To show that he has no gift for natural science, Socrates successively cites at Phaedo
96
C2-
97
B
7
several cases revealing a way of conceiving aitia. These cases have perplexed commentators and have often been regarded as a confused treatment of problems of a completely different nature (Hack forth, Crombie, Annas, etc.). Rejecting such an interpretation as well as those so far submitted by other scholars(
e
. g. Vlastos, Gallop) , this paper tries to elucidate the continuous sequence of thought presented in this passage as follows: Socrates begins by giving a simple example of the scientist's type of explanation, namely,(1)a human being grows, i.
e
. becomes larger, since eating and drinking cause the appropriate matter to be added to each part of the body(
96
C
7
-D
5
). Now, if this explanation of "becoming larger" in terms of "coming to be added"(προσγιγνεσθαι)is correct, it must be the case, more basically, that "being larger" is due to "being added" (προσειναι) of extra magnitude : (2) one person is larger than another, because an extra length(
e
. g. of a head)is added(
96
D8-
E
1), and(3)ten is greater than eight because of an extra two being added(
96
E
2-3). However, Socrates could not accept these explanations, nor could he even accept (4) the simplest explanation that the aitia of things' becoming two is the addition or propinquity of one to one(or, for that matter, division of one) (
96
E
7
-
97
B3), and thus finally he abandoned such a method of investigating aitiai(
97
B
5
-
7
). Thus we can see that Socrates(Plato) is examining the conception of aitia stated in(1) , simply by shifting to more and more basic levels of thought, (2) (3) and(4), without the slightest "confusion" alleged by critics. All these "puzzles" are resolved seriatim by applying the theory of Forms to each(100B-101D). However, various objections to this method have been raised by scholars : the theory is wholly uninformative(Shorey, Vlastos, Crombie, Gallop) ; contrary to our expectation of an explanation of the coming-to-be of concrete things rather than the acquisition of attribures by already existing things, we actually find that the theory is concerned only with the latter(Hack forth, Gallop). Defending the theory of Forms against these and other objections, the present writer argues why only Forms should have the full status of aitiai of "being", and that the theory thereby offers a firm foundation for a correct understanding of the problem of "coming-to-be", even though the theory is not a wholly adequate explanation for the alteration implied in the concept of becoming, as Aristotle pointed out(De Gen. et Corr. B
9
, Metaph. A
9
). While it admittedly leaves several points for future discussions including the point cited above, the Phaedo passage of 95
E
through 101D can and must be regarded as laying a solid foundation for Plato's later natural philosophy and cosmology as fully developed in the Timaeus and Laws Book X, which, with Psyche(the source of all motion and alteration in the universe)and Forms(the principle of(meaning) and(value) )as its most basic factors, undoubtedly incorporates a view of nature that we need today.
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