Abstract
This paper draws on the arguments of the philosopher Wittgenstein to argue for altruism as changing in language games, rather than altruism as a hardened language game. I will introduce and examine the so-called "rule-following paradox" and "familial resemblance," which are often discussed in Wittgenstein's research, and confirm the "converging" and "diverging" nature of language games in the language practice of communication with others. It will be pointed out that the convergence/divergence overlaps with the moral/ethical distinction in altruism. Furthermore, it will be shown that the "hardening" or convergence of language games is the basis for the deviant and divergent use of language, and that the subject must first learn the typical language games employed by the language community. The typical language game of altruism is morality, which can certainly be catalogued, manualized, and listed in a public form. However, by confirming the accidental nature of gift-giving, which is considered to be a branch of altruism, it is shown that altruism as ethics cannot be foreseen.
