Host: Japan Society for Fuzzy Theory and Intelligent Informatics (SOFT)
Name : 36th Fuzzy System Symposium
Number : 36
Location : [in Japanese]
Date : September 07, 2020 - September 09, 2020
Indian Poker is a poker game in which players hold their cards to their foreheads. This is so that players can see all of their opponent’s hands but not their own. One of the most important strategies in poker is the art of bluffing, in which a player makes or raises a bet without having the best hand, in order to fool an opponent into folding. Therefore, (Indian) poker is a game of incomplete information; players do not have knowledge about the payoffs and strategies of the other players. In this study, we discuss Indian poker as an incomplete information game, and devote to find some Nash equilibrium in the game. As a result of the study, we show that there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, but it does have a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.