In this article, we are examining the data of5different sets of interview and telephone surveys, which were conducted by Yomiuri Newspaper from May 1994 through January 1995. In each sets, both telephone and interview survey data were collected with the identical sampling design, on the same interviewing dates and at the same interview points. According to our comparative examination, demographic distribution of the samples did not differ significantly from telephone surveys to interview surveys, but the response pattern were clearly different on some questions. Therefore, it can tentatively be concluded that the different response patterns between the two interview methods are most likely due to the interview environment created by telephones as media of interview. As these findings could only be obtained through an empirical examination, we need to continue our empirical examination and comparison of this new survey method.

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“International contribution”, diffused in the wake of Gulf War, is a peculiar idea in Japan. Western International Relations Theory (IRT) talks about “international coordination” and/or “international cooperation”, but never deals with “international contribution”. I’m going to focus on the idea of “international contribution”, which enables me to discuss Japanese perception of international relations and encourages me to reconsider so-called IRT.
How does the idea of “international contribution” rise up to the surface? The historical overview of this question is presented in the first section. Through the rapid economic growth, the prime ministers of Japan such as Eisaku Sato, Yasuhiro Nakasone and Noboru Takeshita came to feel the enhanced international status as one of big powers, which was unaccompanied by Japan’s actual performance. This gap between the expectation from “international society” and the reality in “international society” provided the setting for the idea of “international contribution”. The emergence of this idea was nothing more than contingent use initially. Notwithstanding this genesis, “international contribution” precisely captured something like the flavor of the time and got into circulation.
Then, how was “international contribution” mentioned? The structural outline, which is visible in the use of “international contribution”, is inductively extracted in the second section. The perception that Japan had taken “free ride” on “public goods” arousing international criticism keenly made Japanese realize the necessity of “international contribution”. Furthermore, “international society” is hypostatized in the background of “international contribution”, dredged through the comparison with “international coordination” and “international cooperation”. These understanding denote that at least for most of the Japanese the realm of international relations is not “anarchy”.
Besides, how was “international contribution” as practice put into? Alongside of this question, transition of subject positions, especially pertaining to the Self Defense Force (SDF) and the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), is reviewed in the third section. Although dispatching SDF which evokes the shade of military forces had long been regarded as taboo in the postwar period, the SDF brought about recognition as an actor of “international contribution” together with growing necessity of “international contribution”. NGO, on the other hand, came to accumulate fund and human material due to escalating interest in “international contribution”. Then the governmental awareness of NGO has gradually changed and the government has got to utilize NGOs.
Various aspects of “international contribution” are sketched through the analysis of these chapters. Based on these aspects, I wonder if “international contribution” is a certain type of IRT. It functioned historically as a “lens” which gave us some “answers” at that time. If that’s the case, we ought to consider what the “academic” theory is and what it should be.

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Today in the Post Cold War Era, the explanations of U. S. government and officials regarding the roles and missions of U. S. military bases and Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa are very confused. Even some highranking Marine Corps officials have raised the possibility of moving the Okinawa Marine Corps to Australia.
The aim of this paper is to explore the future possibility to change the strategic status of the U. S. military bases in Okinawa through analyzing a history of the roles and missions of those military bases and Marine Corps stationed there.
In the Cold War Era, U. S. Military Strategy gave to the U. S. forward deployment forces in the Asia-Pacific region three overall roles and missions: (1) to prevent the Soviet Pacific fleet Moving out to the Pacific Ocean in the all out war between U. S. and Soviet, (2) to prevent and deter possible intervention of Soviet or China to the Asian regional conflicts, (3) to provide forward bases for U. S. intervention in the case of an Asian regional conflict. Regarding (1), U. S. Defense Ministry's report issued on April 1989 described, for the first time, that the roles and missions of Okinawa Marine Corps are controlling the three straits —Tsushima, Tsugaru, Sohya— through which the Soviet Pacific Fleet must move out the Pacific Ocean and capturing the Kuril Islands include Chishima which is into necessary to attack Soviet's military facilities or sea lines of communication.
Now the Cold War is over, U. S. Military Strategy has changed from a strategy of containing the Soviet Union to a Strategy of Regional Defense for defending U. S. national interests. At the same time, U. S. is beginning to regard the emerging China as the biggest rival or the world's largest non-status quo power. In that context, U. S. is paying attention to the connecting line from Korea peninsula, Kyushu, Okinawa, Taiwan, Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore to Indonesia, as a strategically important line which could control the Chinese Fleet to go out the Pacific Ocean. This could be the main reason that U. S. Secretary Defense William S. Cohen emphasized, ‘even after succeeding in peaceful reunification of the Korea Peninsula, our force structure in the East Asia will not change.’
In the Cold War Era, Japan has accepted the permanent stationing of U. S. forces in Japan especially in Okinawa as a international public assets which is necessary to defend the free world from international Communist revolution activities. But the Cold War is over, and the U. S. basic strategy is changing from defending the free world to defending U. S. interests. Okinawa is part of this new trend.

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