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全文: "Supervenience"
20件中 1-20の結果を表示しています
  • Lloyd Humberstone
    Publications of the Research Institute for Mathematical Sciences
    1996年 32 巻 1 号 9-84
    発行日: 1996年
    公開日: 2009/01/22
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 神野 慧一郎
    イギリス哲学研究
    2002年 25 巻 5-22
    発行日: 2002/03/20
    公開日: 2018/04/25
    ジャーナル フリー

    As every Hume scholar knows, there are two leading interpretations concerning the fundamental position of Hume's philosophy. One views Hume the philosopher as a sceptic, and the other regards Hume's moral theory as naturalistic. And as far as Hume's moral theory is concerned, the latter interpretation is now no doubt dominant. Although by and large I would agree with the naturalistic interpretation of Hume's philosophy, I should think it necessary to clarify the meaning of “naturalism”. For, though moral naturalism tends to be identified with moral realism, I rather doubt whether we can say Hume's moral theory is a kind of moral realism. In addition to this, if moral realism, as the correspondence theory of truth maintains, should imply that a moral proposition corresponds to some state of affairs, then a problem would arise: to what state of affairs does a moral proposition correspond? This is a difficult question to anwser if we accept the dualism of fact and value.
    Now some recent moral realists have introduced the idea of “supervenience” into moral theory to solve the problem. This idea, I admit, is very attractive, because it seems not only to give us the criterion to decide whether any moral proposition is true or not, but also enables us to avoid confusing moral property with natural quality. S. Blackburn, however, propounded a forceful argument that is fatal to the strategy of introducing the idea of supervenience for the solution of the problem, and contradicts moral realism.
    If, however, we would accept his argument, what would be the results? In the first place, in order for us still to be justified in talking about the truth of moral propositions, we have to refuse the correspondece theory of truth and make an appeal to the coherence theory (for the pragmatic theory would not be suitable in the present situation). But, then, it may be that we are not allowed to maintain that each moral proposition does correspond to some state of affairs. In that case, to settle the matter, we have to create some logical space of reasons in which moral propositions should be located. And this means that Hume's moral theory cannot be interpreted entirely naturaristically.
    I would indeed make it m y methodological rule to consider the moral matter from a naturalistic point of view as far as it is possible for us to do so, and treat moral proposition as something that can be true or false. But the rule is only a rule, so it cannot be a principle from which one can deduce anything material. Therefore, the interpretation of Hume as a naturalist can hold true, only if and as far as it would permit this circumstance. So my conclusion is rather an ironical one. The strategy of interpreting Hume's moral theory as a naturalistic one is viable, only if it argues that Hume's moral theory is in some sense not naturalistic. I defend a kind of expressivism.

  • Kohji Kamejima
    Proceedings of the ISCIE International Symposium on Stochastic Systems Theory and its Applications
    2003年 2003 巻 17-22
    発行日: 2003/05/05
    公開日: 2018/05/28
    ジャーナル フリー
    A detection scheme is presented for maneuvering affordance in noisy imagery. Under the assumption that image features to be observed are generated as fractal attractors induced by mental maneuvering process, environment features are represented in directional scale images. For eliminating background noise in this sampling process, pixelwise filter is designed based on probabilistic complexity analysis. The detectability of affordance patterns has been verified through experimental studies.
  • 井頭 昌彦
    科学哲学
    2009年 42 巻 2 号 2_59-2_73
    発行日: 2009年
    公開日: 2010/02/15
    ジャーナル フリー
        Although physicalism is usually understood as an ontological thesis, it is not clear that what implications this position has on the matter of ontology expressed by the question “What there is?” In this paper, I begin with Quine's “indispensability argument,” and abstract from it a framework for sorting ontological positions. Then, I try to locate supervenience thesis, which is an important part of physicalism, within the framework above. One conclusion of this paper is that supervenience thesis works, neither as a direct assertion on what there is nor as an assertion on the criterion of ontological commitment we should adopt, but as an assertion on the class of the sentences from which we should extract ontology.
  • 中村 隆文
    科学基礎論研究
    2008年 35 巻 2 号 47-55
    発行日: 2008/03/30
    公開日: 2010/02/03
    ジャーナル フリー
    There are many problems about causality and identity in Humeanism. Especially, a problem that “Humean Supervenience” allowing many possibilities of various external laws encounters is concerned with the difficulty whether such laws can be coherent with the intrinsic properties of causation. This problem is related to another one whether “Humean Supervenience” is compatible with objectivism in accordance with Hume's original intention. Struggling with a disharmony between Hume's pragmatic epistemology and his realistic ontology, many philosophers have tried to dissolve such a complicated problem. But I think their efforts wouldn't be successful and the disharmony doesn't need to be settled, because the prospective collapses of their efforts wouldn't reduce the meaning of Humeanism. In this paper, I conclude that the seeming incoherence should be retained, because it suggests a moderate scientific attitude to be placed between dogmatism and skepticism. I demonstrate it by emphasizing the significance of some parts included in Hume's Treatise.
  • 太田 雅子
    科学哲学
    1999年 32 巻 1 号 45-54
    発行日: 1999/05/15
    公開日: 2009/05/29
    ジャーナル フリー
    Higher-level (mental, sociological and biological, etc.) entities are said to be supervenient on more basic, lower-level (physical, micro-level) entities, and there is a view that lower-level theories can completely and sufficiently explain higher-level events. But Harold Kincaid criticizes such a view. He does not deny that lower-level theories do explain something, but argues that they are only partial and incomplete, because they cannot refer to higher-level kinds which supervene on the relevant lower-level entities and answer important questions about causal laws. I will argue that the completeness or sufficiency of explanation is often evaluated interest-relatively, and, against Kincaid, that higher-level explanation cannot be sufficient without mentioning lower-level causal mechanism.
  • Barbara MONTERO
    Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science
    1999年 9 巻 4 号 207-217
    発行日: 1999/03/05
    公開日: 2009/03/26
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 羽地 亮
    科学哲学
    2008年 41 巻 2 号 2_89-2_100
    発行日: 2008年
    公開日: 2009/08/31
    ジャーナル フリー
        The present review concerns Yukihiro Nobuhara's masterpiece, Philosophy of Consciousness: Introduction to the Study of Qualia. This book should be highly acclaimed due to the fact that from an intentional / representational point of view, a modern orthodox naturalistic standpoint, the problems of qualia are examined conceptually by assimilating bodily sensations to perception, as well as that the author pursues these problems by suggesting the possibility of a strategy in which we assign explanatory priority to linguistic content and explain how mental content results from that. However, I believe that philosophy of mind should be naturalized and studied in greater detail on the basis of the results of neurological studies by distinguishing between sensory and affective phenomena.
  • Daniel HEARD
    Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science
    2003年 12 巻 1 号 53-59
    発行日: 2003/11/25
    公開日: 2009/03/26
    ジャーナル フリー
  • Shunkichi MATSUMOTO
    Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science
    2000年 9 巻 5 号 255-270
    発行日: 2000/03/05
    公開日: 2009/03/26
    ジャーナル フリー
    What I am concerned with in this essay is a case that has often been taken up with respect to the problem of the reducibility of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics or of the logical hierarchy between them, namely, the case of the derivation of the equation for the state of ideal gases (Boyle-Charles law) from the kinetic theory of gases. This is commonly considered to be one of the most successful examples of theory reduction, in that through the efforts of Maxwell and Bolzmann the basic but phenomenological law of classical thermodynamics was brought to bear the Newtonian mechanical description of the movement of molecules which were supposed to constitute gases, and through this then the so-called mechanistic view of the world was laid firmly at the foundation of modern physics. As for the relation between thermodynamics and (statistical) mechanics, the most attractive and often discussed theme must be the one concerning the second law and irreversibility, which won't be taken up here. The main reason that I have chosen to focus on the former case, instead of the latter, is that it is not so much a question of abstract concepts of theoretical origin, such as ‘entropy’, of which it is hard to establish a consensus of usage even among physicists, but rather it is a question of concepts such as ‘heat’, ‘temperature’ or ‘pressure’, which could in one sense be said to be formed by the very logic of our ordinary sense experiences, to which this case refers. In other words, it is expected that the task of explicating the logical status of the presuppositions which are tacitly adopted in this derivation (which physicists often pass by as unquestionable) can serve as a case study for investigating such problems on the philosophy of science as that of the relation between scientific language and ordinary language, the relation between scientific realism and antirealism, or the relation between conceptual reducibility and ‘emergence’.
    The points that result from this essay are as follows. First, the most important presupposition introduced in this reduction and in some sense upon which the whole individual molecules, it wouldn't make sense to think of the mean kinetic energy of molecular motion, and accordingly, nor of the concept of temperature of the gas system. But, on the other hand, they are also said to be subordinated to the whole system, to the effect that, once becoming members of the gas ensemble, the individual molecules are inevitably put under the structural constraint of the Maxwell-Bolzmann distribution and so are forbidden random movement. One might be able to notice here a situation analogous to the ‘hermeneutical circularity’ between parts and the whole, say, in the context of interpreting texts.
    Thus, even if we were to overlook the problem of the reducibility of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, concerning the validity of the introduction of the additional postulate concerned, the emergence of the latter from mechanics eventually blocks the overall reducibility of the former to mechanics, and so establishes its emergence in the full sense.
  • 松本 俊吉
    科学基礎論研究
    2001年 28 巻 2 号 79-85
    発行日: 2001/03/31
    公開日: 2009/07/23
    ジャーナル フリー
  • Masaharu MIZUMOTO
    Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science
    2003年 12 巻 1 号 25-52
    発行日: 2003/11/25
    公開日: 2009/03/26
    ジャーナル フリー
  • Koichiro MISAWA
    Educational Studies in Japan
    2013年 7 巻 37-49
    発行日: 2013年
    公開日: 2018/06/27
    ジャーナル フリー
     There has been no shortage in calls for interdisciplinary enquiry. Yet it is often difficult to know exactly what is intended by this in the fullest sense. What is interdisciplinary enquiry in its totality? If we do not know precisely what it is, how do we bring this kind of enterprise to fruition?
     The study of education, while being already interdisciplinary in some sense, is far from ideal. Whereas the sociology of education and educational psychology that are somehow "scientific" in character have retained widespread appeal, the history and philosophy of education, which are not necessarily scientific, have lost much of their appeal. This indicates that something has been left out of the development and expansion of the study of education. What has been left out, this paper asserts, is a broader reconsideration of the normative character of our knowing something in particular and of our lives in general.
     This paper draws on the combined conceptions of "the space of reasons" and "second nature" to fully acknowledge the need for an interdisciplinary perspective on the study of education and on the role of education itself in a broader context of human living. To develop an appreciation of these notions suggests that philosophical thinking should be open to, rather than proffered in intrinsic opposition to, empirical or "scientific" investigations. The happy consequence of such a position is that this would open up a far more inclusive terrain on which educational issues can be addressed.
  • Kenichi FUKUI
    Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science
    2002年 11 巻 1 号 19-33
    発行日: 2002/11/25
    公開日: 2009/03/26
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 青山 拓央
    科学基礎論研究
    2005年 33 巻 1 号 25-29
    発行日: 2005/10/25
    公開日: 2009/07/23
    ジャーナル フリー
    心身相関の同時性はどのように確保されるのだろうか.あるいは現象的経験における「現在」の存在を認めるとき, 私と他者との現在は共有されているのだろうか.スーパーヴィーニエンスの概念やトークン同一性に訴える議論は, 物的一元論と調和する反面, これらの問いに答えてはいない (循環に陥る危険性が高い).他方, 心身の相互作用を認める素朴な二元論は, 意外にもこれらの問いに明確な返答を可能とする.本稿の議論が妥当であるなら, 素朴な心身二元論はむしろ, 心身や自他の時間的な一元化をうながすといえるだろう.
  • 源河 亨
    美学
    2016年 67 巻 2 号 13-24
    発行日: 2016年
    公開日: 2018/01/01
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
    In daily life, we judge various things aesthetically. For example: “this picture is graceful”, “this landscape is dynamic”, and “his clothes are old-fashioned”. One aspect of our ordinary practices concerning aesthetic judgement seems to support objectivism, according to which, aesthetic judgment can be assessed as right or wrong based on some objective ground. However, another aspect of our practices seems to support subjectivism (or extreme relativism), according to which, aesthetic judgement is a mere expression of subjective impressions and cannot be assessed as right or wrong. In this study, I survey the dispute between objectivism and subjectivism in recent analytic aesthetics, and present an approach that supports objectivism. I argue that some aesthetic judgement is based on “evaluative perception”. It is a special class of perceptual experience affected by evaluative component of emotion and has Gestalt-like “parts-whole structure”. Furthermore, I claim that evaluative perceptions and aesthetic judgement based on it can be assessed as right or wrong in a similar way as ordinary perception and judgement based on it (e.g. colour perception and colour judgement) can be assessed.
  • 松本 俊吉
    科学哲学
    2007年 40 巻 1 号 1-13
    発行日: 2007/07/30
    公開日: 2009/05/29
    ジャーナル フリー
    In order to contextualize the subjects the contributors discussed in the workshop by giving them some backgrounds, first (§1) I will relate how the relationship between biology and physics has been dealt with in the philosophy of biology so far, intending to make a connection with Mr. Morimoto's argument. Then (§2) I will provide some historical background on how such concepts considerably, if not exclusively, distinctive of biology as 'function', 'purpose', or 'design' have been the targets for philosophical considerations so far, building a connection to Mr. Otsuka's argument. Finally (§3) I will present my little analysis of the problem of the scientific status of some 'historical sciences' Mr. Minaka is concerned with from a somewhat different angle from his.
  • 西脇 与作
    科学基礎論研究
    1995年 23 巻 1 号 7-13
    発行日: 1995/12/25
    公開日: 2009/07/23
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 羽地 亮
    哲学
    2000年 2000 巻 51 号 249-258
    発行日: 2000/05/01
    公開日: 2009/07/23
    ジャーナル フリー
    The thesis that the use of words for sensations is dependent on its situations provides us two crucial insights into Wittgenstein's philosophy ; one is explicable and the other critical.
    It has long been a matter of controversy what his Private Language Argument really means. The argument has been understood wrongly as a proof of the impossibility of private language. But it should be interpreted as an attempt to establish the above thesis that without determinations of situations surrounding the uses of sensation-words one cannot tell whether those words are meaningful.
    The same thesis also highlights a limitation of Wittgenstein's thought. He excludes speaker's neurophysiological situations from upon what his usage of sensation-words depends. This exclusion seems me untenable. It is possible and necessary to pursue determinations of the situations thoroughly into speaker's neurophysiological aspects. This move gives a way to naturalize his philosophy which is regarded as antinaturalistic.
  • 西脇 与作
    科学基礎論研究
    1988年 18 巻 4 号 191-198
    発行日: 1988/03/25
    公開日: 2010/01/20
    ジャーナル フリー
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