Iraqi Islamist parties have been attracting considerable attention, especially after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent regime change from an authoritarian to a ‘democratic’ system. However, these parties experienced serious ideological antagonism amongst themselves as well as struggle for political interests.
These ideological conflicts can be traced back to the segmentation in the Da‘wa Party, the Islamist ruling party after 2005, in the 1980s. The Da‘wa Party at the time was ruled by the clerical disciples of Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr, the charismatic leader of the modern Iraqi Islamist movements. However, these clerical disciples were dismissed from the party by non-cleric leaders despite the former’s influence and guidance in political ideology. Moreover, the non-clerical leaders began consulting with Faḍl Allāh.
How did non-clerical leadership justify this segmentation, that is, the dismissal of clerical disciples, even though the later wielded a strong influence on the Da‘wa Party? This paper tackles this issue by analyzing the ideologies of the disciples, Faḍl Allāh, and the party,—especially in Wilāya al-Faqīh, a doctrine justifying the rulership of a religious authority.
This paper presents the following findings: The Da‘wa Party justified the dismissal of the disciples and the subsequent consulting with Faḍl Allāh by advocating the party’s ideological estrangement from its Wilāya al-Faqīh doctrine with respect to three points: organization/institutionalization of leadership, sole authority or several authorities, and importance of people’s support. Moreover, Faḍl Allāh shared the party’s new ideologies with regard to these three aspects. The party felt that the sense of impending crisis brought about by these clerical disciples, who were under the influence of the Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini, would damage the party’s independence and that its ‘Iraqi-ness’ would steer the change in its policy. In other words, the party believed that it would be able to justify the segmentations by emphasizing its ‘Iraqi-ness.’
Several weeks after the death of Āya Allāh al-‘Uẓmā ‘Alī Arākī in November 1994, Supreme Leader ‘Alī Khāmene'ī was promoted by the two Iranian Islamic jurist groups as one of the recommended marāja‘-e taqlīd (“sources of emulation,” the title of the highest-educated Islamic jurisconsults). This event has had an impact on not only the marja‘-e taqlīd system but also the relationship between political authority and religious authority in post-Khomeini Iran. Although many researchers have referred to this event, only a few have examined its subsequent influence on both Iranian politics and the marja‘-e taqlīd system in Iran.
In this paper, I will attempt to reveal the influence of this event on the marja‘-e taqlīd system in Iran in two ways. First, I will illustrate the character of the new marja‘-e taqlīd concept that was developed by the two associations, focusing on not only the intermittent aspect but also the continuous relationship between the marja‘-e taqlīd system and the two associations' announcements. Second, by focusing on the location of Khāmene'ī as a marja‘-e taqlīd in 2008, I will show the influence of this new marja‘-e taqlīd concept on the development of the marja‘-e taqlīd system in Iran after the 1994 event.
This paper reveals two specializations of legal scholars engaged in crime victims support in Japan by examining how their specializations are formed through their practice of restorative justice, and the dilemmas in their specializations. The first specialization, which is based on restorative practices, held dilemma in both theory and practice. The second specialization was found in the institutionalization of criminal justice. This specialization held dilemma in both a moderate degree of institutionalization and a strong degree of institutionalization. Both of these specializations were formed through multiple commitment of legal scholars to restorative justice with the above two dilemmas.
The term "wilayat-i faqih" began to attract an attention in the world after Ayatollah Khomeini expressed his view to Islamic government in the late 1960s as well as after the establishment of Islamic Republic of Iran. Usually, outside Iran, attempts have been made to examine this subject from the point of view of modern western political framework as it were a purely political matter. However, since "wilayat-i faqih", in concept and framework, essentially Islamic, it is necessary to look into it from the Islamic worldview and then to consider its significance to the people who are living in the Islamic socio-cultural environment. For this purpose, this paper tries to examine the concept of "wilayah" focusing on its politico-juridical development. It is no exaggeration to say that the dispute in the eighteenth century between the Akhbari school and the Usuli school formed a turning-point in the history of the Twelver-Shi'i jurisprudence. However, the opposition between the Akhbari and the Usuli currents was apparent in the Twelver Shi'ism from its begining. The main point of the difference is the method and the source which are applied in case questions arise in society. The Akhbaris, relying on the method of "taqlid", rely primarily on the tradition of the Prophet and the Imams as the source of the religious knowledge and just imitate and follow them. The "taqlid" of the Akhbaris had shown a tendency to negate all responsibility and to obey blindly. On the other hand, the Usulis are based on "ijtihad" which endeavours to deduce a judicial decree on the basis of authentic arguments of the "shari'ah". It demanded a knowledge of various branches of learning, and he who possessed a knowledge of them was called "mujtahid". The Usuli trend lost momentum in the seventeenth century because of the Akhbari resurgence through the work of Mullah Amin Astrabadi. Since then, the Akhbaris continued to flourish for some two hundred years andtraces of the idea of the Akhbaris are still to be found. However, the needs of the times in the nineteenth century chose the Usulis, because social circumstances changed more rapidly than before and in order to solve the newly rising problems, much more activities as well as knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence were required. Therefore, activism among "faqih"s arose along with the Usuli's popularity among people. Khomeini was not the first scholar to conceptualize the "wilayat-i faqih". Mullah Ahmad Naraqi in the nineteenth century was the first "mujtahid" to have proved that the "wilayat" in actuality of the Usuli sense was delegated to a "faqih" during the occultation of Imam. The "wilayat" in actuality is different from the "wilayat" in potentiality in the Akhbari's sense. Briefly speaking, the "wilayat" in potentiality is supposed to be delegated without any particular reason to all the jurisprudents regardless of their qualification, but on the other hand the "wilayat" in actuality is delegated to some able "faqih"s who are by virture of their knowledge and personality as mentioned before. Another important condition which enables a "faqih" to attain the "wilayat" in actuality is the generous support of people. In other words, even if a "faqih" is very much qualified in the knowledge, without the support of people, he cannot be a person to whom the "wilayat" is delegated. Therefore, at this point it should be rioted that the significance of the "wilayat-i faqih" as well as that of the "faqih" itself has been changed in the course of the Usuli interpretation. Repeatedly saying, the "wilayat-i faqih" is considered a social duty not as a source of power. When we look into the
(View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)