The Eisenhower Administration developed the concept of the Asian Nuclear Center in 1955 as an economic aid program under the Colombo Plan for preventing infiltration of communism into Asia. The center was given the role of ensuring, improving and strengthening the welfare in the Asian countries and countering the communists' allegiance that the U.S. was only interested in the military use of atomic power. However, this maneuver was abandoned in 1959.
Tracing the history of the Asian Nuclear Center indicates the cause of the failed attempt reflecting the various differences between American and British perceptions as well as the complex images of how to create a favorable Asian international order as perceived by the Eisenhower Administration.
Initially, there was almost a consensus among the administration that the center would be established in Ceylon. The State Department once sounded out the site for construction with Commonwealth of Nations. Yet the group backing the Philippines for the site—with a sense of rivalry against the Commonwealth in the light of peaceful use of nuclear power, and due to the believed strategic importance of the Philippines within SEATO for the U.S.—tactically changed this policy within a very short period of time.
The British and Canadian governments were stunned to know that change and showed their discontent. The Colombo Plan was designed for the Asian region including non-allied nations in order to block the communism. The U.K. possessed bigger fear than did the U.S. regarding the possibility that the projects of the Colombo Plan would be merely regarded as anti-communist campaign by the non-allied states and lose its appeal. Establishing the nuclear center in a country such as the Philippines holding the memberships of both the Colombo Plan and of the SEATO could realize such fear.
Interestingly enough, no small number of officials of the Eisenhower Administration kept holding serious concerns about the selection of the Philippines, attaching importance to the cooperation with the Commonwealth. However, their worries were proved to be true by the consequences that the Commonwealth no longer agreed with the concept and that Asian nations also showed their hesitations to support the concept. Most of these countries were disappointed by the lack of consultation from the U.S. The Eisenhower Administration, now, could not expect the other states to share the burden of the operating cost for the center. Besides, the advent of the Soviet's ICBM and the mutual deterrence diluted the necessity of the American refutation to the communists' criticism focused on the U.S.'s preoccupation with the nuclear power only for military use. The lack of clear feasibility and necessity of the nuclear center erased the impetus of the proposal.

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One of the causes of the Northern Territories Problem was the failure to apply to the territories “the principle of non-aggrandizement” which the Allied countries, including the Soviet Union, confirmed during World War II. Why did such a thing happen? In an attempt to solve this problem, I will analyze how the Northern Territories were dealt with in the policy of the United States when the Japanese Peace Treaty was drafted by John Foster Dulles.
The provisions of the treaty concerning the Northern Territories are as follows. In Article 2, Japan renounces the Chishima Islands and Southern Karafuto. We can find two problems here. First, “the Chishima Islands” are not defined. Second, the future status of the Chishima Islands and Southern Karafuto are not defined. According to Dulles, Article 22, which provides that a dispute concering the interpretation or execution of the treaty could be referred for decision to the International Court of Justice, is of use for solving the first problem. But, the article is practically useless, because the Soviet Union would not sign the treaty. Moreover, due to Article 25, the Soviet Union cannot gain “any rights, titles or benefits” by the treaty. Therefore, the second problem also was not settled in the treaty.
Article 26, too, has a problem. It says, “Should Japan make a peace settlement or war claims settlement with any State granting that State greater advantages than those provided by the present Treaty, those same advantages shall be extended to the parties to the present Treaty.” In 1956, when Japan was about to recognize the possession of the Chishima Islands and Southern Karafuto by the Soviet Union in the bilateral peace negotiations, Dulles intervened on the grounds that if such a settlement was realized, the United States also should be rewarded with the Ryukyu Islands by Article 26.
Why has the treaty, drafted by Dulles, a competent lawyer, presented so many problems regarding the Northern Territories? Dulles tried to make the Soviet Union sign the treaty with the bait of the Northern Territories, and he had to overcome the difference of opinions regarding the disposition of Taiwan with the United Kingdom. He also had to take the opinions of the Senate and the Pentagon into consideration. Moreover, Dulles was afraid that the Japanese would be dissatisfied with the separation of the Ryukyu Islands and would then arouse anti-American feelings. Therefore, he devised such provisions that the Japanese would be more frustrated with the Soviet Union over the Northern Territories.
Dulles adopted realism and power politics, treating the Northern Territories as a bargaining chip. This was one of the main reason why “the principle of non-aggrandizement, ” which conformed with idealism and democracy, was not applied to the Northern Territories.

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日本国内では1950年代半ごろまで, 日本の自衛力建設が進めば日米安全保障条約の相互防衛条約化と駐留米軍の撤退を米国政府に対して要請できるようになると考えられていた。相互防衛条約という形式と基地の提供は不可分ではないし, 米軍駐留と自衛力建設とのトレード・オフ関係が条約で規定されているわけでもない。にもかかわらず, 2国間の安全保障関係の態様と米軍への基地提供と再軍備がなぜ, このような関係でとらえられたのだろうか。本稿は, 1951年に調印された日米安保条約の形成過程と日本国内の批准過程に焦点を当て, 条約が法的に意味した範囲とその日本における解釈を明らかにする。北大西洋条約 (1949年7月) やANZUS条約と米比相互防衛条約 (1951年) とは異なり, 旧安保条約が基地提供に関する条項と2 国間の安全保障関係を一つの条約で規定したことと条約が暫定的な性格をもっていたことに注目し, なぜそうした方式が選択されたのか, それによって条約にどのような構造が生じ, いかなる解釈を可能としたのかを考察する。

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How do politicians achieve the profit of interest groups? This research is a case study analyzing the political process during which the Medical Diet Members (representatives who spoke for the interest of doctors) have succeeded in emasculating the law that provided the separation of medical practice and drug dispensation. The three viewpoints of the analysis are the following:
  First, how did Kato Ryogoro (Liberal Party), who was the mediator of the Medical Diet Members, bring the Liberal party measures closer to the JMA? Secondly, what kinds of pressures or adjustments were observed between the JMA and the Medical Diet Members during the process of the emasculation of the law? Thirdly, how did the Medical Diet Members managed to form a majority including non - partisans in order to emasculate the law?

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