2022 Volume 58 Issue 1 Pages 44-51
In response to the growing concerns about the unsustainable consequences of the current industrial agri-food system and the increasing call for sustainable transformation, the concept of “climate smart agriculture (CSA)” has been developed and mainstreamed in the international community. Given its ambiguous definition and applications, and its advocacy by global agribusiness corporations, there is concern as to whether the concept of CSA may obscure the transformative perspectives of alternative agri-food initiatives and hinder their scale up. This paper utilizes the Gramscian concept of hegemony, to trace the development of the CSA concept and uncovers power dynamics behind the mainstreaming and institutionalization of CSA. In doing so, this paper elucidates the recent corporate consolidation in the agricultural input industry and their strategies for digital agriculture, which is touted as a powerful tool for CSA and therefore a key solution to climate change. The findings show that by exercising hegemonic power to legitimize their CSA model, global agribusiness corporations are turning climate crises into new opportunities for capital accumulation without fundamental transformation of the agri-food system.
The current industrial agri-food system is now commonly recognized as a key driver of climate change and food insecurity, raising global concerns and calling for international actions to make the system more sustainable. It is within this context that the concept of “climate smart agriculture (hereafter CSA1)” has been developed and mainstreamed in the international community. The concept is usually perceived as a “triple win” by means of increased productivity, enhanced resilience (adaptation), and reduced GHG emission (mitigation) (FAO, 2010, 2013), despite not having any clear definition or criteria. Aside from the FAO and World Bank, it is advocated in particular by global agribusiness corporations and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (Canfield et al., 2021). There is a concern that the idea of CSA may obscure their transformative perspectives and hinder the scaling up and institutionalization of locally emerging alternative agri-food initiatives. Therefore, this powerful drive to mainstream CSA is rejected and criticized by civil society groups and peasant and indigenous organizations, who instead call for fundamental transformation towards sustainable and equitable agri-food systems based on human rights, food sovereignty, and agroecology perspectives. The objective of this paper is to shed light on the power dynamics within and behind CSA by referencing the Gramscian concept of hegemony and its components: discursive, institutional and material power.
The concept of sustainability, a foundation in which CSA is assumed to play its role, has been place for some time, but its understanding and application is not uniform and has become political and contested (Hinrichs, 2014). Unsustainable consequences of the current system are commonly understood but framed differently: problems are differently defined; causes are differently diagnosed; and therefore, remedies for sustainability are differently prescribed. Various actors and initiatives claim to be committed to sustainable transformation. However, not all these actors and initiatives work towards the same vision of agri-food sustainability (Konefal, 2018).
There are two major conflicting framings and approaches. The mainstream view is that sustainability can be achieved through technological innovation and increased market efficiency. Konefal (2018) describes this “technology fix” framing as “the sustainable intensification approach”. This framing is indeed exemplified in the case of CSA. The alternative view is that unsustainability is intrinsic to the current system, and that we need a fundamental transformation of the system. This framing is referred to as “the agroecological approach” (Konefal, 2018). Needless to say, sustainability should be understood in the broadest sense, including ecological health, economic viability and welfare, social justice and empowerment, and cultural diversity and creativity in an integrative way (Thiele, 2016). Similarly, agroecology, usually conceived as environmentally sustainable farming practices, is also aiming to enhance economic, social and cultural diversity as well as the empowerment of producers and consumers. Such a broad conception, however, is not reflected upon in the mainstream framing of sustainability.
Given these contested framings, it is necessary to look at politics and power relations within the concept of sustainability and behind its implementation. This is why this paper uses Political Economy, approaching sustainability issues from a “power lens” perspective, a way of identifying and uncovering different sources and exercises of power in the structure and processes observed (Fuchs et al., 2016). Political Economy as a discipline can be defined as an interdisciplinary approach that analyses how political processes affect and are affected by economic processes. It pays attention to the uneven distribution of political and market power, especially with critical insight into the increasing role of business as a political actor (Fuchs, 2007; Mikler, 2018). Here, politics covers both the formal (governmental) and the informal processes of the interactions and negotiations among stakeholders.
According to Gramsci (1971), capitalist power relations are expressed both through coercion and consent, and the sources of power are both material (control over economic resources) and immaterial (control over knowledge, ideas and norms). Power as such is also described as hegemony, which is exercised not only in the political and economic spheres, but also in civil society. For example, this can be demonstrated through media, education institutions, religious organizations, or even community groups, where dominant ideologies are accepted by subordinated people as common interests. Consent to them is produced and reproduced as social norms in people’s everyday perceptions and practices.
The Neo-Gramscian school applies Gramscian theory and concepts to uncover how hegemonic actors exercise their material and immaterial power in the formation and development of the international regimes on concerned global issues (Levy, 1997; Newell and Levy, 2006; Newell and Taylor, 2018). This approach is useful to conceptualize the situation of a dominant coalition, or historical bloc, of powerful actors. A historical bloc of hegemony can be maintained and reinforced by exercising material, institutional and discursive power. Discursive power is the ability to influence policies and political processes through the shaping of knowledge, ideas and norms. Institutional power can be exercised by forming coalitions among powerful business actors and other legitimate actors such as the state, intellectual elites and civil society groups to protect and consolidate their hegemony. Material power can work as an enabler, to exercise discursive and institutional power, with the source derived from their control over production, finance, and technology, to secure their existing and future market positions.
CSA is more than just a collection of agricultural technologies and practices that emerge in a neutral political space. Rather, it is a highly political model of agriculture that operates on the horizon of the current dominant agri-food regime. CSA is privileged and given priority over other alternative agricultural approaches. Such a critical insight is only possible by looking at CSA through a “power lens.”
First, we need to explore the discursive politics of CSA. How the idea of CSA has emerged, defined, developed, legitimized, and mainstreamed. Second, we need to examine the institutional politics surrounding CSA. How hegemonic actors have successfully created institutional spaces in which a particular agenda for CSA has become a common agenda. Third, we need to identify the sources of material power of hegemonic actors that enable them to exercise their discursive and institutional power to further strengthen their hegemonic positions. How and which actors are successfully framing their technology products and services as legitimate solutions to climate change and how and which actors are successfully forming coalitions to legitimize their business strategies, turning climate change crises into new opportunities for capital accumulation.
(1) Discursive Politics of CSAThe underlying idea of CSA has existed since the late 1990s (e.g., the “doubly green revolution” concept stressed conservation and productivity), but the official introduction of CSA dates back to 2010, with its definition first given by FAO, then endorsed by World Bank and other institutions (Newell & Taylor, 2018). Its definition as the “triple-wins” of increased productivity, enhanced resilience, and reduced emissions, is not necessarily required to be holistic or integrative; it does not preclude selective picking and choosing what is beneficial for powerful corporate actors. Therefore, a wide range of agricultural technologies and practices can be included in the CSA concept, ranging from agroecological practices (e.g., agroforestry, intercropping, rainwater harvesting, native crop management) to the “efficient” and “responsible” use of chemical fertilizer, to the promotion of no-till cultivation of herbicide-tolerant GM crops with herbicide applications, and to the development of drought-tolerant GM crops.
Taylor (2018) problematizes the following aspects in the CSA framework. First, the framework does not give a clear definition or criteria for “productivity”, and therefore, political implications and socio-ecological consequences, which are inevitably resulted when measured through different criteria, are overlooked in their discourse. Second, it has not given a clear definition of “resilience” as well, and therefore, different consequences in each context and possible tensions between differently positioned social groups are overlooked in their discourse. Third, the CSA discourse is often characterized by a collection of “success stories,” which tends to be removed from their historical contexts and socio-political and ecological complexities. Last but not least, it focuses only on the production process, and therefore unsustainable practices in distribution and consumption processes are left unquestioned. Overall, these characteristics and orientation of CSA can be framed as a “de-politicization” of the inherently complex, social, cultural, political, ethical and ecological meanings of sustainable transformation (Swyngedouw, 2015; Duncan and Claeys, 2018).
(2) Institutional Politics of CSAThe institutional politics of CSA can be illustrated using a map of stakeholder communities (Figure 1). As a flagship organization of CSA governance, the Global Alliance for Climate Smart Agriculture was established in 2014, with FAO at its core, but in reality, multinational agribusiness corporations, especially the fertilizer industry such as Yara International, Mosaic and their industry associations, has played a leading role2. Such global governance bodies focusing on specific issues are commonly referred to as multistakeholder initiatives (Cheyns and Riisgaard, 2014; Hisano, 2019), involving relevant UN agencies, international financial and development assistance institutions, international environmental NGOs, international farmers’ organizations, universities and research institutions, foundations and philanthropy organizations, as well as multinational corporations and industrial associations.
CSA Complex: A map of stakeholder communities
Source: Newell and Taylor (2018), p. 115, modified by the author.
Notably, the World Economic Forum, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, their member corporations, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation work closely to establish several public-private partnerships to demonstrate their influence. Aside from, but related to, the Global Alliance for CSA, there are several CSA-related multistakeholder initiatives, such as the Cool Farm Alliance, the European Carbon+ Farming Coalition, the Sustainable Agriculture Initiative Platform, and Farmers for a Sustainable Future. Through these numerous initiatives, the idea of CSA has been defined, shared, institutionalized, and disseminated in favor of powerful corporate actors.
A practice of governance that brings multiple stakeholders together is framed as “multistakeholderism” (TNI, 2019; FS4P, 2021), in which participating stakeholders, such as business and civil society actors, are treated as equal and can make decisions on standards and develop policies and programs as if they had governmental authority. However, it tends to overlook power imbalances and actual (a lack of) legitimacy, thus, allows powerful transnational corporations, instead of legitimate public authorities, to influence international and national policy making, financing, and governance while promoting corporate-friendly solutions. The latest example of multistakeholderism was the UN Food Systems Summit held in September 2021. It was convened and hosted by the UN. However, it has been heavily criticized by civil society and peasant/indigenous peoples’ organizations for being “captured” by powerful corporate actors to pursue their interest while undermining human rights, food sovereignty, and agroecological perspectives (Canfield et al., 2021).
(3) Material Power behind CSAThe third pillar of hegemony is material power, derived from their control over economic resources. Agrochemical, seed, fertilizer, and farm machinery industries in particular influence discourse and institutional spaces of CSA. These agricultural input markets are oligopolistic and controlled by just a handful of global corporations3 (ETC Group, 2019). We have seen a series of mega mergers and acquisitions (M&A) over the past several years, including Bayer/Monsanto, DuPont/DowChemical4, and ChemChina/Syngenta. Alongside these mega M&A, is another wave of M&A involving farm tech start-ups and strategic alliances with ICT giants (Jiang, 2021).
Agribusiness actors engaged in M&A are aiming to move into the rapidly expanding market for digital farming products and services, such as those for soil analysis, crop diagnosis, and weather analysis using satellite imagery and those for big data analyses and business planning using AI and machine learning. A typical example of digital agriculture is an automated tractor equipped with GPS and remote sensing tools connected to cloud systems and user terminal devices. These giant agribusiness corporations have bought up several of these key farm tech start-ups and have launched their digital platforms to involve and connect as many customers as possible, geared at making their platforms the de-facto standard (Table 1).
| Company | Acquired FarmTech Startup | Digital Platform(s) | Partnership(s) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bayer/Monsanto | Climate Corporation (2013) | Climate FieldView | John Deere, CNH, AGCO, Agrium |
| Syngenta | AgConnections (2015) | Land.db, AgriEdge, Cropwise, Cropio | Nutrien, Simplot, Land O’Lakes |
| Corteva | Granular (2017) | Granular Insights/Business/Agronomy | John Deere |
| BASF | ZedX (2017) | xarvio Digital Farming Solutions | John Deere, Nutrien, Bosch |
Source: Author’s elaboration based on corporate information.
The fast-growing market for digital agriculture is indeed an extension of the conventional markets. Yet, it has been touted as a key solution to climate change, while accommodating the impasse of the industrial agriculture model without any actual structural transformation. As a result, agribusiness corporations are able to keep their hegemonic position in this era of climate crises. It is claimed that digital tools and data help farmers make informed decisions about where and when to apply fertilizers, pesticides, and water in order to grow more crops with fewer resources and less environmental impact (Kelly and Rankin, 2020).
The concept of “regenerative agriculture” is also often used in the same context. The idea and practices of regenerative agriculture must be progressive, transformative, and beyond the limitations of the already appropriated concept of “sustainable agriculture” (Duncan et al., 2020). However, according to agrochemical companies, the dubious combination of herbicide-tolerant GM crops, no-tillage, herbicide/fungicide applications, and precision farming technologies is considered a typical menu of regenerative agriculture to improve soil health and carbon sequestration5, which is also linked to the controversial model of carbon trading6, then fit into the concept of CSA. Here, a depoliticizing discursive strategy is evident in that the socio-political implications and ecological complexities are removed from the idea of regenerative agriculture, which is instead reduced to a technical practice of soil improvement and carbon sequestration (Taylor, 2018; Wozniacka, 2019).
There might be a possibility that these strategies will result in the reduction of pesticides and chemical fertilizers, more efficient operation of tractors, more sustainable use of land and water while mitigating climate change. However, CSA may also pose more concerns rather than contributing to the fight against climate change (Zundel and Ribeiro, 2018; Rotz et al., 2019; FoE Europe, 2020; GRAIN, 2021). Firstly, there is a concern regarding the digital divide. Digital agriculture requires capital-intensive technologies, infrastructure, and expertise. This may inevitably exclude smallholder farmers or otherwise lead to dispossession of farmers’ autonomy and local knowledge. Secondly, the algorithm of digital agriculture is embedded in and tailored to industrial monocropping agriculture. It therefore excludes agroecological, multifunctional farmers despite the potential of big data for alternative farming7. Finally, as we have already been witnessing, ongoing competition for this market further creates an impetus towards the concentration and consolidation in the agri-food industries.
By exercising discursive, institutional, and material power, hegemonic actors are turning climate change crises into new opportunities for capital accumulation, in which their preferred technologies and strategies are packaged and promoted as solutions to climate change. This reminds us of Harriet Friedmann’s (2005) conception of a “corporate-environmental food regime”, in which agri-food corporations selectively respond to and appropriate growing social and environmental concerns that have arose in the interstices of the second food regime. Prause et al. (2021), based on their deeper and broader understanding of the ongoing digitalization of the agri-food system, which extends along every step of the food commodity chain from agricultural inputs and farm operations to retail and consumption, contend that digital technologies are contributing to transitions to and shaping the organization of the third food regime.
Emphasizing the hegemonic power of corporate actors in the context of CSA is not meant to suggest that such hegemonic power is absolute or deterministic. As Gramscian scholars have cautiously noted, hegemony is neither total nor uncontested (Levy, 1997). Instead, in the process of accommodation and compromise needed for the hegemony to be accepted by the broader society, some room for maneuver and space for agency can be created for alternative and counter-hegemonic actors to engage in a Gramscian sense of “war of position, in which a dynamic kaleidoscope of shifting coalitions, ideologies, and market positions occasionally presents windows of opportunity” (Levy, 1997: p. 141), as already demonstrated at the local territorial level.
One of the fundamental questions in the social sciences is how to understand the relations between human agency and the social structure. This fundamental question also requires us to think about the interactions between the local and the global and how the global is constituting and being constituted by the local. We, agrarian and rural development scholars, opt for the local rather than the global; more fascinated by place-based initiatives and encouraging stories on the ground rather than discouraging and dystopian pictures of the dominant global agri-food system. However, both sides of the social sciences regarding the agency-structure dichotomy—structure-oriented political economy and agency-oriented rural sociology8—more or less agree that local alternatives need to be contextualized by understanding the bigger picture, i.e., the global structure. Alternative imagination never comes from a vacuum. New forms of resistance can only be organized and materialized if the narrative behind the dominant food regime is understood (Vivero-Pol et al., 2019).
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