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全文: "知識論法"
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  • 北野 安寿子
    哲学
    2008年 2008 巻 59 号 149-162,L15
    発行日: 2008/04/01
    公開日: 2010/07/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In recent decades, one of the most widely debated questions in the philosophy of mind has been whether consciousness is physical or nonphysical. Jackson's knowledge argument, which argues that there are truths about consciousness that cannot be deduced from physical truths and infers that physicalism is false, has attracted interest since its appearance in 1982. In this paper, I examine the three major physicalist replies to the argument.
    I first clarify what the argument requires of physicalists: they must show that physicalism is as compatible as property dualism with the following two intuitions: (i) no amount of nonphenomenal knowledge suffices for phenomenal knowledge (empiricism about phenomenal knowledge), and (ii) the object of a piece of empirical knowledge is a fact. I next point out that there are two options a physicalist who accepts (i) and (ii) might take: (A) to refute the knowledge argument and nevertheless satisfy (i) and (ii); (B) to show that physicalism can accept the argument and satisfy (i) and (ii). In the final section, I examine the three major (A)-type responses to the argument: the Non-Propositional-Knowledge View; the Old-Fact/New-Mode View; and the Incomplete-Physical-Knowledge View.
    The conclusion I draw is this: the first reply fails to establish the invalidity of the argument; the second fails to satisfy intuition (ii); the third succeeds in satisfying both intuitions, but only in a negative way. It therefore appears that (B) is the more preferable option for a physicalist to adopt.
  • 前田 高弘
    科学基礎論研究
    2009年 37 巻 1 号 29-38
    発行日: 2009/11/25
    公開日: 2017/08/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    It is often thought a difficult task to find a place for qualia in the physical world. The reason for this may be that qualia seem to be essentially intrinsic qualities so they cannot be captured entirely in terms of their causal-functional roles. This is the typical way in which qualia are thought to be physicalistically problematic. In this paper I rethink that very problem of qualia by means of metaphysical considerations concerning properties in general. The relevant question in the metaphysics of properties is whether properties have essences which determine their identities independently of their dispositional aspects. (Such essences are called 'quiddities'.) Indeed, the problem of qualia would take a different shape depending on the answer to that metaphysical question. I show this with reference to three main views on that question, namely, quidditism, the causal theory, and the identity theory. In closing, I make a brief remark about what these considerations imply for the relationship between physicalism and qualia.
  • 鈴木 貴之
    哲学
    2004年 2004 巻 55 号 193-205,29
    発行日: 2004/04/01
    公開日: 2009/07/23
    ジャーナル フリー
    Some anti-physicalists claim that the conceivability of zombies itself shows in an a priori way that physicalism about consciousness cannot be true. We have to see if this argument is successful before we start to build a physicalistic theory of con-sciousness. There are two popular physicalist objections to the argument. The ob-jection based on necessity a posteriori does not succeed because of the equivocality of the statements in question.Another objection, based on non-ascriptivism about meaning, fails because non-ascriptivism mistakenly thinks that conceivability is a quite empty notion. Despite the failure of these objections, we can object to the con-ceivability argument by emphasizing the possible inappropriateness of concepts. Our present concepts do not necessarily depict reality in an appropriate way. So, conceivability based on our present concepts has no consequences for metaphysical possibility if the concepts used are inappropriate ones. We have reason to think that our current concept of consciousness is inconsistent, so the conceivability of zom-bies is not a reliable guide to their metaphysical possibility. We may see that physi-calism about consciousness is true and zombies are inconceivable when we have the appropriate concept of consciousness.
  • 科学哲学
    2008年 41 巻 2 号 2_101-2_134
    発行日: 2008年
    公開日: 2009/08/31
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 水本 正晴
    科学哲学
    2006年 39 巻 1 号 79-95
    発行日: 2006/06/25
    公開日: 2009/05/29
    ジャーナル フリー
    In this review I comment on the papers in Shiriizu Kokoro No Tetsuhaku, or Philosophy of Mind Series (2004), edited by Y. Nobuhara. This series consists of three volumes, Human Part (vol. 1), Robot Part (vol. 2), and Translation Part (vol. 3). I shall comment on each paper in the first two volumes, since the last one consists of translations of classic papers of philosophy of mind in English-speaking countries.
  • 水本 正晴
    科学哲学
    2006年 39 巻 1 号 63-77
    発行日: 2006/06/25
    公開日: 2009/05/29
    ジャーナル フリー
    David Chalmers presented a zombie argument, from which the falsity of physicalism allegedly follows. Although many authors who criticize this argument attack the derivation of the metaphysical possibility of zombies from the logical possibility of zombies, in this paper I will argue against the very first premise of the argument: the logical possibility of zombies. I will show the a priori impossibility of zombies, through what I call the Blinking Qualia argument.
  • 水本 正晴
    科学哲学
    2002年 35 巻 1 号 27-42
    発行日: 2002/05/25
    公開日: 2009/05/29
    ジャーナル フリー
    Wittgenstein was intrigued by the idea of experiments where subjects see their own body through mirror or screen, and move their body relying solely on that visual information. But it is not so clear why such experiments are so important and what they are supposed to show. In this paper I argue that such experiments reveal our naive conception of the relation between intention and body, which is based on two specific models; namely, criticize both of them, and draw some alternative pictures.
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