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全文: "沖縄人民党"
12件中 1-12の結果を表示しています
  • ─USCARによる市町村自治への介入を中心に─
    村岡 敬明
    法政論叢
    2020年 56 巻 2 号 1-
    発行日: 2020年
    公開日: 2021/01/20
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 史学雑誌
    1987年 96 巻 4 号 515-562
    発行日: 1987/04/20
    公開日: 2017/11/29
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 七〇年安保前後の東京と沖縄
    村井 良太
    年報政治学
    2017年 68 巻 2 号 2_122-2_148
    発行日: 2017年
    公開日: 2020/12/26
    ジャーナル フリー

    1960年代から1970年代の日本では保守長期政権下にもかかわらず 「革新自治体」 が全国に広がった。ここでは事例研究の一方法である政治史を用いて, 佐藤栄作政権 (1964 ~ 1972) が革新自治体の隆盛にどう向き合ったのかを, 特に重視された東京都と琉球政府/沖縄県に注目して分析した。明らかになったのは, 第一に, 保守中央政府・陣営も革新地方政府・陣営もともに日米安保条約が再検討期を迎える1970年を重視していた。第二に, 同じく双方とも, 政治・行政の科学化と社会開発を共通目標としていた。第三に, 佐藤政権は予想される70年安保や沖縄返還という困難な課題と向き合う中で革新地方政府を地域住民の代表として彼らと協働した。そして第四に, 革新自治体は複合的性格を持っており, 1970年以降, ローカル・オポジションの拠点から市民参加や自治体改善運動の場へと変化していった。

  • ―教公二法問題を中心に―
    櫻澤 誠
    年報政治学
    2010年 61 巻 2 号 2_255-2_277
    発行日: 2010年
    公開日: 2016/02/24
    ジャーナル フリー
      Precedence research considers consistently that the Council for the Reversion of Okinawa Prefecture to the Fatherland (CROPF) is leftist forces. But, in fact, early CROPF avoided confrontation with the Okinawa conservative forces, and performed nonpartisan movement. Okinawa Teachers Association (OTA) which was the center of CROPF also held cooperative relations with an education office and the Okinawa conservative forces. OTA was not opposed to twin education bills itself, and required the improvement about the regulation side. Since the school staff's election campaign activated around 1965, the Conservative Party feared change of power. The Conservative Party tried to legislate the bills for restricting a teacher's political activity forcibly. CROPF was extensively opposed to the Okinawa conservative forces, and the bills turned into a rejected bill. Thereby, an Antagonistic Conservative-Progressive Axis centering on the security and the base problem in Okinawa was established, and nonpartisan movement disappeared.
  • 一九四〇年代後半の沖縄を事例に
    一色 哲
    日本の神学
    2010年 49 巻 32-52
    発行日: 2010/09/17
    公開日: 2012/01/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    Okinawa was occupied by the U. S. Armed Forces after World War II. It served as the starting point of that control system from 1945 until 50. In that age, Christianity became the core of the mental reconstruction of the community. The Christianity of Okinawa then expanded this power by enriching political relations with the occupation forces. This paper demonstratively clarifies these facts by analyzing the memorandums of the concerned persons in those days and the first historical materials. During that period, the Christians in Okinawa established the “Christ League of Okinawa” and propagated Christianity in a systematic manner. They received the indirect support of the U. S. Armed Forces. A part of the Christian leaders made maximum use of this support and tried to favorably proceed with the postwar reconstruction. They partly acknowledged military occupation. On the other hand, another leader maintained a bridge between the Occupation Forces and the Okinawan government. They devoted themselves to the mission's activities. Such two tides existed in the Christianity of Okinawa later on as well.
  • 江上 能義
    年報政治学
    1996年 47 巻 173-188
    発行日: 1996/12/10
    公開日: 2009/12/21
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 沖縄における〈歴史の収奪〉
    石原 俊
    ソシオロジ
    1999年 44 巻 1 号 3-19,132
    発行日: 1999/05/31
    公開日: 2016/11/02
    ジャーナル フリー
     In this article I examine historical narrations concerning military occupation on Okinawa. During World War II, the U.S. military invented a new technique of occupation. With the aid of a new form of social science, Area Studies, they began to research on the social and historical relations, especially some frictions, in enemy areas in advance. And they attempted to "appropriate" such relations. I focus the deep relationship between U.S. military "desire" and the "knowledge" in Area Studies.
     Preparing for occupation on Okinawa, some famous social scientists, such as George P. Murdock and Alfred M. Tozzer, collected many treatises and historical materials in Japanese about Okinawa (n) , and formed a militarized knowledge about Okinawa. They attempted to "appropriate" racism to Okinawans in the Japanese (immigrant) societies. And they planned to segregate the "Okinawan" and the "Japanese", and to create an "Okinawan" geopolitical "identity". When Murdock and Tozzer used as materials pre-war Okinawans' historical narrations such as Fuyu Iha's narrations, his efforts to aquire Okinawans' historicity were exploited by nonhistoricized "identity" politics in Area Studies. I term such "appropriation" of historical relations on Okinawans "exploitation of historicity".
     After the bloody battle, the U.S. social scientists went to Okinawa and joined military administration as officers. They attempted to find an "Okinawan" society under the U.S. military government. But, the oppressive social and political situation for the Okinawan continued. Under such conditions, there appeared Okinawan inhabitants who attempted to democratize Okinawa society. At the beginning of "post-war" Okinawa, first they had to re-appropriate the ideom "Okinawan" which had been given to them through the knowledge of Area studies, and had to seek to re-historicize their social and political position.
  • 我部 政男
    年報政治学
    1989年 40 巻 47-73
    発行日: 1990/03/29
    公開日: 2009/12/21
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 小松 寛
    国際政治
    2012年 2012 巻 168 号 168_58-73
    発行日: 2012/02/29
    公開日: 2014/03/31
    ジャーナル フリー
    Previous studies of Okinawa's restoration to Japan have explored Japan-U.S. relations while paying little attention to relations between Japan and Okinawa. However, this approach assumes that Okinawa was simply an object in the negotiating process for its reversion to Japan, and not a subjective actor. Accordingly, this paper is concerned with negotiations between Japan and Okinawa in order to clarify the part played by the latter. I shall focus on visits to Tokyo made by Chobyo Yara, Executive Chief of the Ryukyu Government, to meet with Japanese Government officials including Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi. In particular, this paper deals with “homeland level status”, a term used in their discussions to define the conditions for Okinawa's reversion.
    Japanese officials made frequent mention of their expectation that U.S. military bases would be reduced and consolidated after Okinawa's reversion, just as they had seen the removal of military bases after Japan's independence in 1952. This reveals an evident analogy between the restoration of Japanese sovereignty and the restoration of Okinawan administrative rights. However, the reality that several U.S. military bases were moved from Japan to Okinawa, which came under U.S. direct control, was ignored: a fact which reveals a significant flaw in the Japanese Government's logic.
    Throughout their negotiations, the Ryukyu Government made persistent claims for “immediate, unconditional and total” reversion, to which the Japanese Government repeatedly answered that reversion would bring Okinawa to “homeland level status”. These negotiations offered no room for manoeuvre to the Ryukyu Government, who was powerless in decisions regarding the restoration of administrative rights to Okinawa. Yara therefore sought to justify Okinawan peoples' demand for “immediate, unconditional and total” reversion using three key arguments: that politically, as Executive Chief, Yara represented the consensus of Okinawan opinion; that nationally, Okinawa should be reunited with Japan; and, that Okinawa's aspiration for peace would be secured by the “democratic and peaceful” Japanese Constitution.
    On the Okinawan side, the reversion movement is said to have developed from resistance to military occupation and its aim was the complete removal of military bases. However, Okinawa had already been positioned as a keystone of the U.S. military within the U.S.-Japan security treaty structure even before its reversion. In this sense, it is logically doubtful that Okinawa's reversion to Japan could have led to the clearance of military bases. Hence, such expectations held by Yara and pro-reversion supporters may be considered contradictory.
    To understand the “Okinawan Problem” as it exists today, it is necessary to consider the history of both Japan-U.S. and Japan-Okinawa relations. To that end, it is critical to problematise Japan and Okinawa's historical relationship.
  • 沖繩返還交渉の政治過程
    比嘉 幹郎
    国際政治
    1975年 1975 巻 52 号 5-26,L1
    発行日: 1975/05/10
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The main objective of this paper is to clarify the basic character of the reversion movement in Okinawa. To achieve this objective, the paper has first explored the patterns of orientations among Okinawan inhabitants towards the politics of reversion, then examined the attitudes of several influential Okinawan political groups towards the reversion problem, and finally analyzed some important reversion activities, especially in the period after 1965. As a result, it was found that the pattern of resistance or rejection, rather than that of easy accommodation, prevailed among the Okinawans under U. S. administration, that a wide range of differences in attitudes towards the reversion problem, particularly towards the issue of U. S. military bases, existed among the Okinawan groups, and that three closely related aspects or phases of the reversion movement, characterized respectively as the nationalistic, Constitution-oriented and antidiscrimination movement, were discernible.
  • 沖繩繩返還交渉の政治過程
    宮里 政玄
    国際政治
    1975年 1975 巻 52 号 47-64,L2
    発行日: 1975/05/10
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this paper is to analyze USCAR's administration policies in terms of High Commissioners' perception of political situations in Okinawa, thereby clarifying what advice and information High Commissioner offered to Washington. It is hoped that this paper will supplement the Clapp paper and also serve as a sort of link between Okinawan-Japanese pressures and U. S. policy. As background, organizational and political setting in which USCAR operated is discussed, and the two following sections analyze USCAR policies between mid-1964 and 1969, namely, the concession policy (mid-1964-1967) and the policy of maintaining effective use of the bases after reversion (1968-1969), in relation with the perceived Okinawan pressures and Japanese participation in Okinawa. The concluding section summarizes consistencies and changes in USCAR policies, and analyzes their possible relations with moves in Washington.
  • 沖繩返還交渉の政治過程
    比屋根 照夫, 我部 政男
    国際政治
    1975年 1975 巻 52 号 27-46,L1
    発行日: 1975/05/10
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This study aims at elucidating the significance of the struggle against the U. S. military land acquisition program in Okinawa, a movement which gained momentum immediately following the announcement of the so-called Price report in June 1956. To accomplish this aim, we divided the movement into the three periods of inception, enhancement and expansion, and analyzed the character and distinguishing features of each period. The significance of the land struggle may be summarized by the following two points. First, this struggle represented an Okinawan people's challenge to the basic U. S. policy of maintaining military bases in Okinawa for the defense of the free world as well as to the concomitant policy of retaining long-term administrative rights over the islands. Second, the struggle was not only a movement against the U. S. military land acquisition program but also a prototype of the reversion movement in the 1950's. The character of this reversion movement was clearly based on the concept of reversion developed during the land struggle.
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