When the Soviet Union declared war on Japan in August 1945, the latter was almost exhausted after over three years of the Pacific War. Ironically enough, at that moment Japan was trying in vain to find a way out of the war by means of the good offices of the Soviet Union. Because of such circumstances, the people in the Soviet Union seemed to be apathetic at best to another round of war after the deadly fighting with Nazi Germany. Thus, to justify the war with Japan, Stalin felt it even necessary to cite the old humiliation due to the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 to 1905.
Until August 1945, a major concern of Stalin was how to adroitly find an opportune moment to enter into the war against Japan. After the Japanese surrender, he was very resolute in trying to ensure the Soviets a proper place as a great victorious power. The present paper intends to show what Soviet Russia attained and how, through joining her allies in defeating Japan.
Though Stalin wished to expand the Soviet security zone as far as possible, he also recognized that such an advancement of Soviet power would be possible only in areas subdued by Soviet armed forces. In this sense, his foreign policy reflects his trust in strength. General V. Chuikov, designated a military attache at the Soviet Embassy in Chungking in autumn 1940, records an interesting statement suggestive of Stalin's future policy in Asia after the war. Stalin told Chuikov then that as long as Chinese communists were less able than the Kuomingtang to resist Japanese aggression, the USSR could not help but bolster Chinese nationalists despite her ideological sympathy for the communists, because any Chinese prolonged resistance would lessen the Japanese threat to Soviet far eastern borders (V. I. Chuikov, Missiya v Kitae, 1983).
Such a view about the importance of strength in foreign policy may be considered an ingredient of a general belief system rather than a circumstantial perception. Consequently, this “operational code” probably convinced Stalin, after the Second World War, that the Soviet Union should be cautious in conducting her occupation policy in Japan. The Soviet Union was prepared to accept U. S. predominance in Japan provided that Soviet basic security requirements would be satisfied. Besides this precondition, all Stalin wished for was an apparent equality with the U. S. in controlling Japan.
The Soviet Union and the United States had heated arguments over the allied control machinery regarding Japan. The United States was in a much more advantageous position because of the sheer fact of the existence of American armies in Japan. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union also had a lever for influencing the U. S. policy in Japan. This lever was her dominant status in Eastern Europe. If the United States wanted to gain some concessions in Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union, the former was obliged to make concessions regarding Japan. Thus both countries could, before the end of 1945, come to a compromise to establish the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan. Afterwards, with the advent of the Cold War, the Soviet Union became more and more antagonistic towards U. S. conduct in Japan. But that is another story.

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As nationalism was one of the most important aspects of Kemalism, the early Turkish Republic showed no interest in the areas and peoples beyond her border. Atatürk suppressed the activities of those advocating Pan Turkism and had them purged, but after his death, Ismet Inönü recognized their rights and the movement rose again.
During the final years of the First World War, Nuri Pasha, who was one of the younger brothers of Enver Pasha, and his uncle Halil Pasha advanced towards the Caucasus region with an army. After the war they stayed in Berlin. After returning to Turkey, Nuri established a weapon factory. Many people visited him because of the nostalgia they felt for his brother Enver Pasha. During the republican era, there were many generals and officers within the Turkish Armed Forces who admired Enver Pasha, and the relatives of generals monopolized the weapon industry.
Hüseyin Hüsnü Emir Erkilet fought together with German colleagues during the First World War and retired as a major general in 1932. As for the reason for his retiring at such a young age, a famous story has it that it was because he gave the map of the fortified zone of Çanakkale to the Germans, but the real reason was his intimate relationship with the Freedom Party.
In 1925, Nuri and Erkilet secretly assembled with friends who had fought in Caucasus, in 1940 Erkilet, Halil and their families vacationed together, and after 1941 they often held meetings concerned with the Turkic peoples living in the Soviet Union.
It was thought that Erkilet was pro-German, though in his articles in the ‘Cumhuriyet’ newspaper he seemed to be neutral. However, after the start of the Nazi-Soviet War, he was active against not only the Soviet Union but also the Russians.
In September 1941 Nuri visited Berlin, and proposed to persons of authority in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Turkic peoples found their own states and organize the Muslim corps to support the German forces. Moreover, he stated that a Pan Turkist cabinet would be formed in Turkey and most of the officers would support it, and he mentioned the name of General Kazim Orbay, his brotherin-law who commanded the 3rd Army, as a person who would play an important role in the Pan Turkism movement.
Hitler personally invited the two retired generals Erkilet and Ali Ihsan Sabis to the eastern front, and so they applied for the necessary visas for leaving the country. However the Turkish government intervened and replaced Sabis with General Ali Fuat Erden. In this way, the Turkish government turned the personal invitation into an official one.
In 1944, after the advance of the Red Army towards Eastern Europe, the Turkish government arrested the Pan Turkists and began the trial so-called “Racism and Pan Turkism Trial.” They were convicted on the pretext of having cooperated with the Germans. However since Nuri and Erkilet were prominent persons under the patronage of the Turkish Armed Forces, they were neither arrested nor indicted even though they had close German ties.
General Erden, who was promoted to chief judge of the Supreme Court-Martial, dismissed the verdict of the “Racism and Pan-Turkism Trial.” As the reason for this dismissal, it was thought that he believed that it was not necessary for Turkey to demonstrate any sympathy for the Soviet Union. However, at the same time, there were conflicts between Inonu and the Turkish Armed Forces as is shown by the contraversy over Fevzi Çakmak's pension and Orbay's resignation. After the war, the explosion in Nuri's factory and his death gave rise to active discussions in the Turkish National Assembly. This also proves that there were many opponents to Inönu.

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The Soviet Union and South Korea concluded diplomatic relations in September 1990. This paper makes references to the Soviet policy decision process in establishing diplomatic relations with South Korea based on the new archives from both the Soviet Union and South Korea sides.
The move to expand the economical and cultural relationship between the Soviet Union and South Korea was held in view within the Soviet Union till the beginning of 1990, but regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations with South Korea, the Soviet Union was still in an opaque situation because of opposition from the Soviet Union Ministry of Foreign Affairs and KGB. But the change of the political system in the Soviet Union, i. e., introduction of a presidential system in March 1990, changed the traditional foreign policy decision-making style of the Kremlin, and made it possible for diplomacy to be led by Gorbachev and his assistants, not by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
After Gorbachev held a talk in San Francisco with the South Korean President Roh Tae-woo by the initiative of the president's executive office of himself in June 1990, he succeeded in weakening the resistance of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's opponents. Furthermore, the approach of South Korea whose positive initiative taken by two assistants for President Roh Tae-woo had the effect of making the talks in San Francisco possible..
Not only the structure of such domestic policy decisions but several other factors contributed to the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and the Soviet Union. For example, the aggravation of the Japan-Soviet relationship by the Kuril Islands dispute became a fair wind for South Korea. Gorbachev was interested in approaching South Korea because large economic aid could not be expected from Japan.
We should also point out that Soviet recognition towards South Korea improved during the glasnost policy of the Soviet Union, and the image of North Korea got worse in contrast. The report which the Soviet Union Communist Party International Affairs Department submitted in February 1990 showed how drastically Russian view of North Korea had deteriorated.
However, East Asia's regional situation was affected seriously by such a policy change, by driving isolated North Korea to resort to nuclear brinkmanship. The establishment of the diplomatic relations, which put priority on narrow national interest rather than on long-term influence which the Soviet Union diplomacy had on the Korean peninsula, should be reappraised in a broader context, including its negative aspect.

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