The purpose of the paper is to examine critically Giere's view of distributed cognition. Giere has treaded a tricky path between extreme ends in the disputes about the notion of distributed cognition and, as a result, two kinds of complains have been leveled against his view. On the one hand, conservatives like Vaesen criticized him for misusing the notion of distributed cognition. On the other hand, radicalists like Clark and me thought of him as a conservative for defending the traditional idea of the mind.
My argument unfolds as follows. In section two, I review briefly the typical cases of distributed cognition found in the works of Clark and Chalmers, Hutchins, and Knorr Cetina and extract a common characteristic of distributed cognition. In section three, I examine Vaesen's response to Giere's view of the distributed cognition around the debate between i-cog and d-cog. In section four, I show that Giere's reply to Vaesen's criticism is not appropriate for defending his version of distributed cognition and suggest a way towards the proper direction without breeding misunderstanding of the notion of distributed cognition.