本論文は、1925(大正14)年の「朝鮮神宮御祭神論争」に関する先行解釈の再検討と、新たな解釈を試みるものである。従来の解釈では歴史事実の説明に限界がある。これはこうした解釈が当時の日韓同祖論を考慮していない事による。この論争では、政府・総督府側の皇祖神奉斎論も、神社人側の檀君=朝鮮国魂神奉斎論も、共に日韓同祖論に依拠している。筆者は、日韓同祖論を近代的「伝統の創出」として捉える。その上でこの論争の背景に、当時の半大陸国家・日本社会における朝鮮半島の特異な位置がある事を指摘する。更に、「国魂」に関する議論を通じ、こうした朝鮮の特異性が神社信仰の土着主義的性格とどのように関わったかをも考察する。

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In modern bourgeois states, two types of criminal procedure have evolved historically and exist now; a continental type of officialist criminal procedure called “half-inquisitorial and half-accusatory”, and an Anglo-American type of more accusatory and adversary criminal procedure.
The continental type of criminal procedure has its essence in the procedure before trial (especially in the procedure of Voruntersuchung) which maintains the inquisitorial procedure approximately as it is, and therefore, this can be called inquisitorial proceeding by Untersuchungsrichter, in that it makes Untersuchungsrichter a substantial judge for all criminal procedures. It is generally known that this “inquisitorial proceeding by Untersuchungsrichter” takes its original form in the French Criminal Procedure of 1808, and that the Prussian Criminal Procedure of 1847 and the German Criminal Procedure of 1877 belong to this type. But these two types of modern criminal procedure have been made several revisions in each country.
In Japan the Criminal Procedure of 1880 and that of 1890 received the French Criminal Procedure of 1808, and the Criminal Procedure of 1922 was under the great influence of the German Criminal Procedure. As regards the old Criminal Procedure of 1922, entirely amended by the new Criminal Procedure of 1948, the previous “inquisitorial proceeding by Untersuchungsrichter” was revised and evolved to “inquisitorial proceeding by a prosecutor”. However, the reformations and revisions in each country did not result in the abandonment of the “original type”.
From this discussion, our problems can be set up as follows. First, what is the fundamental cause of the formation and development of these two types? Secondly, what is the cause of the development from “inquisitorial proceeding by Untersuchungsrichter to the “inquisitorial proceeding by a prosecutor”?
In this paper, I dare focus my research on the second problem with a perspective of the first problem.

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The purpose of this paper is to clarify the publicness of the critical movement against the promotion of land readjustment in the 1920s Imperial Capital Reconstruction Plan by focusing on the concept of shimin (citizens). In particular, the practice of the Kaizen Domeikai and District 31, which used the notion of shimin, in opposition to the norm of shimin demanded of urban residents by the reconstruction authorities, is analyzed in this paper from the pamphlets published by the Kaizen Domeikai and District 31. As a result, first, we find that the concept of shimin used by the main body of the movement partly included the publicness that was discussed in postwar social movement theory. Second, from their notion of shimin, we can also find subjects who were able to resist urban modernization in an organized and continuous way by connecting their interests with the publicness required by the authority.

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In the post Russo-Japanese War period, streetcars in the city of Tokyo became a political issue with respect to fare increases and municipalization. The streetcars were a necessity for the city's residents, so this issue received a great deal of attention from the masses. One important aspect is the campaign which rose up against the Tokyo Railway Co. (Tokyo Tetsudo Kaisha 東京鉄道会社), the firm which controlled the Tokyo city council through pro-Seiyukai 政友会 party aldermen. Conventional scholarly accounts explain that fare increases, company mergers and municipalization were enacted by the Seiyukai. in conspiracy with their political cronies on the city council, a number of business cliques and a group of bureaucrats. However, in fact, a variety of different expectations and motives, not unrelated to the downturn in the economy of the time, played an important role in the alliances which were formed and the conflict which arose between the bureaucracy, the political parties, the business world and the masses. Here we see such cases as non-Seiyukai factions welcoming the social policy thinking of the bureaucracy, and the Seiyukai itself backing the interests of monopoly firms. For example, the nationalistic foreign expansionist faction (kokuminshugiteki taigaikoha 国民主義的対外硬派), which has been described as holding an anti-bureaucracy and therefore anti-Seiyukai position, was actually more flexible in its politics. Where they elected to throw their support between these two positions differed depending on the particular issue at hand and the general circumstances of the time. This complicated position taking was a result of the fact that the breadth of political choice was often determined by such factors as economic conditions and the Government's basic economic policies. This is exactly the case in the issue of Tokyo Railway during the era of the first Saionji 西園寺 and second Katsura 桂 cabinets (Jan. 1906-Aug. 1911). The economic and political problems which complicated this issue included : (1)the Tokyo city council majority faction (i.e. the Seiyukai faction), which reflected the wishes of Tokyo Railway, (2)the opposition city council minority, which backed municipalization, (3)the close relationship between the Seiyukai itself and Tokyo Railway, (4)the Katsura cabinet's policy direction favoring municipalization, (5)the municipalization policy of Goto Shimpei 後藤新平, which was designed to eliminate the political influence of the Seiyukai from the Tokyo city council and fully realize public utility company service, (6)the political movements of the masses. While this paper takes up the specific issue of Tokyo streetcars, the major problem itself is hardly confined to one region alone. The major issue for Japan as a whole following the war with Imperial Russia was the creation of prosperity and strength in connection with the establishment of a militarily powerful nation. In order to accomplish this task, it was necessary to harness the people's energy into some sort of organizational form. The mere recognition of this problem was identical to the quest for political power. Those politicians, like Goto, who raised urban issues, took up the pros and cons of fare increases and publically sponsored utilities as one link in overall urban policies, in order to give full play to the people's energy and to eliminate the barriers to the development of local-government. Therefore, these issues formed one aspect of how to re-integrate the Japanese empire as a whole. It was in this sense that the social policy considerations of bureaucratic factions took a critical position vis-a-vis Seiyukai control of the Tokyo city council, and were able to team up with the non-Seiyukai minority in designing a plan for the municipalization of puplic utilities.

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In the Meiji Period (1868-1912), it became common for Japanese businesses to adopt the form of a corporation - the first was Dai-ichi National Bank founded in 1873 with Shibusawa as President. He also contributed to setting up around 500 other corporations. Shibusawa developed his own management philosophy based on Confucius' teachings, which was to combine economics and morality with the interest of the nation as priority. By the mid-Meiji Period, manipulation of financial statements and dividends had spread amongst Japanese corporations. In 1911, the Imperial Parliament held discussions on: introducing an auditing system run by professional accountants; preventing any one person serving as board member of several corporations; limit the responsibilities of non-board-serving corporate advisors. However, these discussions never made law and allowed some company presidents to pursue self-interests at the expense of shareholders and creditors. Therefore, it is now worthwhile for the present parliament to review the 1911 discussions.

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Due to continuing tax increases during the Russo-Japanese War, postwar regional society became faced with the serious problem of increased tax burdens. This article takes up strata of powerful local figures at the time, which have been dealt with in almost all of the research to date in the context of regional improvement movement and the expansion of political parties, shedding new light on their relationship to the local taxation system. The author offers Saitama Prefectures as a typical example of where large increases occurred in the income tax and points to a little known tax institution, the Income Investigation Commission (IIC; Shotoku Chosa Iinkai 所得調査委員会), which was involved in calculating individual income tax amounts and whose members were chosen by taxpayers in local elections. The article begins with a quantitative study to determine the place of income taxes within the context of regional society, showing how both tax revenue and the number of taxpayers increased during the War and how after the War social strata with vested interests in the question of taxation greatly expanded. As to the process of choosing members of the IIC, elections were held mainly county by county (gun 郡), while candidates and the distribution of posts were controlled by local leaders under non-competitive conditions. Elected members tended to be holders of important local offices, such as village headman, and were involved in local improvement projects in collaboration with national policy. However, in 1909, members of the IIC clashed with the Department of Tax Affairs, demanding a decrease in the income tax burdens of local residents. Saitama IIC members filed complaints with higher authorities and were supported by village headmen. Despite the refusal to meet their demands, the following year they lobbied the National Diet and both political parties to pass legislation, in a non-partisan spirit that also marked the movement to lower land taxes. The author concludes that the power elite in post-Russo-Japanese War regional society came to possess a dual character: one complacently conducting projects along the policy lines of central bureaucratic agencies; the other in conflict with how the national tax revenue authority was dealing with regional society.

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This paper, by focusing on private investors, clarifies the mechanism by which the colonial government-general aided private railway companies in colonial Korea through the "Twelve-Year National Railway Project." The twelve-year project was a large-scale colonial policy in three parts. First, to construct five new lines with a total length of 860 miles between 1927 and 1939; second, to purchase five important lines totalling 210 miles from three private railway companies; and third, to upgrade both the existing national railway lines and those acquired from private companies. Including existing budget allocations the government-general provided 320 million yen over twelve years for the first and third parts, and 26 million yen over five years for the second part. The government-general gave two reasons for the purchase of the private lines. First, the private lines provided essential connections between newly constructed and existing national railway lines; and second, the private railway companies could employ the proceeds of their sales to complete other railway lines and overcome financial difficulties. The private railway companies' financial difficulties were one motivation for the twelve-year project. The companies, many of which were established between 1918 and 1920, immediately faced difficulties in raising capital. The ensuing financial crisis of the post-World War One period saw them able to maintain dividend payments only with financial assistance from the government-general, while remaining unable to raise further capital for the construction of new lines. Investors in private railway companies lobbied for the establishment of the twelve-year project as a solution to the companies' financial difficulties, and as a result, five lines were bought from three companies after 1927. The funds obtained through the sale of these lines enabled the companies to complete other lines, and a part of the funds flowed back to the Toyo Takushoku Kaisha. Studies of railway history in Korea to date have concentrated on the national railways, and little is known of the history of the private railway companies. This focus has resulted in a generally accepted understanding that the twelve-year project and the purchase of private lines was no more than a necessary part of the expansion of the national railway. In contrast, by focusing on investors in private railway companies with a direct interest in the project, this paper demonstrates that one highly important aspect of this colonial project was to aid private railway companies and financial institutions through capital provision.

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