The Three Kinds of Inferences Found in Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā

Abstract

The first chapter of Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā, famous for its strong criticism of the independent inference (svatantrānumāna) method adopted by Bhāviveka and its justification for Buddhapālita’s reductio ad absurdum (prasaṅga) method, shows large discrepancies with Dignāga in the theory of inferences, but bears a striking resemblance to the three kinds of inferences theory usually known to be found in Kuiji’s commentary on the Nyāyapraveśa, Yinming ru zhengli lun shu 因明入正理論疏 (T. 1628 [XXXII] 1b11–12, 25–27). Due to a neglect of the Chinese texts, few former studies have noticed the similarities between Candrakīrti and Kuiji, and some even imprudently misunderstood Dignāga’s svārthānumāna, Candrakīrti’s svārthānumāna and Kuiji’s inference for self (zi biliang 自比量) as the same. This paper, therefore, examines the possibilities of explaining Candrakīrti’s texts with the three kinds of inferences theory of Kuiji, and proves that Candrakīrti’s conscious development of his theory of inferences truly has much in common with Kuiji’s idea.