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全文: "what is it like to be a bat"
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  • John O'DEA
    Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science
    2007年 15 巻 2 号 81-93
    発行日: 2007/03/25
    公開日: 2009/03/26
    ジャーナル フリー
    Higher-order theories of consciousness, such as those of Armstrong, Rosenthal and Lycan, typically distinguish sharply between consciousness and phenomenal character, or qualia. The higher-order states posited by these theories are intended only as explanations of consciousness, and not of qualia. In this paper I argue that the positing of higher-order perceptions may help to explain qualia. If we are realists about qualia, conceived as those intrinsic properties of our experience of which we are introspectibly aware, then higher-order perception might have an explanatory role as the means by which we are aware of these properties. This would also allow us to treat qualia as the inner appearances resulting from inner perceptions, and therefore to treat them as intentional objects.
    It is fair to say that “inner sense” theories of consciousness are not widely accepted. Though Lycan (1987, 1996) and Armstrong (1984, 1993) are heavy hitters in their favour, the arguments against are formidable.1 Some are arguments against the very notion of an inner sense, and others are arguments against the inner sense as a theory of consciousness in particular. In this paper I will argue that whether or not inner sense theories of consciousness are viable, it is worth considering an inner sense theory of the introspectible quality of sensory states-that is to say of qualia. An inner sense theory of qualia faces few of the objections to the former, and solves many of the problems associated with the latter; including, I believe, the explanatory gap. Here I introduce a dispositional inner sense theory of qualia.
  • Paul M. Churchland, Patricia S. Churchland
    認知科学
    1997年 4 巻 3 号 3_45-3_55
    発行日: 1997/09/01
    公開日: 2008/10/03
    ジャーナル フリー
    Broad spectrum philosophical resistance to physicalist accounts of conscious awareness has condensed around a single and clearly identified line of argument. Philosophical analysis and criticism of that line of argument has also begun to crystallize. The nature of that criticism coheres with certain theoretical ideas from cognitive neuroscience that attempt to address both the existence and the contents of consciousness. As well, experimental evidence has recently begun to emerge that will serve both to constrain and to inspire such theorizing. The present paper attempts to summarize the situation.
  • 佐藤 徳
    認知科学
    2011年 18 巻 1 号 29-40
    発行日: 2011年
    公開日: 2011/09/07
    ジャーナル フリー
    The sense of agency is the sense that one is causing an action. The predictive account of the sense of agency proposes that sensory prediction based on efferent information plays a critical role in generating the sense of agency. Alternatively, the inferential account of the sense of agency proposes that we experience the sense of agency when we infer that one's own thoughts are the cause of an action. According to this account, the inference occurs when a thought appears in consciousness prior to an action, is consistent with the action, and is not accompanied by conspicuous other causes of the action. Recent study showed that both of these factors did contribute to the sense of agency. In this paper, multi-layered model of sense of agency was presented. Within this framework, the basic level consists in sensori-motor processes, while the higher level comprises conceptual process. At the basic level, the non-conceptual feeling of agency is produced by sensori-motor integration process of efferent with afferent information. In case of incongruence between these indicators, the pre-conceptual feeling of agency is further processed by inference mechanism to form an attribution of agency (judgment of agency). This paper proposes that what is self-specific is not judgment of agency but rather non-conceptual feeling of agency. That is, the intertwining of action and its sensory consequence in the world makes self so special.
  • 中才 敏郎
    科学哲学
    1988年 21 巻 57-70
    発行日: 1988/11/05
    公開日: 2009/05/29
    ジャーナル フリー
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