On the Sarvāstivāda Theory of the Existence of Form (saṃsthāna): The Arguments for the existence of saṃsthāna in Saṃghabhadra’s Nyāyānusāra

Abstract

In the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKBh), Vasubandhu maintains that form (saṃsthāna) is non-existent mainly on the following two grounds: 1) saṃsthāna would be cognized by two different sense organs (indriya), i.e. eyes (cakṣus) and skin (kāya) if saṃsthāna were to exist; 2) the atoms (paramāṇu) of saṃsthāna do not have their own specific characteristics (svalakṣaṇa). Against this, Saṃghabhadra raises three objections in the Nyāyānusāra. First, saṃsthāna is a different reality from color (varṇa) because it is cognized as such. Second, the forms ‘long, short’ and so on are cognized in two steps: the first step is the perception of saṃsthāna by visual consciousness (cakṣurvijñāna), and this saṃsthāna is existent; the second step is the cognition of ‘long’ and so on by mental consciousness (manovijñāna), and this ‘long’ and so on is non-existent. Therefore saṃsthāna is not cognized by the body. Finally, each atom cannot be apprehended by direct perception (pratyakṣa). It is for this reason that each atom does not appear either as colors like ‘blue, yellow’ and so on or as forms like ‘long, short’ and so on.