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  • 中津 俊樹
    アジア研究
    2001年 47 巻 1 号 80-86
    発行日: 2001年
    公開日: 2014/09/15
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 浅野 亮
    国際政治
    2018年 2018 巻 191 号 191_160-191_163
    発行日: 2018/03/28
    公開日: 2018/12/19
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 八塚 正晃
    アジア研究
    2014年 60 巻 1 号 37-55
    発行日: 2014/10/15
    公開日: 2014/10/25
    ジャーナル フリー
    Official Chinese Communist Party history simply indicates that Deng Xiaoping launched the open-door policy in 1978, largely discounting international factors, such as China’s joining the United Nations and China-U.S. reconciliation. With regards to the pre-1978 era, most studies focused on inter-Politburo politics, because during the Cultural Revolution power struggles often occurred among the leadership. According to the literature, the political situation after the death of Lin Biao is described as the struggle between Zhou Enlai, who aimed at economic reconstruction, and the radicals such as the “Gang of Four,” but they were under the almost complete dominance of Mao Zedong. Previous studies describe how Zhou’s economic policy was at the mercy of politics, and do not analyze his intention and policy. This article reconsiders the conception and limitation of the open-door policy which was launched as a part of Zhou’s policy, considering the importance of the changing international circumstances through analyzing a project designed to import large industrial plants from Western countries. This project was called the “4-3” development strategy, because its total projected cost was US$4.3 billion.
    Closer examination reveals that the industrial development strategy underlying the open-door policy was formed gradually in the early 1970s, in association with the change in the leadership’s perception towards new international circumstances. Until then, the Chinese leadership had pursued the construction of “the third front” as a preparation for war, which was a massive construction of defense and heavy industries in inland China. However, the change in the international situation in the early 1970s reduced the necessity of preparing for a war. Zhou Enlai and the bureaucrats therefore proceeded with the “4-3” development strategy as a part of a new national strategy, which included the reorganization of the bureaucracy to support the open-door policy and the shift of investment from military industry to agriculture and light industry and from inland to coastal areas. They implemented these policies through modifications of the 4th Five Year Plan.
    However, there was a conflict between the open-door policy and Mao’s revolutionary diplomatic strategies, despite Mao’s support for the former. The conflict came to the surface as the U.S.-Soviet détente emerged, and the pursuit of the opening was hampered. However, the open-door policy was gradually transformed into a comprehensive industrial policy. As a result, Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping were able to launch a systematic open-door policy soon after Mao’s death.
  • ―科学・政治・国際関係―
    佐藤 悠子
    国際政治
    2015年 2015 巻 179 号 179_126-179_141
    発行日: 2015/02/15
    公開日: 2016/01/23
    ジャーナル フリー
    There are two major political issues that have been repeatedly debated in China’s modern history; how China’s relationship with the West should be and how China should treat Western science and technology.
    During the Cultural Revolution (CR), criticism against “bourgeois academic authority” raged. Science and even the lives of Chinese scientists were in jeopardy. The world-renowned physicist Albert Einstein became one of the main targets of this campaign. It was triggered by an article titled “Xiangduilun pipan (Criticism on the theory of relativity)” written by a local middle school teacher.
    In Beijing, one of the vice presidents of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) Chen Boda took charge of the campaign. Most of the participants were young scientists whose knowledge was too limited to refute Einstein’s theory. Senior scientists such as Zhu Kezhen, another one of the vice presidents of the CAS, and Premier Zhou Enlai’s protégé Zhou Peiyuan, vice president of Beijing University and physicist who had worked with Einstein, took the side of Einstein.
    Chen brought the campaign to schoolchildren and even planned to organize a rally of ten thousand people. But he fell off the ladder of power when he joined the bandwagon trying to elevate his patron Lin Biao to the position of the President of the State at a conference in Lushan in August 1970. It made Mao suspect that Chen in fact intended to replace Mao with Lin who had demonstrated his ability to mobilize the People’s Liberation Army in October 1969. The anti-Einstein criticism ceased in Beijing after Chen disappeared, but in Shanghai Chen’s rivals Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan continued it.
    Thereafter two major changes in domestic and international context strengthened the hands of Zhou Enlai, who had been protecting scientists, through the upheaval of the CR: the U.S.-China rapprochement and the Lin Biao incident.
    Henry Kissinger secretly arrived in Beijing in July 1971, which opened China’s door to the West. Zhou Enlai intentionally issued important directives on promoting basic theoretical study in science in front of the Chinese American scientists who were visiting China. Zhou also encouraged scientists to write him letters in order to make the issue publicly known. After the Sino-US rapprochement, a newly published Chinese academic journal “Wuli (Physics)” became the stronghold for physicists who supported Einstein and his theory.
    Soon after his allegedly aborted assassination of Mao Zedong in September 1971, Lin Biao died in Mongolia. It weakened the authority of Mao who chose Lin as his successor, and enabled Zhou Enlai to bring back the scientists to Beijing from local labor camps.
    Zhou also gave the green light to physicist Zhang Wenyu’s proposal to build a high energy accelerator at the cost of $ 2 billion, despite a contrary voice from Yang Zhenning, a Nobel laureate physicist and professor at the University of Chicago.
    High energy physics is based on Einstein’s theory of relativity. The physicists who had participated in building China’s first atomic bomb supported building a high energy accelerator. Zhang Wenyu led a delegation of Chinese scientists to the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory in the United States in 1972, and Zhou Enlai established the High Energy Physics Institute in the CAS in 1973.
    By 1972, the Cultural Revolution in the field of science had lost steam because the physicists were now allowed to applying Western physics despite its “bourgeois”, “academic authoritarian”, and “wasteful” nature that had been fiercely condemned during the Cultural Revolution.
  • 松本 ますみ
    現代中国
    2022年 2022 巻 96 号 186-190
    発行日: 2022年
    公開日: 2023/06/21
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 田島 俊雄
    社会経済史学
    1983年 48 巻 6 号 690-692
    発行日: 1983/03/25
    公開日: 2017/11/24
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
  • 名古屋大学出版会 2014年 iii+247ページ
    山田 紀彦
    アジア経済
    2015年 56 巻 4 号 119-122
    発行日: 2015/12/15
    公開日: 2022/08/10
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 飯塚 央子, 阿古 智子, 張 小蘭
    アジア研究
    2003年 49 巻 1 号 118-123
    発行日: 2003年
    公開日: 2014/09/15
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 内山 雅生
    社会経済史学
    1983年 48 巻 6 号 692-696
    発行日: 1983/03/25
    公開日: 2017/11/24
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
  • 萩原 充
    歴史と経済
    2003年 45 巻 4 号 55-57
    発行日: 2003/07/30
    公開日: 2017/08/30
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 三谷 孝
    史学雑誌
    1978年 87 巻 5 号 792-797
    発行日: 1978/05/20
    公開日: 2017/10/05
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 天野 祐子, 泉谷 陽子
    史学雑誌
    2010年 119 巻 5 号 832-838
    発行日: 2010/05/20
    公開日: 2017/12/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 権 寧俊
    アジア経済
    2002年 43 巻 7 号 23-47
    発行日: 2002/07/15
    公開日: 2023/03/29
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 史学雑誌
    2005年 114 巻 2 号 262-281
    発行日: 2005/02/20
    公開日: 2017/12/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 柳沢 英二郎, 森山 昭郎, 伊豆見 元, 中見 立夫, 長井 信一, 森 利一
    国際政治
    1979年 1979 巻 61-62 号 110-159
    発行日: 1979/05/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 山田 敦
    国際政治
    2015年 2015 巻 179 号 179_1-179_15
    発行日: 2015/02/15
    公開日: 2016/01/23
    ジャーナル フリー
    This introductory essay overviews six research topics essential for a better understanding of the linkage between science and technology (S&T) and contemporary international relations. They are (1) the globalization of S&T, (2) international politics in cyber space, (3) the information revolution and the changes in national security, (4) diplomacy for S&T, and S&T for diplomacy, (5) the role of the state in S&T innovation, and (6) the global governance of S&T. Each section introduces one or two articles in this special volume and reviews their theoretical and empirical contributions to the field.
  • 姜 涌, 近藤 正一, 北川 啓介, 若山 滋
    日本建築学会計画系論文集
    1999年 64 巻 525 号 319-326
    発行日: 1999/11/30
    公開日: 2017/02/03
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper attempts to trace out the transformation of Chinese architectural theories represent by papers on Chinese "Architectural Journal" during 1954-1978. Based on the previous analyses of statistics and construction, the keywords and the frequency of them are calculated thematically and used for sketching out the transformation and systemization architects' discours. A variety of architects' discours are situated at a verbal map in according to axe of its historical and contextual relationship with social and cultural background. The centralized paradigm and dualistic valuation structure of Chinese socialist architecture provide critical insights into Chinese architecture of that period, as well as today.
  • ――新疆ウイグル自治区の事例から(一九六六―一九七六年)――
    熊倉 潤
    国際政治
    2019年 2019 巻 197 号 197_58-197_73
    発行日: 2019/09/25
    公開日: 2020/04/16
    ジャーナル フリー

    It is well known that China’s ethnic-minority elites fell during the Cultural Revolution, especially in the periphery areas near from Sino-Soviet border. However, Saifuddin Azizi, who was trusted by Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng and other top leaders, was protected and maintained his position in Xinjiang since the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution. In addition, he was promoted to the first secretary of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Party Committee, which was the post where only Han cadres had taken office before the Cultural Revolution. Han cadres have fallen in the process of Sino-Soviet confrontation and the Cultural Revolution in Xinjiang, and the ethnic-minority elite became the top leader of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. That is in contrast to the process in which the Mongolian cadres, who had held key positions, were being persecuted one after another, starting with the fall of Ulanhu in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, and their status being relegated to the Han.

    The case of Saifuddin indicates that China’s ethnic-minority policy under the Sino-Soviet conflict also has dynamics different from the trend toward persecution. This mechanism has not been considered as a major research target in recent research, but this paper shows that it was relatively well known in research conducted in Taiwan in the same age. However, as those researches at that time had limitations, this paper also uses the historical materials published recently. Analysis shows that Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng and others trusted Saifuddin, and used Saifuddin heavily to realize “Great Confederation” and to strengthen “Unity for Ethnicities”.

    Why are the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, which were the same as the front line against the Soviet Union, were so different? In the case of Inner Mongolia, Ulanhu was criticized before the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, and the existence of himself in the party was regarded as a problem, and it is clear that the content of the criticism was closely related with the institution of Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities. On the other hand, in the case of the Xinjiang, the main target of criticism was not Saifuddin from the beginning, but Wang Enmao, the first secretary of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region Party Committee. As Wang Enmao was considered as the “old cadre” to be excluded from the trunk, he was criticized heavily. The progress of the Sino-Soviet conflict urged the realignment of multi-ethnic governance, but it does not necessarily result in fall of minority leaders. If the “independent kingdom” of Han leader, Wang Enmao, was regarded as bigger problem, it was criticized first.

  • 李 彦銘
    国際政治
    2011年 2011 巻 163 号 163_154-168
    発行日: 2011/01/20
    公開日: 2013/05/10
    ジャーナル フリー
    In September, 1972, Japan normalized its relationship with the People's Republic of China. Before this, the Japanese business community had already changed to a more pro-mainland China political attitude, and this change created a favorable domestic environment for normalization. The core question here is why this change occurred and how the business community reached a consensus between 1970 and 1972. The existing literature points out three main factors: 1) success of China's pressure policies toward Japan; 2) structural change in the international system, indicated by improvement in Sino-US relations in 1971; 3) the supporters of normalization became powerful within Japan, as the so-called “Panda huggers” who continually pursued improved Sino-Japanese relations after WWII succeeded in involving the “interdependence diplomacy” supporters in the pro-mainland camp. However, the international economic environment was not considered as a factor influencing the policy preferences of Japanese business community.
    My first point is that Beijing's policies toward Japan, although they are described as “strategic” by early research, were not highly coherent. There is new evidence to show that these policies were separate outcomes and had different origins, including Japan policy and foreign trade policy of China. The change in attitude toward China was not produced by Beijing's policies directly and happened before the structural change of the international political system.
    Second, this change was basically based on Japanese actors own views of China's significance, which was influenced by their perception of the change of international economic system. This perception can be traced to the end of 1960s when Japanese economy was experiencing high growth. Increasing tensions between Japan and the US on economic issues, such as the revaluation of the Yen against the US dollar in 1971, signaled a major change in the international economic system. The Japanese business community realized that they have to actively adapt to the new order, and then they begun to stress the significance of improving international cooperation. The attitude change toward China was a large step in expanding Japan's international cooperation.
    Through this case we can find that the Japanese business community was sensitive to the international economic environment as social economic actors. At the same time, in the consensus formation process, there existed significant differences between these actors, such as so called Zaikai (including the major business associations and their leaders) and the big companies. The former considered the national economic strategy of Japan, but the latter basically prioritized the interest of their industry and their company. This new perspective helps us to understand the current Sino-Japanese relationship.
  • 堀本 武功
    南アジア研究
    1993年 1993 巻 5 号 102-125
    発行日: 1993年
    公開日: 2011/03/16
    ジャーナル フリー
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