The Political Implications of “Directive Principles of Fundamental State Policies” in the Context of Thailand’s Constitution

Abstract

This study examines the political implication of “Directive Principles of Fundamental State Policies” in the context of Thailand’s constitution, in comparison with other countries’ constitutions. Democratization in Thailand accelerated in the 1990s. As pointed out in many previous studies, the urban middle class and traditional elite began increasingly to express their frustration with the democratically elected government, citing, among others, corrupt politicians and electoral fraud as problems. A new constitution was promulgated in 1997 with the ostensible goal of resolving these issues, and this goal has been inherited by the current 2007 constitution. “Constitutionalism” was declared a keyword of the political reform, and it was expected that the judiciary would be the institution responsible for resolving these issues. Careful examination of the 1997 and 2007 constitutions reveals that they codify various efforts aimed at constraining the National Assembly, comprising representatives of the citizens, and the Council of Ministers. In contrast to Western-style constitutionalism, in which the constitution and laws are employed to protect citizens’ rights and to prevent the arbitrary use of state power while respecting democracy in the sense of rule by the majority, Thailand’s constitution is structured in such a way that it enables arbitrary restriction of state power, and particularly that of the Council of Ministers, by the judiciary. Further, I point out that, as such, the 1997 and 2007 constitutions both serve to suppress the popular will that is expressed through elections.