Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu)
Online ISSN : 1884-0051
Print ISSN : 0019-4344
ISSN-L : 0019-4344
The Causal Distinction of Cognition in Prasastapadabhasya
Hirofumi MIURA
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Keywords: Vaisesika, Prasastapada
JOURNAL FREE ACCESS

2005 Volume 54 Issue 1 Pages 330-326,1266

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Abstract
Prasastapada, who organized the Vaisesika philosophy, constructed his epistemology following in the tradition of Vaisesikasutra (A. D. 1c.). He also adopted the causal theory of non-existence of effects (asat-karya-vada) in his epistemological system. In this paper, the author intends to consider the relationship between Prasastapada's epistemology and causality in his main work, Prasastapadabhasya (A. D. 6c.).
We can see the three kinds of causes in asat-karya-vada. The first is the intimate cause (samavayi-karana), the second is the non-intimate cause (asamavayi-karana), the third is the efficient cause (nimitta-karana). These causes and their expressions correspond to the distinction of cognition in Prasastapada's epistemology.
In direct cognition (pratyaksa), non-intimate cause is the contact with atman and manas, and efficient cause is expressed with the term apeksa. But non-intimate cause means to see the sign (linga) in inference (anumana). In memory (smrti), non-intimate cause also means the ‹special› contact with atman and manas. In the saint's cognition (arsajñana), both causes are expressed in ablative form.
From these points, we can conclude that Prasastapada's epistemology parallels the distinction of causes in his causality.
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