Despite the failure of the Suez operation in 1956, the Macmillan Cabinet continued the preceding Eden Cabinet’s policy of trying to maintain British influence in the Middle East. To this end, the British government sought to pressure Nasser in the hope of obtaining economic concessions and reducing his influence in the region. However, the British government believed that United States support was essential for achieving its goals in the Middle East as it was feared that Britain did not have sufficient military or financial strength to act alone. The Macmillan Cabinet set about repairing relations with the Eisenhower Administration, which had been damaged by the Suez operation, but it turned out that there were significant differences between British and American policy towards Egypt and the Middle East.
During the 1957 crisis in Jordan, despite Britain’s good relations with that country, the United States’ lack of interest in intervening also prevented Britain from doing so. However, during the Syria crisis in the same year, the United States intervened to bring the situation under control. Macmillan, believing that the US was motivated primarily by concern about the spread of communism, interpreted this as evidence that it might be possible to act in concert with the United States in the Middle East. Consequently, when Egypt and Syria united to form the United Arab Republic (UAR), Macmillan proposed to the United States that the two countries dispatch troops to the UAR and to Jordan to destroy Nasser’s influence and prevent the possible spread of communism. At the same time, Britain was continuing negotiations with Nasser, hoping to obtain financial and economic concessions while Nasser was feeling the pressure of the United States’ military presence. But, contrary to Macmillan’s expectations, the United States declined the British proposal. It was at this moment that Macmillan realised his misunderstanding of the motivating factors behind US foreign policy and the limited possibilities for joint Anglo-American action in the Middle East.
Macmillan was made aware of the limitations of Britain’s military influence over Egypt and the Middle East. As a result, the Macmillan Cabinet chose to adopt a policy more in accordance with a recent United Nations resolution that called for the renunciation of the use of military force in the Middle East. Britain established a detente with the Nasser regime while maintaining face by emphasising the importance of Britain’s relationship with the United Nations.