I will consider the recruitment of Japanese advisors with regard to Dr. Ariga Nagao, who served as advisor for legal matters to Yuan Shikai over a long period of time. Through an analysis of the specifics of employment for Japanese advisors and of the role Ariga played in the formulation of the Republican Constitution in the Early Republican period. I will attempt to reevaluate his historical significance in modern Sino-Japanese relations.
The assumption in March 1913 of the position of advisor on legal matters for Yuan Shikai by Dr. Ariga Nagao, a professor Waseda University in Tokyo, was a milestone in Sino-Japanese relations. The Japanese response to his hiring as advisor was by no means passive. Insofar as the appointment was entangled with a variety of Japan's vested concerns, its significance can be simply summarized as national selfinterest.
In August 1912, Yuan Shikai proposed that Ariga Nagao be employed as advisor. According to surviving sources, Ariga's selection was pushed by three parties. First, Japanese Imperial Army Colonel Banzai Rihachiro, advisor on military affairs to Yuan Shikai since the late Qing, recommended Ariga. Secondly, Ariga was highly recommended by members of the Legislative Bureau who had previously studied in Japan. Thirdly, the Australian journalist G. E. Morrison, who was serving as presidential advisor, recommended Ariga.
During his tenure in China, Ariga followed strictly the wishes of Yuan Shikai as he devoted his energies to implementing a constitutional monarchy. At first Ariga devoted his efforts to the Constitutional Research Discussion Group, whose deliberations were compiled in the work Guanyi xianping, then translated into Chinese and distributed to the public. In addition, responding to Yuan Shikai's criticisms of the provisional constitution, Ariga drafted three articles that were translated into Chinese and presented to Yuan Shikai: “A Viable Plan for a Republican Constitution, ” “The No-Cofidence vote Crisis” (October 1913) and “A compilation of Errors from the Draft of the Constitution” (November 1913). In sum, within the short period of a few months, Ariga as Legal advisor made a valuable contribution to Yuan's machinations against the revolutionary forces.
Three points not touched upon in previous research can be made with regard to Ariga's activities from the perspective of Sino-Japanese relations. First, Yuan tried to use his Japanese advisors as a means to smooth relations with Japan. This approach is best represented by the dispatch of Ariga to Tokyo after Japan issued the Twenty-One Demands in an attempt to sway the elder statesmen of Japan. Second, the drafting and enactment of the Republican Constitution were inseparable from Ariga's activities. Although previous researchers have debated endlessly on the model for the Republican constitution, they have made almost no reference to Ariga. But, as I have noted in this paper, Yuan Shiaki listened carefully to Ariga's suggestions before incorporating the Japanese model without reservation into the Republican constitution. It is no exaggeration to say that research on Ariga Nagao presents a valuable perspective on both Republican history and modern Chinese legislative history. Third, we cannot ignore the fact that those who studied in Japan and came back to China to play a major role in drafting and revising the late Qing constitution continued to play a central role into the Republican era. In addition, after a temporary disruption during the 1911 revolution, Japan again exerted a profound influence on Chinese politics, economics, and education as the activities of Japanese advisors employed by the Republican administration again brought the efficacy of the Japanese model to the attention of the Chinese. To put it another way, after the fall of the Qing dynasty Japanese influence continued to penetrate deeply into China, carried on by these advisors. Any consideration

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The object of this article is to understand the policy of the Japanese Government towards the Chinse Revolution of 1911. Yuan Shih-kai, recalled by the Manchu Dynasty, arrived in Peking on November 13 and organized his cabinet. As Dr. Lowe has indicated Britain placed great trust in Yuan Shih-kai and believed the new Chinese Government, monarchical or republican, could only work effectively if Yuan controlled it. Japan favoured retention of the Manchu Dynasty under a constitutional monarchy and urged Yuan to support the monarchical course. But Japan regarded Yuan as basically Anti-Japanese and did not place much trust in him. So Japan proposed to Britain joint intervention to achieve constitutional monarchy in China, but the latter opposed any steps beyond protecting its nationals. Finally, the trade interest of Britain in the Yangtze valley and in south China sacrificed the Manchu Dynasty from obtaining early peace and Japan was not strong enough financially to defy British intentions. On December 28, Japanese chargé d'affaires in London stated to Sir E. Grey that the Japanese Government would not take any further action, but would await development of Chinese political situation.

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