Two Interpretations of Madhyamakāvatāra 6.34 in Tibet

Abstract

Candrakīrti (ca. 600–650) states in his Madhyamakāvatāra 6.34 to the effect that, if an entity were established by way of its character, emptiness (śūnyatā) would be the cause of destruction of the entity, and that, if so, the conventional reality (saṃvṛti) of such an entity would bear analysis by reasoning. It is evident that Candrakīrti here criticizes another school’s tenets. Who is the target of criticism? There are at least two interpretations in Tibet regarding this question.

Tsong kha pa (1357–1419) and his followers of the Dge lugs pa argue that the Svātantrika school is the target of criticism since it accepts, on the conventional level (tha snyad), the existence of things established by way of their character (rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa). On the other hand, Shākya mchog ldan (1428–1507) and Go rams pa (1429–80), both belonging to the Sa skya pa, reject the Dge lugs pa’s interpretation on the basis of their own understanding of the Madhyamakāvatāra and its autocommentary. They argue instead that the Mind-Only school is the target of criticism here. The underlying idea of the Sa skya pa argument is that there is no ideological difference between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika.

The present paper discusses the two interpretations of Madhyamakāvatāra 6.34 with special emphasis on the problem of “own character” (rang mtshan), which is discussed in detail in Shākya mchog ldan’s Dbu ma rnam nges.