Since its articulation in 1823, the Monroe Doctrine was never given a single definition. Its definition depended largely on the historical context: U.S. policymakers defined the doctrine in a way that justified the foreign policy objectives they pursued. President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) was no exception. His administration’s foreign policy was designed to fundamentally transform U.S. relations with other nations, first within the Western Hemisphere and then across the Atlantic. The Monroe Doctrine was instrumental in effecting these transformations. This article examines the way FDR, in the period 1933 to 1941, employed the nineteenth-century doctrine to pursue his foreign policy goals in the context of the Good Neighbor Policy (GNP) and World War II.

Concurrent with the launch of the domestic New Deal, FDR launched the Good Neighbor Policy toward other American nations. Giving up the right of intervention, the GNP marked the decisive end of the U.S.’s openly imperialistic policy in the Western Hemisphere. However, the Monroe Doctrine, which had long served as the basis for such imperialistic policy, was still in place, and served as a reminder of U.S. imperialism. From the U.S. perspective, the freedom of unilateral military action implied by the Monroe Doctrine was so vital to national security it could not be relinquished. Thus, a challenge for the FDR administration was to eliminate the imperialistic implications of the Monroe Doctrine without revoking the doctrine itself. In fact, other American nations attempted to pan-Americanize the Monroe Doctrine. Insisting that the Monroe Doctrine was a national policy, the FDR administration avoided international discussion on it. Later, Western Hemisphere nations agreed on the concept of hemisphere-based collective security without referring to the Monroe Doctrine, which was the first major articulation of such a concept.

During the late 1930s, a fierce debate raged in the United States over whether the country should participate in World War II. FDR and the isolationists decisively disagreed on what needed to be done to defend the United States and, by extension, the Western Hemisphere. Both sides used the Monroe Doctrine to justify their position. The isolationists invoked the traditional definition of the Monroe Doctrine, which was based on political separation between the hemispheres. To refute the isolationist position, FDR offered a reading of the Monroe Doctrine he claimed was more in tune with twentieth-century realities. FDR declared that isolation could no longer protect democratic American institutions from an un-American system; “essential” differences between democracy and totalitarianism rather compelled the United States to intervene to preserve its democratic institutions. FDR did not lead the United States into war, but he called for and implemented actions with the risk of war with Germany before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

In his attempts to formulate a new international role for the United States in the mid-twentieth century, FDR fundamentally redefined the Monroe Doctrine without claiming to do so. Relying on the “redefined” Monroe Doctrine, FDR succeeded in presenting his policy not as a deviation from tradition but as its extension.

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The aim of this paper is to show how vocal communication techniques and audiences' recognition and attitudes about voice changed in U.S. radio broadcasting during the 1920s. Some past studies on radio broadcasting have focused on the effects of "crooning," in which voice from the radio suggests an "intimate" imaginary relationship between the broadcaster and the audience. However, such studies were interested only in the effects of the technological change brought about by the electrical amplification of microphones. In this study, the author examines not only technological changes in devices used by radio broadcasters but also in devices for audiences, including radio receivers and speakers, as well as changes in the audiences' recognition of voice. In particular, the author focuses on the emergence of the term "personality" (which is used as a metaphor for individuality and character in discourse about voice broadcasting) and the term "radio voice" (which refers to a voice suited to radio broadcasting) in order to raise the following question: How did the custom of "analyzing personality from voice communication" emerge and how was it established? To answer this question, the author analyzes the process of change in the recognition of voice among broadcasters and audiences resulting from advances in radio broadcasting technology, such as microphones and radio devices, in the United States around the period from 1920 through 1927. By using primary materials, including radio magazines and newspapers that were read by the public at large at the time, the author studies the history of media by focusing on statements about voice made by broadcasters and by audiences. The findings of this study show the following: Radio-broadcasting devices were improved on an ongoing basis during this period. As radio broadcasting changed in nature from "Dxing" to "appreciative listening" as a result of technological progress, broadcasters invented vocal communication techniques suited to radio broadcasting while audiences developed imagination skills regarding the voice from the radio by changing their attitude toward voice communication. In this historical process, the term "radio voice" changed its meaning from "articulate communication skills" to "elements that show the depth of personality." At the same time, the habit of identifying individuals by "listening" to personality radio and feeling close to the broadcaster was generated.

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Political Scientist Clinton Rossiter maintains that even a democracy needs to transform itself into a kind of dictatorship when the safety of the nation is in danger. Within the situation Rossiter calls “constitutional dictatorship,” the chief executive assumes direct leadership of the nation because of his responsiveness and the flexibility of his actions.

In fact, in the United States, there has been a consensus on the presidential prerogative, especially in times of crisis, whereas it remains undefined as to when an emergency is recognized and who determines it. Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) assumed the role of determinant when he proclaimed a state of national emergency. As significant as this may appear, historians and political scientists have paid scant attention to FDR’s proclamations. Thus, the immediate aim of this article is to demonstrate the strategy behind the FDR’s decision to proclaim an “unlimited” national emergency on May 27, 1941.

At first glance, this proclamation had almost no influence on whether the U.S. Navy should escort British merchant ships sailing across the Atlantic, which was the most relevant issue at the time. Moreover, FDR did not make the most of the psychological effect of the proclamation as the interventionists had desired. Indeed, FDR dismissed the idea of making drastic changes in his policy. As a result, his proclamation has been seen as just another occasion on which to declare an emergency; however, the presidential proclamation of emergency possessed not only psychological but also legal effects; namely, to invoke powers available only in times of emergency. Recognizing that, FDR attempted to take the advantage of the situation. Having considered the evidence and facts, it appears reasonable to think that an “unlimited” national emergency was necessary for FDR to interpret the powers delegated to the president during World War I and to justify his future actions, relative to the kind of action previously taken during wartime.

Although Congress did not necessarily agree with FDR’s judgment on whether an “unlimited” national emergency truly existed and despite the fact that FDR’s proclamation of emergency had no constitutional status, Congress validated it by referring to it in bills. If the duration of law was based solely on the FDR-claimed state of emergency, then Congress had no method by which to revoke it because there was no way to revoke the presidential proclamation itself. Harry Truman, FDR’s successor, also proclaimed a national emergency in the face of the Korean War. In fact, it was not until the National Emergencies Act of 1976 that the procedure by which presidents could proclaim a national emergency was established.

FDR’s proclamation is of symbolic value because it signals the ambiguity associated with who is able to determine the existence of an emergency. Future Presidents no longer can unilaterally proclaim a national emergency; however, given the lingering nature of the “war on terrorism,” they can claim a state of emergency or crisis to justify their use of prerogative. Therefore, the problem posed in this article remains relevant today.

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本支部では,2001年シンポジウム『北海道の物理教育 〜高校が大学に期待すること,大学が高校に望むこと〜』,2002年パネルディスカッション「高等学校学習指導要領と物理教育 〜新教育課程の実施を目前にして〜」,そして今回2003年シンポジウムということで,12月に開催される支部研究会において,高大連携を話題の中心とした議論を過去3カ年間継続してきた。2002年には,新教育課程における物理Iの冒頭で扱われる電磁気分野(生活の中の電気)に関して,様々な意見交換がなされたが,今回はそれも含めて,新しい物理Iの教科書について議論された。

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