Abstract
To appropriately understand and operationalize the concept of “personalist rule,” this article separates the institutional arrangements of the (de)centralization of executive power into three components: the organizational foundation of the ruling elites, executive-legislative relations, and constitutional authority and partisan power. This article is divided into four sections. First, it indicates that previous studies on “personalist rule” have focused on its two primary features: the long-standing rule and centralization of executive power. Second, based on the above three aspects of the (de)centralization of executive power, it explores the institutional arrangements of the Egyptian third republic, which was established in the 2014 constitution and reformed in 2019 to coexist with the second chamber, the vice presidency, and presidential term limits under semi-presidentialism. Third, it discusses the institutional implications of extensive constitutional reform and suggests that the introduction of the vice presidency and second chamber, with the simultaneous relaxation of presidential term limits, can give an impression of strengthening the decentralization of executive power when in fact weakening it. Finally, it concludes that such an argument contributes to broadening the institutionalist perspective on authoritarian regimes and constructing a measurable and reproducible indicator of “personalist rule.”
