Abstract
This article examines whether utilitarianism justifies wildlife management by hunting (Hereafter, such hunting is referred to as “therapeutic hunting”). People kill certain animals administratively to secure the health of the ecosystem and/or to preserve the aggregate welfare of the target species. In either case, such intervention is considered essential, and utilitarianism is often used to support these arguments. This is probably because this form of hunting is considered as increasing overall welfare, i. e., achieving the goals of utilitarianism, since it is done to prevent predictable undesirable outcomes, considering the impact on the whole and the value entities that are prioritized.
However, this article points out that, contrary to such a view, attempts to justify therapeutic hunting by using utilitarianism as a support are unlikely to succeed. The conventional argument in defense of hunting is a partial and truncated use of utilitarianism and overlooks several factors that should be taken into account. For example, hunting is not a method that considers the welfare of animals, nor is it a rational method. Also, if hunting based on utilitarianism is interpreted correctly, it is clear that there are fewer situations in which it is conducted than is usually thought. In addition, the fact that alternatives to hunting exist makes it difficult to justify therapeutic hunting through utilitarianism.
Certainly, the utilitarian principle theoretically condones the killing of wild animals in some aspects, but several conditions must be met to do so. Through a detailed analysis on these factors, this research intends to describe that it is not as easy to defend therapeutic hunting by the principle of utilitarianism as is generally accepted.
