In this paper, I outline and motivate the fictionalist account of biological teleology, which has received relatively little attention in recent discussions. It holds that our teleological discourse about biological traits employs a useful metaphor that treats them as if they were purposefully designed by an intentional agent, say, God or Mother Nature. Drawing primarily on various conceptual tools developed in the contemporary philosophy of fictionalism and metaphor, as well as on different forms of evidence, I argue for two specific versions of teleological fictionalism: descriptive and prescriptive pretense fictionalism. I argue that when we ascribe a purpose to a biological trait, at least in some important classes of cases, we are invoking a game of prop-oriented make-believe in which the trait in question is used as a prop. I also argue that we should engage in such metaphorical discourse, at least on some important occasions, on the grounds that it can yield certain practical benefits that might outweigh its costs. The upshot is that teleological fictionalism is a live option that deserves further philosophical scrutiny as well as empirical investigation.