Consensus-Building in Authoritarian Jordan amidst “Democratic” Reform: Analysis on the Legislative Process of the Amendment of the Civil Retirement Law

Abstract

This article attempts to analyzes the issue of amendment of the civil retirement law in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, which, as of 2011, is yet to be settled, to examine the issue of consensus making among the ruling elite in Jordan. It traces political development of the law over the course of two parliaments―the 16^th parliament and the 17^th parliament. It argues that, when parliamentarians were structurally urged to pursue their self-interests, the King had no choice but to take the political risk of choosing to distribute the national wealth, under the democratization process which the monarch initiates. The study’s findings are twofold: First, that pro-regime parliamentarians side with the ruling establishment in the case of controlling oppositions, but tend to deviate when it comes to national wealth distribution. Second, consensus making is fundamentally difficult in Jordan’s current institutional setting. This study implies the importance of in-depth research on the interactions of the ruling elite with focus on the legislative process for deeper understanding of contemporary Jordanian regime. In addition, this study implies that the Jordanian king functions as a representative of national interests in the legislative process, which would contribute for elucidating the role of a king in the contemporary era.