On August 23, 1958, the People's Liberation Army of China began a heavy bombardment against the Quemoy Island, an island still under the control of the Chinese Nationalist regime in Taiwan. This action escalated tensions across the Taiwan Strait, leading to the direct military confrontation between China and the United States. In fact, the conflict was so serious that the United States considered using tactical nuclear weapons against the Communist China.
This paper explores why China chose to conduct such military activities despite risks of direct military engagement with the United States. China's decision to bombard the Quemoy is puzzling because it was fairly predictable that China's use of force would prompt the United States to respond militarily, bringing the two countries to the brink of a nuclear war. Why did China dare to take such risks and what were they trying to accomplish?
There are two schools of thought that attempt to explain China's behavior leading to the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. The first focuses on an external factor, that is, China's security environments. According to this view, China's decision to conduct bombardment against the Quemoy was driven by Chinese leaders' concerns about increasing military threats posed by the United States. The second school of thought, the so-called “domestic mobilization” school, argues that the main reason for China's use of force was the necessity to mobilize domestic support for “the Great Leap Forward, ” a radical communization program that Mao Tse-dong tried to promote. Recently, researchers who utilized new documentary evidence from China and the former Soviet Union emphasize the role of Mao's radical communist ideology, and they claim that the “domestic mobilization” argument combined with an explanation based on Mao's ideology, provides a better explanation for China's behavior. Chen Jian, for instance, argues that Mao, who was committed to radical communist internationalism, was concerned about the slow speed of communization in China, and tried to accelerate the speed by creating an external crisis.
While recognizing the importance of Mao's radical ideology, I argue that the importance of Mao's ideology was exaggerated because many of his radical statements were interpreted without analyzing contexts in which they were made. Furthermore, I point out evidence that shows that the Chinese leaders' decisions were driven by their concerns about China's security, not only because of increasing US threats but also because of the Soviet Union's pursuit for the “peaceful coexistence” with the West. In this sense, China's use of force was designed to serve two political purposes: warning the United States against increasing support for Taiwan and damaging what Chinese leaders considered to be Moscow's “appeacement” policy toward the United States.
In making the argument stated above, I analyze the Chinese leaders' statements and decisions from 1954 to 1958 by examining Chinese and Soviet primary documents made available through the Cold War International History Project. Special attention is paid to analyzing Chinese leaders' diplomatic decisions within the context of China's strategic environments, because doing so provides a more complete picture of how China decided to bombard the Quemoy. In conclusion, I not only summarize the research findings, but also attempt to derive some theoretical implications from this case study by utilizing the notion of a “building block approach” to theorizing international relations.

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On September 3, 1954, Chinese artillery began shelling one of the Kuomintang-held islands, Quemoy (Jinmen). The Eisenhower administration ordered the 7th Fleet to recommence patrolling the Taiwan Strait. It was the beginning of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. However the United States did not take a thoroughly pro-Taiwanese stand when the Crisis broke out. The U. S. faced, as Dulles put it, a “horrible dilemma” over the policy toward the Crisis. The Eisenhower administration felt that if the U. S. directly defended Quemoy and other offshore islands against China by force, it would have induced the outbreak of an US-China War, like the Korean War. On the other hand, if the U. S. overlooked Communist China's use of force in the Taiwan Strait, the so called anti-Communist countries defense line —which runs from the Aleutians through the Japanese Islands, South Korea, the Ryukyus, Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands, the Philippines, part of Southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand— would have been broken down by China, and furthermore, by the Soviet Union. However at the beginning of the Taiwan Strait Crisis, no consensus existed in the U. S. Government about whether the offshore islands were substantially related to the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands which the U. S. had made consistently clear to protect, after being informed of the deneutralization of Taiwan in 1950.
The Eisenhower administration decided to make a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. U. S. -Taiwan treaty negotiations began in November 1954. The U. S. considered that the purpose of the treaty was to bring about a cease fire, and to commit to the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands and other related territories, so as to create a deterrent to Chinese military action in the Taiwan Strait. On the other hand, the U. S. exercised effective control over Kuomintang offensive military operations, formalizing the understanding that without mutual consent, the Kuomintang would not take any offensive action which might provoke retaliation by China, leading to the invocation of the treaty.
On December 2, 1954, the U. S. signed a Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. The treaty required the U. S. and Taiwan to: (1) Maintain and develop “jointly by self-help and mutual aid” their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and Communist subversion directed against them “from without, ” (2) Cooperate in economic development, (3) Consult on implementation of the treaty, and (4) Act to meet an armed attack “in the West Pacific area directed against the territories” of either the U. S. or the Republic of China, including Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands, and “such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement.”
Mutual Defense Treaty Article VI specified that, in addition to Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands, the treaty would be applicable to “such other territories as may be determined by mutual consent.” In addition, Article VII gave the United States the right (by mutual consent) to deploy its armed forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands for the purpose of their defense. In a word, the treaty did not obligate the United States to protect the offshore islands, while still leaving it free to do so.

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The world in the 1950s witnessed the growth of peaceful coexistence, which was basically brought about by the drastic changes in the Soviet diplomatic postures. The two superpowers' accomodation, however, did not last for a long time. The Cold War tensions mounted once again soon, following the Soviets' launching of the first man-made satellite into space, the East-West collison over the status of Berlin, the successful revolution in Cuba, and the shooting down of an American reconnaissance plane in Soviet territory.
During this short period of coexistence, the United States tried to use the given breathing spell for rebuilding the Western alliance. While relying upon the threat of massive retaliation to deter overt attacks by the Russians and the Chinese, the Eisenhower Administration sought a more efficient and less costly strategy of containment, the key to which was the collective security system to allow American allies to respond in local conflicts, as shown in the case of Indochina in 1954.
Fortifying the global American alliance network, with the greater emphasis in Asia and the Pacific regions, would be possible through bilateral security treaties with South Korea and Taiwan, multilateral arrangements in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and inclusion of West Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty. All these efforts were aimed at not only military but political and economic integration of America's allies, and the linkage of each integrated areas under American auspices, to secure maximum economic prosperity and political stability of the Free World. Expanding trade and investment, as well as American aid, were primary means for neutralizing the Soviet diplomatic offensive in the developing areas.
Secretary Dulles' firm belief in collective security and in economic integration, and his grave doubts as to the idea of national sovereignty, were also shared by President Eisenhower, and hence constituted the backbone of their New Look strategy. Yet they could find little sympathy among American allies toward their endeavor for an integrated and strengthened alliance. Nor was there any sufficient common understanding as to the Communist menace. America's allies were increasingly hostile to excessive pressures from the United States, and the Americans were irritatd by their allies' reluctance in cooperating with them in meeting challenges posed by the Soviet and the Chinese Communists.

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　本研究は、台湾金門島に現存する伝統的集落の移住経緯と空間特性を明らかにすることを目的とする。これまで個別に捉えられてきた全143の伝統的集落の立地環境、歴史的建築物の種類と残存数、集落規模、建物棟数、方位軸、抱護の種類と空間範囲、居住者の主要姓氏、移住前後の居住地をまとめ、集落空間を類型化した。その結果、立地環境を平地から山裾、斜面地までの10類型、自然地形と植生による抱護の種類を９つに分類した。さらに集落を構成する建物棟数から空間規模を小・中・大に設定し、歴史的建築物の残存数と合わせて、各集落の現状を明らかにした。また、居住者の主要姓氏から単姓村76、複姓村67が確認された。文献資料とヒアリング調査に基づいて長期間にわたる移動前後の居住地とその変遷を追い、現地調査により居住地の環境を理解することで、集落の移住形態を５つの型（移住群：拠点型Ⅰ、Ⅱ、転移型、定住群：発展型、安定型）に分類した。これらの結果から、周囲を海に囲まれた島嶼の環境と歴史的な居住地の移動によって構築された集落の空間特性を明らかにした。

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Views on the Eisenhower Administration's foreign policy have dramatically changed in a decade. In the field of the Sino-American relationship, many scholars explored voluminous materials and revealed that Eisenhower-Dulles's China policy was, contrary to our common understanding, not so obstinate or stubborn. Such scholars are now called the Eisenhower revisionists.
The Eisenhower revisionists indicate various facts which exemplify the administration's flexibility on its China policy. Their remarks can be summarized into two points: despite the Korean War or the Taiwan Strait Crisis, Dulles continued to pursue the Sino-Soviet split: Dulles also tried to work out the “Two China” formula and even conceived of Beijing's entrance into the United Nations. However, the Eisenhower revisionists do not succeed in explaining why the U. S. -Chinese relationship was not improved during this period, which is the major problem of their arguments.
The revisionists tend to regard the Sino-Soviet split as premise of the Sino-American accommodation, which seems somewhat naive. If the Sino-American relationship was a dependent variable of the U. S. -Soviet relations, the Sino-Soviet split may cause the Sino-American rapprochement, but this was not true. The relationship between the Sino-Soviet split and the Sino-American accommodation is not so self explanatory as the revisionists' assumption. Therefore, we cannot conclude that Dulles had a flexible policy on China, because he had a sophisticated view on the Sino-Soviet relations.
The other problem is that Dulles might consider some sort of the “Two China” formula, but he never thought of this scheme as a means of negotiation. His basic China policy remained to keep the maximum pressure on China in order to change its course. Once he said, “the U. S. could possibly recognize Communist China at some future time, but as long as Communist China is so bitterly hostile to us, we do not want to enhance its prestige”. Even if he had such a novel idea as the “Two China” policy in mind, the circumstances did not allow him to carry it out.
After the Geneva Conference of 1954, China enhanced its position in international society, especially in Asia. In this situation, the United States feared not only the expansion of communism but also the spreading of anti-Western sentiment in Asia. The U. S. thought China could strengthen this feeling through its anti-impelialist rhetoric. China became a regional threat to the U. S., which was, to some extent, independent of the Soviet or the communist threat. This was one of the main reasons why the U. S. -Cheinese relationship remained hostile, while detente between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. was in progress.

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This paper examines how the “Taiwan issue” was dealt with by the U. S. and the Japanese governments at the time of Sino-American rapprochement and Sino-Japanese normalization in the early 1970's. Given the Soviet threat, Chinese leaders downplayed the “one China” principle, demanding that the U. S. and the Japanese governments admit Taiwan as a part of China, while at the same time making space for them to continue their security commitment to the island. In terms of the triangular formation of China, the U. S., and Japan, the sudden change in the Sino-American relationship transformed the triangular formation from the stable U. S. -Japan security tie containing the PRC, into a more ambiguous direction in which the United States was the “pivot” and the other actors were U. S. “wings.” During the process of Japan-China nomalization, the triangle also shifted a fashion in which the three states had positive relationships with each other.
As far as the U. S. decision-making process was concerned, the Nixon-Kissinger policy toward the PRC, by exploiting the Sino-Soviet split, sought leverage over the Sovier Union and China with an eye to ending the Viernam War. In this perspective, American policy-makers did not intend to alter the security partnership with Japan. In fact, the Nixon administration used the U. S. -Japan Security Treaty in order to assuage China's fear of Japan's anticipated military expansion and nuclear development, should the U. S. military forces have been withdrawn from Japan. Since U. S. decision-makers considered their China policy separately from American relations with Japan, the Nixon administration did not expect the hasty resumption of Sino-Japanese relations.
The sudden Japanese overtures to China were thus perceived by U. S. government to presage the making of more intimate Sino-Japanese relations. In response to Japan's approach to the PRC, the Nixon administration indicated some unease and irritation toward Japan.
Specifically, it wondered, during the Sino-Japanese resumption process, whether Japanese leaders would agree with PRC officials on excluding the clause on protecting Taiwan from the 1969 U. S. -Japan Joint Communiqué, in which Nixon and Sato agreed on a need to protect the “Far East” after the U. S. government returned Okinawa. In the event of a future rupture in U. S. -PRC relations, the U. S. government continued to be interested in keeping Taiwan as an important outpost. Moreover, after Tanaka became Prime Minister in July, 1972, his pledge of nomalizing Sino-Japanese relations worried U. S. officials, who feared the terms of the normalization. Their concern regarding Taiwan continued until Nixon and Tanaka discussed the Japanese government's nomalization with the Chinese at the Hawaii summit in August-September, 1972.

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