During the Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) conducted guerrilla warfare in areas occupied by the Imperial Japanese Army. The Kuomintang aimed to continue the fight against Japan while maintaining their own governing authority in those regions by mobilizing the local population under Japanese occupation for guerrilla warfare. They carried out operations to disrupt logistics and transportation networks controlled by the Japanese forces.

Prior studies have evaluated the KMT’s wartime mobilization system as a “total war” system premised on the penetration of ruling power into society. However, according to some empirical studies on the wartime mobilization system in enemy-occupied areas, spontaneously organized self-defense groups and bandit groups were mobilized for guerrilla warfare, and the conscription system that had been established before the war did not function. Considering this point, it is necessary to conduct a comprehensive reexamination of the KMT’s wartime mobilization system, including the actual condition of their guerrilla warfare.

This paper turns its attention to “Jiangnan” region in southern Jiangsu Province, where Nanjing and Shanghai, which were important political and economic bases for the KMT, were located, and which became the front line after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. The paper then examines the extent to which the KMT was able to build a modern military based on a compulsory military service system in the “Jiangnan” region. Then, this paper will shift its attention to the Loyal Patriotic Army, a paramilitary organization of the Kuomintang that played a leading role in guerrilla warfare against the Japanese in “Jiangnan”, and clarified the actual situation of unit management, including the acquisition of soldiers, using primary historical documents. Through this work, this paper reexamines the KMT’s wartime mobilization system at the front-line areas and in the Japanese-occupied areas, which had not been sufficiently examined in previous studies.

This paper reveals that the Loyal Patriotic Army’s main source of soldiers was the various armed forces that emerged because of the weakening of the KMT’s rule. These armed forces could have been the immediate military power of the Loyal Patriotic Army, but their behavior was based on their own survival strategy rather than anti-Japanese consciousness, and it was difficult to control them. Therefore, while relying on these armed forces for wartime mobilization, the KMT continued to face the challenge of “domestic pacification,” which is a process of centralized control of the violent apparatus.

In conclusion, this paper points out that the KMT’s wartime mobilization in “Jiangnan” during the Sino-Japanese War was not based on a total war system but was dependent on local voluntary armed forces that became active partly because of the retreat of the party’s governing power. The KMT was able to mobilize such armed forces because the interests of both sides coincided in securing the war effort and guaranteeing survival, but this symbiotic relationship was very fragile.

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Although the Republic of China, which was victorious in the Second World War, intended to obtain more war reparations from Japan than any other victorious country, the issue of the Republic of China’s demand for reparations did not develop as the government had initially expected. This was due to the US’s change to its policy in the occupation of Japan and its reduction of reparations collected. However, among the allied nations and governments, the detailed processes of negotiation and intentions regarding reparations have still not been clarified. Thus, it is possible that there were issues and circumstances affecting the Republic of China’s demands for reparations beside the reduction of reparations due to policy change in the US.

This paper focuses on the Republic of China’s decision-making process regarding the question of how to deal with the former Japanese navy vessels, which the government considers to be very important, and offers a detailed explanation of how this relates to the US’s provision of surplus military vessels to the Chinese Navy moved forward at the same time. This paper explores other possible factors affecting the Republic of China’s reparations claims, apart from the much-discussed US policy change.

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Tan Kah Kee (1874-1961), a Fukien-born Chinese in Singapore, was one of the most eminent leaders of all Chinese in contemporary Southeast Asian societies. With the promotion of China's modernization program in these years, his name in China has come to fame again as one of the greatest industrial entrepreneurs, an outstanding patriot and a famous benevolent person for the promotion of school education and the devotion to charities both in Singapore and Amoy where he was born and grew up. Such a characteristic image about Tan Kah Kee as a typical example of loyal and patriotic subject to his motherland, however, is far from the real situation of his personal history. He was only an ordinary Chinese businessman in Singapore, a non-elite and a non-partisan Hokkien merchant without any academic career of secondary education. The real events of his life tell us indeed that he was neither a patriotic Kuomingtang (KMT) supporter, nor an ideological Communist.
As he fully realized the neccessity of school education, Tan in 1910's began operation to invest his capital in the promotion of Chinese school education both in Singapore and Amoy and also founded Amoy University in 1921. In 1916 when he became naturalized as a British subject, Tan kept friendly relations with the British Colonial Authorities in Singapore. Through the wartime, there were various points of view on their political identity among different dialect and religious groups, or different economic and social status of the Singapore Chinese. Although he was apointed as a Chairman of the Nanyang Chinese Relief General Association in 1938, Tan stood out of the political movement by the KMT and the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and kept a friendly relations with the Colonial Authorities. As he was disappointed at the corruption of the KMT bureaucrats during the wartime, Tan keenly desired in his heart that a new democratic government should be established in post-war China.
In 1942 when the Japanese army invaded to Singapore, Japanese military police put a price on Tan Kah Kee as a top-ranking leader of the anti-Japanese movement in Nanyang. Tan exiled to Java and hid himself at a house of the Amoy school graduate at Malang until the end of the war. Soon after the end of the war, Tan returned to Singapore and made a poor attempt at the promotion of Nanyang Chinese relief fundraising campaign for the wartime victims both in Singapore and the Fukien. The power structure of the Nanyang Chinese, however, was very much transformed by the upheaval of the war and Tan's leadership declined with the growing KMT's and the MCP's powes in post-war Singapore. There was indeed a generation gulf between Tan and the new leaders of the Chinese political and economic circles in post-war Singapore.
His return to China in 1949 was motivated neither by ideological nor by practical consideration for protecting interest or all Chinese abroad and was merely urged by the traditional custom of many China-born Chinese in abroad who usually go back their home-town for living calmly in their old age. In 1949, Tan was invited to Beijing for helping the Overseas Chinese affairs of the new government. But, he was excused himself from the invitation and usually stayed in Amoy for devoting all of his retired life to the community development in Amoy. With the reassessment of the role of the Overseas Chinese for their investment to modernize China in these years, the great name of Tan Kah Kee has come to the fore again in some Chinese periodicals since 1980. His contribution to social and economic development projects after retirement, however, was largely concentrated to Amoy where was a microcosm of Tan's spiritual identity.

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The research to date dealing with the assassination of Yang Yuting by order of Zhang Xueliang on 10 January 1929 focuses on the belief that Yang was pro-Japanese. What the research fails to consider, however, is the assassination of Chang Yinhuai on that same date, which pan by no means be attributed to pro-Japanese sentiment, since Chang never studied in Japan, which is the only proof offered for Yang's pro-Japanese position. Could these assassinations have had some other motive? The author of this article believes so, based on two points yet to be considered in the existing research. The first has to do with the public careers and political ideas of the two victims. Studies have clearly shown the political ideas and actions of Zhang Xueliang from the time of the bombing death of Zhang Zuolin at the hands of a Japanese agent on 4 June 1928 to the hoisting of the Nationalist flag on 29 December of that year ; however, a similar analysis of Zhang's activities during that time has yet to be done, due to the a priori assumption that Zhang and Yang were political enemies. Consequently, we have no idea of Yang's policy stances or how they conflicted with Zhang's, other than the former's alleged pro-Japanese sentiment, leading to the conclusion that Yang's assassination was motivated by personal conflict between the two. This is why the author of the present article has felt the need to delve into the political ideas and actions of Yang and Chang Yinhuai. The author's second point focuses on the power structure of the Sandongxing 東三省 Regime and the political roles played in it by Zhang, Yang and Chang. Whenever conflict occurs in any political regime, clashes usually occur between factions, not individual politicians. In the case of the Sandongxing Regime, conflict not only occurred along generational lines (between the old timer and newcomer factions), but also geographically between the leading province in the triad, Fengtian, and the other two, Jilin and Heilongjiang. What remains unclear is where Zhang, Yang and Chang stood within the Regime's structure of conflict, which may be the key, to why the latter two were assassinated. One more factor that must be taken into consideration is the situation of the three countries bordering on the Sandongxing region : China, the Soviet Union and Japan. The research to date has tended to emphasize the actions of Japan in the framework of the historical background to its relationship to Manchuria. However, even if it can be proved that Yang was pro-Japanese, it is still important to identify his place in the Regime's structure and the Regime's relationship to its other two neighbors. Also, within the fluid international situation at that time, the Regime's structure was probably also in flux, one good example of which being Yang's assassination. With respect to China, it was being ruled by two central bodies, the government in Beijing ruling over Changcheng 長城 and all points south and the Nationalist government. However, these bodies did not exercise full control over the country in the same manner as the former Qing Dynasty or the later People's Republic. This is why the author deals with the "China factor" focussing not only on the two central ruling bodies, but also the, movements of the various warlord factions.

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本稿は1974年度本学会秋季学術大会共通論題「1930年代における日本帝国主義の植民地問題」の報告原稿である.統計資料の一部を削除し注を付したほか論旨内容には変更を加えていない.なお,本共通論題は本号所掲の小林報告・高橋報告との三報告で編成された.その際,本稿は総括的に「大東亜共栄圏」全域の経済構造につきさしあたり流通過程の側から概観する役割を与えられており,小林報告は「大東亜共栄圏」の中核をなす「日満華北経済ブロック」に限定して生産過程に立入った分析を行なうものとされた.主として日本帝国主義の側から問題点を検討する本稿と,植民地・占領他の側により重点をおいた小林報告との両者をあわせて問題の全体像への接近が試みられる.両報告で十分に取上げえなかった農業・土地問題については,さらに対象地域を限定して日本農業と植民地「満州」との相互関連につき農業移民問題を通じて追求した高橋報告により論点の所在を解明する.本共通論題の構成にあたって留意された点はほぼ以上の如きものであった.三報告の作成にあたっては,満州史研究会・満州移民史研究会の会員諸兄から数多くのご教示をえた.報告者三名を代表し深く感謝の意を表したい.

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