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  • 韓 載香
    歴史と経済
    2009年 52 巻 1 号 1-18
    発行日: 2009/10/30
    公開日: 2017/08/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper examines the process through which credit unions were founded by the Korean-Japanese minority, placing particular emphasis on the political and economic conditions that prescribed and enabled their establishment within the historical setting of the North-South conflict. Organized activity by Korean-Japanese political organizations such as Choren, the Federation of Korean-Japanese People, was instrumental in creating the first credit union in the period of reconstruction after World War II. In the ambiguous situation arising while the legal status of the Korean-Japanese was yet to be defined and the establishment of credit unions was not yet certain, organized action by the Korean-Japanese was an important driving force behind joint establishment of credit unions for the elimination of discrimination. However, while the effect of political divisions did not appear immediately, the north-south conflict gradually penetrated the credit union, resulting in the purge of those with differing political opinions. To service those Korean-Japanese who were excluded from the first, a second credit union, the Shogin, was ultimately established by the business community associated with South Korea. Thus, political and economic factors were compounded in the background of this nationwide rollout of the two credit unions. The establishment process of Shogin was not necessarily smooth. One problem was the lack of knowledge regarding financial institutions in the South Korean-Japanese community; another was that despite the will to establish the Shogin, there were not the financial resources to do so. A further problem was that the financial authorities regarded all Korean-Japanese customers as South Korean citizens, which for legal reasons resulted in the lengthy delay in its establishment. In such conditions, the establishment of Shogin was ultimately accomplished with support from ethnic-political institutions such as Mindan, the Federation of Korean-Japanese People, and financing from the South Korean government, which committed to the establishment of the credit union as political conflict with the north sharpened. In the end many small credit unions emerged prefecture by prefecture since they were prescribed for political as well as economic reasons. These credit unions had limited operational scope as financial institutions from the beginning, due to their funding scale. Future growth thus relied on population size and the economic viability of the Korean-Japanese community in the area covered by each union.
  • 伊藤 忠治
    日本経営診断学会年報
    1995年 27 巻 120-125
    発行日: 1995/12/10
    公開日: 2010/06/15
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 岡本 至
    社会科学研究
    2005年 56 巻 2 号 109-139
    発行日: 2005/02/07
    公開日: 2021/02/09
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
  • 受託機関(信用金庫)との関係性の観点から
    宮﨑 忠恒
    社会経済史学
    2019年 84 巻 4 号 507-527
    発行日: 2019年
    公開日: 2021/02/12
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
  • 松村 正俊
    日本不動産学会誌
    1989年 5 巻 2 号 51-58
    発行日: 1989/10/30
    公開日: 2011/06/15
    ジャーナル フリー
  • ライブラリアンの職分
    村橋 勝子
    情報管理
    1998年 41 巻 8 号 642-644
    発行日: 1998年
    公開日: 2001/04/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 邉 英治
    歴史と経済
    2004年 46 巻 2 号 1-20
    発行日: 2004/01/30
    公開日: 2017/08/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    In Japan, the WWI "bubble" and the long depression of the 1920s greatly impaired banking management and caused serious problems with bad loans. Financial crises broke out continuously in 1920, 1922, 1923 and 1927. 1927 is often considered a "landmark" year in the sense that the financial crises in that year led to drastic changes in the financial structure, and led to several major bank mergers. Thus, most previous studies of bank regulation have emphasized the importance of The Bank Act of 1927, and insisted that the bank merger policy was at the center of bank regulation, and that all other regulations simply complemented it. Subsequently, many studies of bank policy at that time have focused primarily on bank mergers. Furthermore, some studies conclude that bank regulation at that time was clearly different from bank regulation in the postwar period. However, after carefully analyzing numerous historical documents and materials such as "Showa Zaiseishi Shiryo" (Archives of Showa Financial History), "Saitamaken Chiho Kinnyu Shiryo" (Archives of Saitama Prefectural Financial History) etc., I am suspicious of such one-sided views. We need a more balanced view, considering not only The Bank Act of 1927 but also other laws, official notices and guides. In this article, I analyze twelve kinds of bank regulation: bank chartering, liquidation or reform policy, bank merger policy, branching restriction, dividend restriction, separation of banking and industry, interest rate regulation, MOF's bank inspection, BOJ's bank inspection, auditing, disclosure requirement and LLR. I study not only the framework and philosophy of these bank regulations but also the interaction among them in order to clarify the whole system of bank regulation. In conclusion, there were many kinds of bank regulation in 1920s, including the bank merger policy. The MOF's bank inspection system was especially effective in leading bank management better, and it nicely complemented the other regulations. It is clear that bank regulation at that time functioned not only as structural regulation, but also as prudential regulation.
  • 野口 直秀
    保険学雑誌
    2016年 2016 巻 632 号 632_81-632_98
    発行日: 2016/03/31
    公開日: 2016/11/26
    ジャーナル フリー
    本稿では,我が国生命保険業のグローバル化1)について,世界の生命保険市場を概観した上で,日本の生命保険会社の海外展開の現状を整理する。
    また,生命保険業のグローバル化への課題として,国内規制に焦点を絞り,海外の保険会社を買収する際に生じる子会社業務範囲規制を取り上げる。同規制については,国内を視野に制度導入時には合理的な理由を有していたものと考えられるが,我が国保険業のグローバル化が急激に進展している今日,とりわけ海外での適用について,国内外の監督体制の整備やERM等リスク管理手法の進展等の状況を踏まえ,抜本的な検討を要する時期に来ていると思われる。
  • -GHQ指導説の検証-
    黒木 達雄
    保険学雑誌
    2014年 2014 巻 624 号 624_103-624_122
    発行日: 2014/03/31
    公開日: 2014/12/09
    ジャーナル フリー
    第二次世界大戦終戦時,わが国の生保相互会社は第一,千代田,富国の僅か3社に過ぎなかったが,戦後まもなく発生した相互会社化の波により16社へ急増した。戦後の相互会社化は世界的にも稀有な事象であるが,その理由については諸説あるものの,いまだ定説を得るに至らず十分な解明がされていない。とりわけ財閥系生保の相互会社化の理由として比較的有力視されてきたGHQ(連合国最高司令部)指導説には,裏付けとなる客観的資料の欠如という弱点があり,GHQ指導説否定論者の根拠となってきた。
    こうした中,本稿は,米国のエドワーズ財閥調査団報告書および国務・陸軍・海軍三省調整委員会文書(SWNCC302/2修正文書)によって,財閥系生保の相互会社化が米国政府の財閥解体政策の一環であった事実を明らかにした。これにより,GHQが財閥系生保の相互会社化を導いたとするGHQ指導説は定説となり得る要件を具備したといえる。
  • 佐藤 保久
    保険学雑誌
    2008年 2008 巻 600 号 600_65-600_84
    発行日: 2008/03/31
    公開日: 2011/09/07
    ジャーナル フリー
    わが国における金融自由化の過程を欧米諸国と比較してみると,日本的特色として,業務範囲の自由化が重視されてきたことを指摘できる。たとえば,金融機関利用者のメリットに直結する金利・株式売買手数料・保険料率等の自由化,特に小口取引に関わる自由化が,1990年代半ばから2000年にかけて完了した事実こそ,こうした日本的特質を明白に物語っているのである。
    損保業界も同様であり,2000年6月に料率自由化を完了している。一方,生保業界では,1960年代から契約者配当の自由化を実施してきたわけだが,利用者に周知する努力を欠いたため,こうした事実は意外と知られていない。
    本論では,旧大蔵省
    銀行局
    保険部の監督下にありながら,料率自由化に関し全く異なる対応を見せてきた生・損保両業界に注目し,自由化の経緯・経営面への影響等を比較・検証する
  • 邉 英治
    社会経済史学
    2005年 70 巻 6 号 645-666
    発行日: 2005/03/25
    公開日: 2017/08/09
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
    The financial crises of the interwar period left the Japanese banking system with a heavy burden of non-performing loans (NPLs). However, the problem was largely resolved during the period of the wartime economy. the main object of this paper is to clarify the role of the regulatory agency in managing the crises, by focusing mainly on the inspection of banks carried out the Ministry of Finance (MOF). The first section of the paper examines three components of the bank examination system: the budget provided, the nature of the staff, and the actual procedures followed. The second section is an analysis of the policy and functioning of the system based on the historical records of zaibatsu banks and dominant regional banks. The third section investigates Ryo'u Bank as a concrete example of the role of the inspection process in accelerating the disposal of NPLs. In conclusion, it is clear that the MOF inspection system included both mechanisms that accelerated the disposal of NPLs and improved prudential techniques that were incentive compatible. The financial problems were overcome through a combination of three factors: the overall economic recovery, the endeavors of bank managers, and the inspection system, which improved the risk management capabilities of bank managers.
  • 白鳥 圭志
    社会経済史学
    2002年 67 巻 5 号 503-523
    発行日: 2002/01/25
    公開日: 2017/06/16
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
    In the 1920s, Tateoka Bank faced a management crisis due to the bankruptcy of its main client, Hokugun Seishi Co. By 1929 it was clear that recovery was impossible, and the bank therefore made a successful appeal to Ryou Bank for rescue. Ryou Bank's condition was that the President of Tateoka, Isaburo WATANABE, would accept liability for the greater part of Tateoka's losses. This was because Tateoka's credibility was based on WATANABE's financial reputation. WATANABE accepted these terms, and the rescue merger began. However, WATANABE's position was so damaged by the Showa depression that he tried to withdraw his agreement. The President of Ryou Bank, Shinshichi MIURA, did not wish to stop the merger because he wanted to preserve credibility, so he urged Watanabe to reconsider. The mayor of Yamagata, Katsubei TAKAHASHI, who belonged to the same political party as Tateoka Bank, produced a compromise which would lessen the burden on WATANABE. Ryou Bank agreed, making the merger possible. The roles played by WATANABE and TAKAHASHI are characteristic of rescue mergers in this period. However, without MIURA's encouragement, the merger plan would have failed.
  • とくに中心地体系との関連において
    吉津 直樹
    人文地理
    1978年 30 巻 5 号 406-428
    発行日: 1978/10/28
    公開日: 2009/04/28
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this paper is to consider the locational process of banks in order to make clear the regional structure of the Kanto District during Meiji period.
    Banks played an important role in the process of modernization in Japan. That is, they were established in the stage when industrial and commercial capitals had not yet sufficiently been accumulated. For this reason, they were merely loan offices rather than commercial banks. These loan offices or banks were closely related with local industries and had exerted their impacts on the characterization of regional structures.
    For the method of the present study, the writer examined both the head offices and branches of banks and compared them for 1887, 1897, and 1907 in terms of their spatial distributions and temporal changes. In that case, a central place system as an effective framework of analysis for the regional structures was related to the locational process of banks. Now, in order to find the central place system, the writer chiefly used the data of number of merchants as of 1907. As population size of urban centers showed only slight change in general for the period 1868-1907, so the data for 1907 might stand good for the remaining years of the period.
    The results obtained are summarized as follows: There existed various types of locational process of banks due to special circumstances in the advancement of capitalism in Japan and also to differences of regional conditions.
    1) The heierarchical effect of urban centers was observed on the locational process of banks in Japan during Meiji period, although it was not always remarkably recognizable. That is, the location of head offices of banks and their branches tended to begin with the higher order of places and then with the lower order of places. But, both the vicinity of Tokyo and Yokohama and such central places with special functions as hot spring towns, port towns, mining and industrial towns, and so on, showed time lag in the locational process of banks as compared with that of the same order of places in other areas.
    2) Those banks are classified into three groups on the basis of their characteristics, each of which shows different locational process from others. The first group, national banks were established mainly by former-samurais in urban centers that were formerly castle-towns, gradually grew in competition with other private banks and expanded their spheres of inluence. The second group, branches of small local banks were established by rich landowners and merchants in localized areas in various places throughout the Kanto district. Though rises and falls of small local banks were often repeated, a few banks grew and expanded the networks of their branches. And the third group, very large banks by the privileged merchants through Edo and Meiji periods and large merchants dealed in raw silk, were established in Tokyo and Yokohama and then developed their branches in the central cities of higher order such as prefectural seats and the textile districts.
    3) Those three groups of banks mentioned above represented various locations under varied regional structures of industries. In the regions with less developed industries such as Ibaragi and Chiba prefectures, very large banks whose main offices were located in Tokyo and Yokohama established early their branches in the places of higher order and of intermediate order. As these very large banks exerted their dominant influences upon large local banks, the network of branches of the latter banks were hard to be developed. However, the branches of very large banks, which had their head offices in Tokyo and Yokohama, were established only in the central places of higher order or of intermediate order. Consequently, in the places of lower order and the lowest order, small local banks could establish their branches in their neighboring areas.
  • 辻井 重男
    日本ロボット学会誌
    1998年 16 巻 2 号 174-176
    発行日: 1998/03/15
    公開日: 2010/08/25
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 真渕 勝
    年報行政研究
    2004年 2004 巻 39 号 207-210
    発行日: 2004/05/15
    公開日: 2012/09/24
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 粕谷 誠
    三菱史料館論集
    2018年 2018 巻 19 号 1-14
    発行日: 2018/03/20
    公開日: 2023/07/27
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 宮崎 忠恒
    経営史学
    2008年 43 巻 1 号 1_56-1_86
    発行日: 2008年
    公開日: 2011/10/18
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper focuses on problem about management and collection of the loans by government financial institution. Specifically, this article examines how the Japan Development Bank (JDB, Nihon Kaihatsu Ginkou) managed and collected loans that taken over from the Reconstruction Finance Bank (RFB, Fukkou Kinyuu Kinko) in the first half of the 1950s.
    The RFB, which played an important role in reconstruction of Japanese economy after World War II by supplying industrial funds, was disbanded in January 1952. Its vast uncollected loans were taken over by the JDB. Since then, the JDB managed and collected those loans.
    Among those loans, loans to coal mining industry were the biggest one measured by outstanding loans and amount of collection. In addition, collection rate of loans to that industry was lowest at end of March 1956.
    In the first half of 1950s, for the JDB, collected money of those loans was important resource on its own activities. Therefore, the JDB selected to mitigate collection from coal mining industry on its own managerial point of view. Around the same time, the Government, whose priority was put on cutting price of coal, made several plans that included across-the-board mitigation of collection from that industry. However, those plans were not brought into effect. If political and unselective mitigation carried out along those plans, collection rate of loans to that industry was far lower.
    Previous studies about the JDB put importance on its independence at lending activities that is one aspect of the financial institution. However, the result of this paper shows that its subjectivity at managing and collecting activities that is another aspect also should be emphasized.
  • 黒川 和美
    公共選択の研究
    1991年 1991 巻 18 号 1-4
    発行日: 1991/12/25
    公開日: 2010/10/14
    ジャーナル フリー
  • -関西学院大学出版会,2012年3月,はしがき6頁,目次3頁,本文・巻末資料・あとがき176頁-
    家森 信善
    保険学雑誌
    2013年 2013 巻 623 号 623_197-623_200
    発行日: 2013/12/31
    公開日: 2014/12/09
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 高寺 貞男
    経営史学
    1967年 2 巻 2 号 30-63,ii
    発行日: 1967/09/30
    公開日: 2009/11/11
    ジャーナル フリー
    The system of publicizing business balance sheets was introduced to Japan early in the Meiji period on two separate occasions. When the government transplanted the National Bank system from the United States to Japan, in the years 1873-75, it attempted to institutionalize financial statements as a means of controlling the activities of the new National Banks in Japan. Again, in 1883, in the course of introducing continental commercial law to Japan, the French and German system of financial statements was adopted as the core of the accounting system required by the new law.
    In the interval the British form of balance sheet prevailed, under the influence of the Meiji government, and terms such as karikata (“debtor”) or fusai-gimu (“liabilities and obligations”), and kashikata (“creditor”) or shisan-kenri (“assets and claims”) were prevalent. When the Continental system was applied, the term actif=Passiva, which properly meant “asset, ” and the term passif=Passiva, which meant “liability”, were translated respectively as kashikata (Cr) and karikata (Dr). These translations were authorized and established by the first commercial law, issued in 1890. Consequently, in spite of the application of the Continental form of balance sheet which listed the assets on the left hand and the liabilities and obligations on the right, the British form which listed the liabilities and capital on the left hand and the assets on the right had to be followed according to the commercial law.
    The two forms of balance sheet, Continental and British, continued to be valid side by side until the system was unified following the Continental pattern in the middle of the Taisho period, and the commercial law revised in 1922. In the meantime, however, debates on the appropriate form of balance sheet were frequent between the two schools, British and Continental. The controversy was similar to the dispute which arose among British accountants at the beginning of the 20th century concerning Table B of the Company Act of 1862.
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