This paper examines the relationship between a democratization of party leadership selection and party organizational change in Japan. The Liberal Democratic Party, the long ruling party, became used to utilizing votes by party members as a method of electing its presidents. Compared with the Democratic Party of Japan, the second largest party, LDP has a much larger number of members, but its factional linkage which holds diet members and rank and file party members together has dwindled. By contrast, the organizational support base of DPJ remains weak, so the demand of local party organizations for votes by party members does not increase. In sum, as a result of many LDP members voting individually, they are coming on the stage of party leadership selection as new actors. Both because the incentives of candidates and members change, votes by party members became popular in LDP.

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政治的リーダーシップとは，個人的な資質から生まれるものなのか，それとも構造に依拠するものなのか，いずれが正しいのであろうか。日本においても，小泉首相が発揮した（とされる）強力なリーダーシップをめぐって，政治改革や行政改革など，制度的な要因の帰結なのか，「ポピュリスト」的なスタイルの産物なのか，様々な議論がある。本稿も同様の問題意識に立ち，二つの要因の役割について考察する。具体的には，自民党総裁選における党員投票を分析の対象とする。党員投票とは，党内民主主義を促進するための制度であるだけではなく，党首が指導力を発揮するために必要な政治的エネルギーを調達するための装置でもある。そこで，選挙制度改革が党員投票を伴う総裁選の常態化をもたらすメカニズムを検証し，構造的な変化と政治家の個性が果たす役割について，インプリケーションを得ることを目標とする。

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Japan has been increasing its roles in a security field in the post-Cold War era. For instance, it decided to participate in peacekeeping operations, strengthened the alliance with the US and upgraded the peacekeeping missions to one of the Self Defense Forces’ core mission. In 2011, it mitigated the arms trade ban policy—an alleged hallmark of Japan’s anti-militarist norm. This article draws attention to the factors behind such changes Japan made on the security front by examining the arms trade ban policy announced in 1967.
Arguing that Japan’s security policy has been largely constrained by an anti-militarist norm,constructivists have emphasized the significance of non-material factors in explaining a state’s behavior. The accounts seemed persuasive during the Cold War era when Japan shunned playing military roles. However, they failed to retain pertinence when Japan began to expand its military role after the end of the Cold War. In contrast, rationalists argue that a state pursues maximization of national interests; the behavior is determined by cost/benefit calculations. The shortcoming of the rationalist account is, however, that they either ignore or take a normative factor as given, failing to explain whether normative factors had an effect on a state’s behavior. By incorporating power considerations among actors, this article elucidates the factors behind Japan’s preference changes from rationalist point of view.
It is argued by constructivists that the announcement of the arms trade ban policy and ensuing compliance were yielded by the internalization of the anti-militarist norm advocated by the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), which had acted as a norm entrepreneur as well as a protector. However, the investigation of the power balance between the successive Liberal Democratic Party governments and the JSP shows that they were driven by cost/benefit calculation. The 2011 mitigation made by the government under the Democratic Party of Japan was also precipitated by the calculation. By then, the power of the Social Democratic Party, a succeeding party of the JSP which once enjoyed certain influence during the Cold War period, had become negligible. As opposed to the constructivist claim, cost/benefit calculations, not the regulative effect of the norm, are the decisive factor operating behind Japan’s decision making process. More importantly, it is the power balance between norm entrepreneur and decision maker that largely influences the process of cost/benefit calculation.

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The former Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira established “the Comprehensive National Security Study Group” in 1979, which mainly consisted of Japanese leading scholars and government officials. However, the term “comprehensive security” was not invented by him, but was already well known to Japanese people at the end of the 1970s.

Many previous studies have discussed the concept from various points of view. However, they have not explained in what ways policy-makers accepted it and regarded it as an integral factor in Japanese security policy.

This study focuses on the impacts of comprehensive security on policy-makers, and especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, which was in charge of general security issues. It clarifies the situation in which comprehensive security appeared, explains what perceptions the ministry had of the concept, and shows how international and internal factors in those days influenced those perceptions, using declassified Japanese and U.S. government documents.

It also pays attention to the different forms of security, focusing the discussion on the attempt to establish the “National Comprehensive Security Council” during the Zenko Suzuki Administration at the beginning of the 1980s. Comprehensive security did not simply comprise military security – i.e. security in the narrow sense – but also economic security, food security and others, i.e. security in the broad sense. At the same time, into comprehensive security was integrated anything that did not otherwise fall into the category of security.

These elements contributed to jurisdictional disputes. The differentiation of security led other ministries and agencies to become concerned with security in a broader sense. For example, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry was interested in economic security, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, among others, was concerned with food security.

At first, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not manifest interest in comprehensive security. Its main concern was security in the narrow sense because of an administrative dispute with the Japan Defense Agency. This study shows how it started to become involved in comprehensive security, and demonstrates what impact the differentiation of security had on ministries and agencies.

Previous studies have regarded the Japanese government as a single actor, and have not revealed the differences between ministries and agencies. This paper demonstrates that for the Japanese government, the concept was not monolithic. Even though ministries and agencies were allied on the surface, they had different opinions and objectives. By investigating the acceptance of comprehensive security, this study aims to clarify the implications of this concept in the context of U.S.-Japan relations in the last phase of the Cold War.

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本稿では,1971年の参議院における重宗雄三議長の四選出馬断念と河野謙三議長選出をめぐる政治過程が,参議院自民党内の閣僚ポスト配分ルールに対して与えた影響について論じる。重宗の議事運営の手法や人事の私物化には,参議院内部に広範な批判が存在した。河野への議長交替過程は,理想主義的な一部の自民党議員による専横的な議長への挑戦が,同じく参議院改革を目指した野党との提携によって成功したとされてきた。これに対して筆者は,議長交替に至る過程において,参議院三木派が重宗四選反対に回った点に注目する。三木派の行動は,重宗の人格や参議院の理念の問題というより,選挙での脆弱性を抱えた小派閥による閣僚ポスト配分ルール形成の試みとして理解されうる。初入閣時当選回数や派閥別閣僚ポスト配分の分析からは,重宗議長の退任後,参議院自民党における制度化は大きく進展したことが分かる。

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Japan is one of the largest arms importers in the world. On the other hand, it severely restricts the export of weapons. Namely, the Japanese Government carries out the most extraordinary policy that it bans the export of any kinds of weapons abroad, while Japan has developed and produced highly sophisticated weapons for the Self Defence Forces and also it has extremely high capability in terms of military technology.
It was in April 1967 that the principles on arms export were incorporated into national policy by former Prime Minister Eisaku Sato for the first time. It was called the three principles on arms exports, by which Japan refrained from the export of weapons to such countries as (1) communist nations, (2) countries on which were imposed arms embargoes by the UN resolutions and (3) parties to international conflicts or nations which were likely to become parties. Several years later, the Japanese Government revised the principles by enlarging the areas to which they were applied. Namely, in February 1976 the Cabinet lead by former Prime Minister Takeo Miki announced the unified government guideline that Japan refrained from exporting any weapons to every area in the world. Also, at the same time, the Cabinet defined weapons prohibited from exporting under the guideline as one which was used directly for battle by military forces. Thus the Japanese Government shaped the strict policy on arms exports.
In January 1981, however, the scandal that gun barrels had been smuggled to South Korea by some company was brought to the public. It was called the Hotta Steel Scandal. As a result of it, the effectiveness of the policy on arms export came into question. In March 1981, both Houses of the Diet adopted the resolution on the ban on arms exports, which requested the Government to respond to the acts whcih had violated the principles with strictness and discretion, and also required it to take effective measures to improve the condition. Accordingly, the policy of the Japanese Government on the arms export was substantially reinforced.
At the end of June 1981, the United States requested Japan to start the mutual exchange of arms technology between the two countries. At that time, it had been understood in the Japanese Government that the arms on which the principles were applied included every arms technology except widely used ones whcih were applicable for both military and non-military use. The United Sates took notice of the excellent arms technology that Japan, especially Japanese private companies, had developed so far. The United States has dissatisfaction with the unfair transfer of arms technology between Japan and the United States, because Japanese companies and other entities were not permitted to export such technology to the United Stats by the policy of the Government, while the United States had provided arms technology for Japan through licenced production and other means. The request from the United States purported to make the flow of arms technology between the two countries both ways. Actually there was a great controversy in the Japanese Government on whether it was consistent with the established principles on arms exports to accept it. Thus the Japanese Government had much difficulty in responding to the request from the United States.
Through the discussion in the Japanese Government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Agency were in favor for the request, and on the contrary, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry was relucfant to accept it. Finally in January 1983, the Cabinet lead by former Prime Mimister Yasuhiro Nakasone determined to accept it and start the transfer of arms technology to the United States as a exception to the principles. In the process of discussion, a opinion that it is the obligation imposed on Japan under Japan-U. S. Security Treaty and other arrangements between the two countries for Japan to provide arms technology for the

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