The main objective of this paper is to clarify the basic character of the reversion movement in Okinawa. To achieve this objective, the paper has first explored the patterns of orientations among Okinawan inhabitants towards the politics of reversion, then examined the attitudes of several influential Okinawan political groups towards the reversion problem, and finally analyzed some important reversion activities, especially in the period after 1965. As a result, it was found that the pattern of resistance or rejection, rather than that of easy accommodation, prevailed among the Okinawans under U. S. administration, that a wide range of differences in attitudes towards the reversion problem, particularly towards the issue of U. S. military bases, existed among the Okinawan groups, and that three closely related aspects or phases of the reversion movement, characterized respectively as the nationalistic, Constitution-oriented and antidiscrimination movement, were discernible.

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This paper explores the development of the school lunch program in US-Occupied Okinawa, by focusing on the policy making process by the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI), which was established as the local government by the occupier, the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR). Previous studies especially illustrated that the school lunch program in US-Occupied Okinawa totally depended on the food donation by the two organization of the United States: National Catholic Welfare Conference and Church World Service. However, they have failed to elucidate why the dependance had arisen and influenced the Law Concerning School Lunch Program, which GRI set in 1960. This paper clarifies how the school lunch program in US-Occupied Okinawa was instituted and operated. The results were as follows. First, the Land Problem in the mid-1950s had encouraged USCAR to promote well-being of Ryukyuan people. Yet, the finances of GRI were severely constrained to follow the Policy of USCAR. After political adjustment, USCAR succeeded to add the provision that GRI must serve to the children or pupils even when the protector could not bear the school lunch expenses to the Law Concerning School Lunch Program. Second, dependence on the food donation caused the severe gap between what donators aimed to send and what Ryukyuan people needed. Millers' National Federation and United States Department of Agriculture promoted to sell "Bulgur" as a new wheat food, however, a part of Ryukyuan people fed it to their hogs. This paper proves that although the food donation from the United States contributed to the school lunch program, we must realize it also obscured the decline of agriculture in US-Occupied Okinawa.

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  Precedence research considers consistently that the Council for the Reversion of Okinawa Prefecture to the Fatherland (CROPF) is leftist forces. But, in fact, early CROPF avoided confrontation with the Okinawa conservative forces, and performed nonpartisan movement. Okinawa Teachers Association (OTA) which was the center of CROPF also held cooperative relations with an education office and the Okinawa conservative forces. OTA was not opposed to twin education bills itself, and required the improvement about the regulation side. Since the school staff's election campaign activated around 1965, the Conservative Party feared change of power. The Conservative Party tried to legislate the bills for restricting a teacher's political activity forcibly. CROPF was extensively opposed to the Okinawa conservative forces, and the bills turned into a rejected bill. Thereby, an Antagonistic Conservative-Progressive Axis centering on the security and the base problem in Okinawa was established, and nonpartisan movement disappeared.

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1960年代から1970年代の日本では保守長期政権下にもかかわらず 「革新自治体」 が全国に広がった。ここでは事例研究の一方法である政治史を用いて, 佐藤栄作政権 (1964 ～ 1972) が革新自治体の隆盛にどう向き合ったのかを, 特に重視された東京都と琉球政府／沖縄県に注目して分析した。明らかになったのは, 第一に, 保守中央政府・陣営も革新地方政府・陣営もともに日米安保条約が再検討期を迎える1970年を重視していた。第二に, 同じく双方とも, 政治・行政の科学化と社会開発を共通目標としていた。第三に, 佐藤政権は予想される70年安保や沖縄返還という困難な課題と向き合う中で革新地方政府を地域住民の代表として彼らと協働した。そして第四に, 革新自治体は複合的性格を持っており, 1970年以降, ローカル・オポジションの拠点から市民参加や自治体改善運動の場へと変化していった。

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The “Okinawa problem” is made from the complex relationship of three levels of analysis: the first one is a diplomatic problem lies between the Japanese and the US Governments; the second is a dispute over public policy between the Japanese Government and the Okinawa prefecture government; and the last one is a conflict about decision making among various actors in the Okinawa community.
It is this complexity that makes the “Okinawa problem” difficult to resolve. To resolve this, serious attention must be paid to its complexity and the historical background from which the problem has emerged. This paper is intended to reveal the complexity and to identify the impediments in resolving the “Okinawa problem” by analyzing its structure from the three different angles mentioned above. By so doing, the paper aims at developing an analytical framework. This is conducted by using the conflict resolution approach.
The paper is divided into 6 parts. The first section serves as an introduction and it states the purpose of the study. The next section deals with the analytical framework of the study, which focuses on actors, issues, and the historical context of the problem at each analytical level. In the first level of analysis, the status-of-forces agreement will be tackled as an overriding issue of the Japan-US governmental relationship. In the second level, the policy dispute over the burden sharing of Japan's security will be explored as a central disagreement between the central government and the Okinawa prefecture government. This will be followed by an examination of the community conflict between supporters and opponents of the US bases in Okinawa. At this level, feasibility of the “Base-free Okinawa” policy will be discussed. In the conclusion, obstacles to resolving the “Okinawa problem” will be recapitulated and possible formulas for removing them will be considered.
As for the Japan-US diplomatic problems, the study urges to stop assuming that the problems is a distributive (zero-sum) feature. The needed approach must be based on the assumption that a mutually satisfactory solution is possible. De-coupling the vested interests of US Forces in Okinawa from other interlocking wider security problems can be a way to move ahead. Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms should be established between the central government and the Okinawa prefecture government. These mechanisms must serve as confidence-building measures and facilitate dialogue among the actors. The members of the Okinawa community have to come up with a consensus on their attitudes toward the post-base development plans. This can be best accomplished by organizing a series of problem-solving workshops among contending actors.

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