A tentative assumption on application of historical institutionalism to European Union study

―A case of the single market programme―

Abstract

　　This paper attempts to modify historical institutionalism’s philosophy/framework so that its insights might fit into European Union (EU) study. After the launch of the Single Market Programme and ratification of the Single European Act, theoretical approaches regarding the EU developed. Historical institutionalism was one such approach and highlighted the long-term effect of EU institutions on member states. However, historical institutionalism accepts some assumptions of its rival scholarship concerning states’ preferences and behaviors, especially those of liberal intergovernmentalism. This puts constraints on the arguments developed by historical institutionalism.

　　This paper clarifies such constraints in the context of development of theoretical arguments and attempts to overcome them by modifying the arguments made by historical institutionalism so they might fit into EU study. This modified version of historical institutionalism emphasizes that once member states concluded the Treaty of Rome to seek a European solution instead of a national one, noncompliance or failure to implement treaty provisions could not remain. While EU institutions obey the treaty and some transnational actors find opportunities in its provisions, member states do not always comply, sometimes taking measures that reserve national governments’ noncompliance. However, once European solutions are demanded and concluded by member states, they cannot achieve their goals without them and reservation measures and practices must be abandoned. This paper highlights that the initial institutional choice matters because it builds momentum toward integration.

　　This revised version of historical institutionalism avoids some critiques directed toward the original philosophy/framework, such as post hoc explanation and lack of testable hypothesis.