The weapons procurement process in the Soviet Union is crucial in understanding the interaction between foreign policy and domestic politics as well as the interconnection in the domestic political dynamics among politics, economy and military factors. This article aims to examine the political dynamics in the Soviet weapon procurement process.
The article is divided into three parts. The first part, “the static anlysis of the weapons procurement in the Soviet Union, ” explains the actors and their role in the process. Specifically, the three-layered structure consisting of the party, the military, and the government is examined. The actors explained here include: the Politburo, the Defense Council, the Central Committee Secretariat, the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, each military service, the Council of Ministers, the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, the Military Industrial Commission (VPK), each military industrial ministry, its research institutes and design bureaus, and its enterprises.
The second part, “the dynamic analysis of the weapons procurement process, ” examines how these actors interact each other in the actual process of weapons procurement. Requests for weapons development usually originate in one of two ways: from below and from above. From below each military service may request a development of new weapons sytem necessitated from operations requirements. In actuality, it may originate from design bureaus trying to push their new designs. The request must be approved by the General Staff, the Ministry of Defense, the Defense Council, the VPK, and the Politburo. When a request originates from above, the VPK will translate the decision into an actual policy. When a decision is made to develop a weapons system, the VPK, through the appropriate military industrial ministry, begins the process of design competitions among design bureaus. Two or three design bureaus are allowed to proceed to the construction of a prototype. After the prototype is tested by the State committee, only then a decision to proceed to a series production is made. Design bureaus and the
voenpredy sent by the military service serve to control the quality of the weapons produced in enterprises.
The third part singles out some of the salient characteristics of the Soviet weapons procurement process. First, the Soviets take several measures to ensure the high quality of weapons systems within the framework of the planned economy. These measures include high priority given to the military industry, the existence of the consumer's sovereignty in the military industry, free competition among design bureaus, and stability of the weapons procurement elite. But the high quality of Soviet weapons does not mean efficiency of the military industy. In fact, it has caused waste and delays in modernization. The deepening Soviet economic crisis and the sharp rise in the unit cost of weapons production will no longer make it possible for the Soviet government to treat the military industry as a sacred cow. Second, history and the organizational restrictions have led the Soviets to develop a unique design philosophy, which stresses three principles, “simplicity, ” “commonality, ” and “evelutionary revision.” This approach has both advantages and disadvantages: it helps the Soviet military to be provided with inexpensive, mass-produced weapons, easy to operate and maintain. But the Soviet weapons procurement process is not conducive to generate innovations. Therefore, the systemic crisis of Soviet economy will inevitably engulf the military sector, which has been successfully insulated from the inefficiencies of the command economy.
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