The integrity of the cloud is the most important requirement for mission-critical enterprise workloads. NIST SP 800-53 states that information systems must prevent the installation of any components that have not been verified digitally. On a Kubernetes cluster, the admission controller can control requests for application installations, and it would be a powerful protection tool if it could control requests for Kubernetes resources on the basis of signature verification. However, there are various technical challenges when it comes to verifying the signature for a Kubernetes resource at the admission controller because a signed resource is rewritten automatically by internal cluster work and many requests that include an internal mutation without a signature are generated. In this work, we propose an approach to protect the integrity of a Kubernetes resource with signature verification at the admission controller. Our approach addresses the issue that the differences between the signed resource in the admission request and the signature message occur automatically in Kubernetes and conducts signature verification properly by using DryRun. We also propose a profile framework to address the internal mutation request that cannot be attached to the signature. Our experimental results demonstrate that standard applications can be protected by our approach.

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This paper proposes a combinatorial auction-based marketplace mechanism for cloud computing services, which allows users to reserve arbitrary combination of services at requested timeslots, prices and quality of service. The proposed mechanism helps enterprise users build workflow applications in a cloud computing environment, specifically on the platform-as-a-service, where the users need to compose multiple types of services at different timeslots. The proposed marketplace mechanism consists of a forward market for an advance reservation and a spot market for immediate allocation of services. Each market employs mixed integer programming to enforce a Pareto optimum allocation with maximized social economic welfare, as well as double-sided auction design to encourage both users and providers to compete for buying and selling the services. The evaluation results show that (1) the proposed forward/combinatorial mechanism outperforms other non-combinatorial and/or non-reservation (spot) mechanisms in both user-centric rationality and global efficiency, and (2) running both a forward market and a spot market improves utilization without disturbing advance reservations depending on the provider's policy.

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