example, the documents of each internee (uchetnaia delo and uchetnaia kartochka) in the RGVA (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voennyi Arkhiv) are accessible only to the relatives. The GHQ documents (censored letters of the internees and interrogations of the repatriates) owned by the Hoover Institute, Stanford University and partly in the National Diet Library of Japan, have been scarcely used. As for the Japanese documents, individual records made at the landing time and the copies of above-mentioned Russian documents owned by the MHL (Ministry of Health and Labor) are also accessible only to the relatives. In spite of these difficult conditions, Japanese researchers have recently read the documents and written articles on the Lager' system, the real conditions (coldness, hunger and heavy labor) of the Japanese internees, and so-called democratic movements (anti-militarist at first, then pro-Soviet) etc. The author especially emphasizes organized studies among Japanese researchers as well as in cooperation with those of former Soviet Union.
  • 柴田 善雅
    社会経済史学
    1992年 58 巻 3 号 282-312
    発行日: 1992/09/25
    公開日: 2017/09/28
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
    Japanese government started to control economy strongly since 1937, but some companies still could enjoy high-rate profits due to military procurements. Facing such situations, the Ministry of War demanded that the Ministry of Finance should enact a regulation ordinance for high-rate dividends in accordance with "National Mbbilization Law". In those days, the Ministry of Finance did not like the regulation on dividends of private companies. After a political struggle with the Ministry of War, the Ministry of Finance reluctantly promulgated "Imperial Ordinance concerning Dividend of Company and Banking Loan". This regulation ordinance was not entirely restrictive but marked the beginning of the war-time regulation system for company accounting. In 1939, World War II broke out, which stimulated Japanese economy and made price levels rising. In such a situation, Japanese government decided to control the price and wage levels and the Ministry of Finance promulgated "Imperial Ordinance concerning Temporary Measures for Wage of Company Worker" to regulate the wages of white color workers. But according to the Ordinance, the regulation of wages would be invalid in 1940. In 1940, therefore, the government promul-gated "Imperial Ordinance concerning Regulation for Company Accounting", and terminated the former two ordinances. This new ordinance regulated the company accounting in detail, so that government could control dividends, wages, bonuses, retirement allowanbes, rewards to executives and other expenditures of companies more strictly than before. All the levels and disimbursments had to get a permission from the government, with the administration agency being the Ministry of Financ. This tough regulation ordinance remained as a main controlling ordinance for company accounting until the end of the war. During the Pacific War, the government had to mobilize all the domestic equipments for military production; therefore, a number of equipments of less important industries were commanded to shift to more important industries. For the implementation of these measures, the government had to administrate a great deal of fund from the abolished companies. In 1943, "Law concerning Measures for Enterprise Reorganization Funds" was enacted and the government could block the fluctuated money in closed funds. After 1944, the Japanese economy received war damages by bombing, so that the government promulgated "Imperial Ordinantce concerning Special Measures for Enterprise Accounting". The war damages of companies accounting were recovered by this measure. Such a regulation system for company accounting remained until the end of the war.
  • 斉藤 利彦
    日本の教育史学
    1989年 32 巻 31-50
    発行日: 1989/10/01
    公開日: 2017/06/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 鐵と鋼
    1939年 25 巻 2 号 142-162
    発行日: 1939/02/25
    公開日: 2009/07/09
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 鐵と鋼
    1939年 25 巻 11 号 1010-1026
    発行日: 1939/11/25
    公開日: 2009/07/09
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 鐵と鋼
    1939年 25 巻 10 号 920-931
    発行日: 1939/10/25
    公開日: 2009/07/09
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 上田 博
    日本文学
    1975年 24 巻 9 号 77-82
    発行日: 1975/09/10
    公開日: 2017/08/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 伊藤 隆
    年報政治学
    1972年 23 巻 134-180
    発行日: 1973/03/30
    公開日: 2009/12/21
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 判澤 純太
    国際政治
    1991年 1991 巻 97 号 67-85,L9
    発行日: 1991/05/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Konoe Fumimaro is generally thought to have been a feeble and volatile political leader. But in his first government, he was the one who attempted to overcome the gigantic ‘Kogi Kokubo Shugi’ policy or ‘Military centralized industrialism’ which no one had ever been able to stop. And he tried to run Japan's economy by a peaceoriented ‘Kyogi Kokubo Shugi’ policy or ‘Regular industrialism’ instead.
    Being involved in the Marco Polo bridge incident unexpectedly, however, Konoe still convinced himself that Japan could punish China soon by using Japan's economic power. Because he had a strong belief in Japan's monetary‘power policy’ which had been proceeded all through the Manchurian Empire, inner Mongoria and Northern China challenging the circulation of Chiang Kai-shek's ‘Legal Tender’. This was the reason why Konoe did not repress Kôgi Kokubo Shugi's landslide escalation in the eary stage of the war.
    Finally at the end of 1937, the ‘currency war’, turned against China, and Chiang Kai-shek resigned his seat in the Cabinet.
    In January 16, Konoe proclaimed his famous ‘Aitetosezu’ (or refuze to deal) statement against China. By this statement Konoe wanted to thrust his sword in Chiang Kai-shek's political reputation. But it failed to lead to Chiang's military collapse. On the contrary Wang Ching-wei and ‘the East-west military cliques’ lost their power in the Chinese government who both had once organized the ‘anti-Chiang movement’ in the ‘Kuomintang’ (the Chinese Nationalist Party).
    Chiang Kai-shek revived his influence three months later and this time he strengtend the alliance with CCP (the Chinese Communist Party) and fully used CCP's power to increase his power.
    In June 1938, Konoe's political initiative was at last nominal, and ‘Kogi Kokubo Shugi’ had already replaced Konoe's treasure, ie, ‘Kyogi Kokubo Shugi’.
  • 庄司 潤一郎
    国際政治
    1989年 1989 巻 91 号 39-54,L7
    発行日: 1989/05/20
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Konoe Fumimaro served three times as prime minister for over almost three years in prewar Japan. He played an important role in the Sino-Japanese War, the Axis Alliance and the advance to southern French Indochina to guide Japan closer to war. In ideology he was very complicated making efforts for peace with the Allied Nations at the sacrifice of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, while he claimed to break the status quo from his youth (For example his article ‘Ei-Bei Hon'i no Heiwa Shugi o Haisu’)
    In the postwar period the estimates of him were divided broadly into two categories, namely, those who felt he was a tragic premier and those who saw him as a warmonger. Konoe himself regarded his cabinet as having only a weak existence manipulated by the army. But was he usually passive or not.?
    The aim of this paper, therefore, is to examine how Konoe saw international relations and how Japan's diplomatic policy was influenced by them in the first cabinet from the Marco Polo Bridge-Incident to the New Order in East Asia Proclamation.
    A true peace based on international justice which Konoe stated immediately after the inauguration of the new cabinet put emphasis on the justificaiton of Japan's policy towards East Asia from the Manchurian Incident. But international justice converted from negative to positive meanings would lead to the New Order in East Asia through Sino-Japanese War. It was not the result of no clear prospect on the future of the war, but the embodiment of Konoe's world view.
    On the other hand though Konoe tried to strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact, the issue split the Konoe cabinet to lead to a general resignation by the rejection of key ministers of the Cabinet. After all the Axis Alliance was concluded in the second cabinet.
    In spite of such hard-line policy of the Konoe cabinet toward Britain and America, Konoe himself did not intended to appeal to arms. He flattered himself that Britain and America would recognize Japan's situation sooner or later if Japan checked them more strongly.
    In any case the New Order in East Asia based on international justice was an attempt to escape from the Washington Treaty System in Japan's Diplomacy.
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